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Population Aging and the Labor Market 
 
Abstract. Under the demographic context of population aging and considering its 
implications on the age composition of the labor force, this thesis investigates the labor 
market opportunities experienced by older individuals and additionally questions whether a 
specific form of flexible work arrangement would help to expand older employees’ working 
career, contributing this way to an active aging. Due to the fear of prospective labor supply 
shortages, as well as to issues related to the sustainability of Social Security systems, there 
exists a growing concern towards increasing the labor force participation of older workers. 
Therefore, opportunities must be created and/or made accessible to these individuals in 
order for them to find attractiveness in postponing the passage to inactivity. 
For the study of labor market opportunities, using a longitudinal employer-employee data 
set, I concentrate on hiring and promotion prospects faced by the elderly. First, I make use 
of a fractional logit model to evaluate the hiring opportunities at the reach of older 
individuals. I find that although Portuguese firms employ older workers they have a 
preference for hiring younger individuals and this preference results from the fact that 
employers seem to favor long-term employment relationships with their employees. In 
effect, empirical results show a statistically significant negative association between the 
share of the workforce with more than 5 years of tenure and the share of older workers’ 
hired. 
Second, the research on older workers’ opportunities for promotion departs from a sample 
of new firms and their employees. Survival analysis suggests that younger employees 
experience shorter times to promotion than older workers and, therefore, the latter face a 
smaller likelihood of promotion. 
Both the above researches highlight the lack of opportunities for older individuals. They 
are passed over for hiring and promotion because of age. This calls for the need of policy 
intervention to incentive firms to hire and provide career development chances for those 
that are older. 
As a means to extend older individuals’ participation in the labor force, another dimension 
of active aging policies focus on the adoption of flexibility in working arrangements. Thus, 
in a third and final research, the underlying question is whether working hours’ flexibility is 
associated with delayed exit from the labor market. Using a novel dataset from the 2006 
Portuguese Labor Force Survey and employing duration models I find that reducing hours 
of work before retirement is associated with early exits from the labor force. A reduction of 
v 
hours of work seems to signal the wish to retire sooner rather than to announce the desire 
of retirement postponement. Hence, flexibility in hours of work appears not to be an 
effective instrument to promote active aging. 
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Envelhecimento Populacional e o Mercado de Trabalho 
 
Resumo. Perante um contexto demográfico de envelhecimento populacional e tendo em 
consideração as suas implicações ao nível da composição etária da força de trabalho, esta 
tese investiga as oportunidades ao alcance dos trabalhadores mais velhos no mercado de 
trabalho e analisa o impacto de uma forma particular de flexibilidade nas relações laborais 
sobre a extensão da carreira dos trabalhadores idosos, contribuindo deste modo para o 
envelhecimento activo da população. Devido ao receio de uma futura escassez da oferta de 
trabalho, bem como a questões relacionadas com a sustentabilidade dos sistemas de 
Segurança Social, existe uma preocupação crescente com o aumento da participação dos 
trabalhadores mais velhos na força de trabalho. Como tal, devem ser criadas oportunidades 
para que estes trabalhadores sejam atraídos no sentido de permanecerem por mais tempo 
na força de trabalho, adiando deste modo a sua reforma. 
Para estudar as oportunidades no mercado de trabalho, nomeadamente as oportunidades 
de contratação e promoção disponíveis para os trabalhadores mais maduros, são utilizados 
dados longitudinais provenientes dos Quadros de Pessoal. Em primeiro lugar, recorre-se a um 
modelo logit fraccional para avaliar as oportunidades de contratação ao alcance dos 
indivíduos mais idosos. Verifica-se que apesar das empresas portuguesas empregarem 
colaboradores mais velhos aquelas preferem contratar trabalhadores mais jovens. Esta 
preferência resulta do facto de os empregadores elegerem favorecer relações laborais de 
longo prazo com os seus colaboradores. Os resultados empíricos revelam uma relação 
negativa e estatisticamente significativa entre a proporção da força de trabalho com mais de 
5 anos de antiguidade e a proporção de trabalhadores mais velhos recrutados. 
Em segundo lugar, o estudo das oportunidades de promoção dos trabalhadores mais 
velhos tem por base uma amostra constituída por empresas novas e pelos seus 
colaboradores. A utilização de modelos de duração sugere que os trabalhadores mais novos 
enfrentam tempos para a promoção mais curtos que os trabalhadores mais velhos e, 
portanto, os últimos apresentam uma menor probabilidade de serem promovidos. 
Os dois estudos acima mencionados evidenciam a ausência de oportunidades para os mais 
velhos. Pela sua idade, estes surgem preteridos no tocante a oportunidades de recrutamento 
e promoção. Esta situação chama a atenção para a necessidade de uma intervenção de 
política no sentido de incentivar as empresas a apostar no recrutamento e no 
desenvolvimento de oportunidades para os indivíduos mais idosos.  
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Com o intuito de prolongar a participação dos indivíduos mais velhos no mercado laboral, 
o âmbito das políticas de envelhecimento activo passa pela adopção de maior flexibilidade 
nas relações de trabalho. Logo, numa análise final, questiona-se se a flexibilidade do horário 
de trabalho está associada com o adiamento da saída do mercado de trabalho. Usando uma 
nova base de dados proveniente do módulo “Transição para a Reforma” do Inquérito ao 
Emprego e utilizando uma análise de duração, demonstra-se que a redução do horário de 
trabalho antes da passagem para a reforma está associada a saídas precoces da força de 
trabalho. A redução do horário de trabalho parece sinalizar a intenção de saída antecipada 
do mercado de trabalho em vez de anunciar o desejo de adiamento da reforma. Portanto, a 
flexibilidade do horário de trabalho não parece ser um instrumento eficaz na promoção do 
envelhecimento activo. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
This thesis was motivated by the growing attention devoted, in recent years, to the 
labor market participation of older people due to the phenomenon of demographic aging. 
Even though the last years have been characterized by limited economic and 
employment growth, one of the most outstanding features of current trends in European 
labor markets has been the increase in the employment of older individuals. Nevertheless, 
compared to countries such as the United States or Japan, the labor force participation of 
older European still remains low and many workers continue to exit the labor market 
before age 65. Portugal, like the majority of the European Union countries, also needs to 
improve activity and employment rates for older workers by international standards; 
furthermore, early retirement is very common in the Portuguese economy. 
In the context of population aging, increasing the participation and employment rates 
for older workers is fundamental to support economic growth and to guarantee the 
sustainability of Social Security systems. Raising the employment rate for older workers is 
essential to prevent labor supply shortages and to make full use of the available resources. 
The enforcement of active aging policies, which aim at the extension of working 
careers, must however pay particular attention to the promotion of employment 
opportunities throughout working lives, strengthening incentives to work longer. To 
respond to the challenge of an aging population and increase the labor market participation 
of older people, it is crucial to create the conditions to support individuals who desire to 
take advantage of the opportunities provided by longer and more productive lives. 
For the success of active aging policies, governments and social partners working side 
by side can contribute to developing the skills and employability of older individuals while 
maintaining the health, motivation and capacities of workers as they age. Changes are 
required in working conditions and employment opportunities in order to incorporate an 
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aging workforce. Also, age discrimination on recruitment and/or on career development 
opportunities must be eliminated to provide equal employment prospects regardless of age. 
This thesis studies the employment opportunities available for older workers in the 
Portuguese labor market, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of active aging policies in 
attracting and motivating older people. In particular, it focuses on three dimensions of 
employment: hiring, promotion and working hours’ flexibility. 
This thesis is structured into four main chapters that, although treated independently, 
share a common denominator: older workers and their labor market situation. Chapter 2 
develops the motivation, concentrating on the economic consequences of population aging 
and addressing the prospective labor market challenges and opportunities. This chapter 
highlights the impact on economic growth of an aging population, mainly due to the effect 
on overall employment levels of a reduction in the working-age population. Also, it stresses 
the relevance of raising the labor force participation of older people to prevent economic 
slowdown and the increasing pressure on public spending. 
The remainder of the thesis is mainly empirical. Chapters 3 and 4 use the same matched 
employer-employee data set to study, respectively, the hiring and promotion opportunities 
offered by firms to older workers. 
Chapter 3 evaluates the hiring opportunities of older workers in the Portuguese labor 
market. Labor market mobility in terms of new hires is lower for older workers than for 
prime-age workers. Previous literature on older workers’ hiring opportunities suggests that 
older workers do not face the same hiring opportunities as younger workers. In effect, 
empirical evidence shows that firms employ older workers but when they hire new workers 
they prefer to hire younger ones.  
High activity and employment rates confirm a strong attachment of Portuguese older 
workers to the labor market. Nevertheless, the country presents one of the lowest hiring 
rates for workers aged 55 to 64 meaning that workers in that age group face severe 
difficulties in what recruitment is concerned. So, if an older worker loses his/her job 
he/she may face major constraints to get back to work. Therefore, studying the hiring 
opportunities for Portuguese older workers should raise relevant questions concerning 
their labor market situation and the potential policy intervention of governments. The main 
contribution of this research relies on the fact that it employs fractional logit models on 
panel data in order to study the hiring opportunities of older workers. Previous empirical 
studies use estimation techniques that are not appropriate and do not comply with the 
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fractional nature of the dependent variable. Also, no such work has been done for the 
Portuguese labor market. 
Findings suggest that firms employ older workers but prefer to hire younger workers, 
corroborating previous empirical literature. Therefore, once unemployed, older individuals 
find severe constraints to get back into employment. 
In Chapter 4 I use a panel on new firms and their employees to study the promotion 
opportunities of older workers within the same firm. The underlying issue is whether 
workers are passed over for promotion because of age. After defining the promotion event, 
a first glimpse at both the distribution and rates of promotions by age group at hire hints 
on uneven prospects for older employees. 
The empirical setting takes advantage of the event characteristic of the data. Both non-
parametric and parametric duration models’ results show that younger employees 
experience shorter times to promotion than older workers and, therefore, the latter face a 
smaller likelihood of promotion. This result is even stronger when modeling just the 
survival time to first promotion. 
Chapter 5 discusses the transition from professional life into retirement, using a new 
data set from the 2006 Portuguese Labor Force Survey. Identifying the determinants of the 
decision to retire is crucial when policy makers attempt to postpone labor market exit of 
older cohorts. The aim of this chapter is to study the impact of a voluntary reduction in 
hours of work, before retirement, on the moment of exit from the labor force. It is often 
suggested that adaptable working arrangements in the form of flexibility in hours of work 
could be a useful measure to postpone retirement. Under this consideration, a reduction in 
hours of work before complete withdrawal from the labor force would be expected to be 
associated with retirement at later ages. Nevertheless, results prove otherwise. I find that 
reducing hours of work before retirement is associated with early exits from the labor 
force. A reduction of hours of work seems to signal the wish to retire sooner rather than to 
announce the desire of retirement postponement. Several robustness tests confirm these 
results. 
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes summarizing the main results presented in the three 
previous chapters and focusing on the policy implications of the analysis. Furthermore, it 
addresses some guidelines for future research. 
4 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Population aging: consequences, challenges and 
opportunities 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the economic impact of population aging and focuses on the 
major challenges that developed countries face. These challenges may as well be viewed as 
opportunities. An opportunity to improve labor market conditions for older individuals but 
also an opportunity to enhance economic growth. 
This descriptive chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 highlights the demographic 
trends in developed countries while Section 2.3 puts in evidence the economic 
consequences of population aging. The next section draws attention to the importance of 
increasing participation rates of older people in order to avoid labor force shortages caused 
by demographic aging. Section 2.5 concentrates on the labor market opportunities that may 
be driven by an aging population. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 2.6. 
 
2.2 The demographic framework 
As a result of both the increase in longevity and the decrease in fertility rates, expressed 
in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, developed countries face the aging of their population. Health 
conditions’ improvements contributed significantly for raising life expectancy at birth, 
while women’s increasing involvement in the labor market may be considered both as a 
cause and a consequence of the reduction in fertility rates. 
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Table 2.1: Life expectancy at birth, 1960-2004 
Country 1960(a) 1970(b) 1980 1990 1995 2000 2004(c) 
Austria 68.7 70.0 72.6 75.5 76.6 78.1 79.3 
Belgium 70.6 71.0 73.4 76.1 77.3 78.3 78.8 
Denmark 72.4 73.3 74.3 74.9 75.3 76.9 77.6 
Finland 69.0 70.8 73.4 74.9 76.5 77.6 78.8 
France 70.3 72.2 74.3 76.9 77.9 79.0 80.3 
Germany 69.6 70.4 72.9 75.2 76.5 78.0 78.6 
Greece 69.9 72.0 74.5 77.1 77.7 78.1 79.0 
Ireland 70.0 71.2 72.9 74.9 75.7 76.5 78.3 
Italy 69.8 72.0 74.0 76.9 78.1 79.6 79.7 
Luxembourg 69.4 70.3 72.5 75.4 76.6 78.0 78.0 
Netherlands 73.5 73.7 75.9 77.0 77.5 78.0 79.2 
Portugal 64.0 67.5 71.5 73.9 75.2 76.6 77.4 
Spain 69.8 72.0 75.6 76.8 77.9 79.2 80.5 
Sweden 73.1 74.7 75.8 77.6 78.8 79.7 80.6 
United Kingdom 70.8 71.9 73.2 75.7 76.6 77.8 78.5 
EU15 average 70.1 71.5 73.8 75.9 77.0 78.1 79.0 
Japan 67.8 72.0 76.1 78.9 79.6 81.2 82.1 
OECD average 68.5 70.3 72.7 74.9 76.0 77.3 78.3 
United States 69.9 70.9 73.7 75.3 75.7 76.8 77.5 
Source: OECD Factbook 2007: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics. 
Notes: (a) The value reported for Italy refers to 1961; (b) The value reported for Italy refers to 1971; (c) The values 
reported for Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, United Kingdom and United States refer to 2003. 
 
Table 2.2: Fertility rates, 1970-2004 
Country 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Austria 2.29 1.82 1.62 1.47 1.45 1.40 1.34 1.42 
Belgium 2.25 1.74 1.68 1.51 1.62 1.55 1.66 1.64 
Denmark 1.95 1.92 1.55 1.45 1.67 1.80 1.77 1.78 
Finland 1.83 1.68 1.63 1.65 1.78 1.81 1.73 1.80 
France 2.47 1.93 1.95 1.81 1.78 1.70 1.88 1.91 
Germany 2.03 1.48 1.56 1.37 1.45 1.25 1.38 1.36 
Greece 2.39 2.38 2.21 1.68 1.39 1.32 1.27 1.29 
Ireland 3.93 3.40 3.25 2.50 2.11 1.83 1.89 1.93 
Italy 2.42 2.20 1.64 1.42 1.33 1.18 1.23 1.33 
Luxembourg 1.98 1.55 1.49 1.38 1.61 1.69 1.76 1.70 
Netherlands 2.57 1.66 1.60 1.51 1.62 1.53 1.72 1.73 
Portugal 2.83 2.58 2.18 1.72 1.57 1.40 1.55 1.40 
Spain 2.90 2.80 2.20 1.64 1.36 1.18 1.24 1.32 
Sweden 1.92 1.77 1.68 1.74 2.13 1.73 1.54 1.75 
United Kingdom 2.43 1.81 1.90 1.79 1.83 1.70 1.65 1.76 
EU15 average 2.41 2.05 1.88 1.64 1.65 1.54 1.57 1.61 
Japan 2.10 1.90 1.80 1.76 1.54 1.42 1.36 1.29 
OECD average 2.72 2.38 2.14 1.89 1.86 1.69 1.63 1.62 
United States 2.48 1.77 1.84 1.84 2.08 2.02 2.06 2.05 
Source: OECD Factbook 2007: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics. 
Note: Fertility rate computed as the average number of children born to women aged 15 to 49. 
 
Although present in all developed countries, the aging demographic feature is more 
prominent in some countries than others. In European countries like Portugal, Greece, 
Italy or Spain, and in Asian countries such as Japan, estimates show that, by 2050, more 
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than 30% of the population will be aged 65 and over. It corresponds to a 100% growth 
over a 50 year period. Other countries like Turkey, Mexico or the United States experience 
aging at a slower pace: 20% or less of their population is expected to have 65 or more years 
of age by 2050 (OECD, 2006). 
The Portuguese economy reveals the same trend as the European or other developed 
economies regarding population aging. A study conducted by the Directorate-General for 
Employment and Labor Relations (2003) – a department of the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Solidarity – shows that in 2000 Portugal was the eleventh oldest country in the 
world, with 15.4% of its population aged 65 or older. In the 1991 Population Census, 20% 
of the Portuguese population had less than 15 years of age, 16% were between 15-24 years, 
50% were aged 25-64 and 14% had 65 or more years of age. Ten years later, the 2001 
Census revealed that the corresponding values were 16%, 14%, 53% and 16%, suggesting 
an aging trend for the Portuguese population. Consequently, the labor force is also aging. 
The Directorate-General for Employment and Labor Relations’ investigation estimates that 
by 2020 the population aged 60 years or older will account for 24% of the total population, 
while those aged less than 20 years will represent just 22%. This means a drift away from 
the traditionally pyramidal age structure and towards a configuration that resembles a 
mushroom.  
 
2.3 Economic consequences of aging 
Demographic aging will have implications on the level of economic activity in the 
future. First, one of the influential impacts of population aging is on the sustainability of 
Social Security systems, since it will increase the number of older inactive individuals 
(Social Security recipients) compared to that of active subjects (Social Security 
contributors). The ratio of inactive population (aged 50 and over) to the labor force is one 
indicator of the economic burden of the older population on Social Security. In OECD 
countries, projections show that there will be 7 retirees for each 10 workers by 2050. For 
comparison, this ratio was equal to 38% in 2000. However, this ratio is of more concern in 
European Union (EU25) countries: there will be 1 retiree per 1 worker in 2050, compared 
to the ratio of 2 retirees per 4 workers in 2000. In Portugal, this ratio is expected to double 
from 2000 (when it was equal to 37%) to 2050 (75% estimate). 
Such a demographic structure will inevitably lead to public expenditure growth due to a 
higher amount of pension recipients, on one hand, and to the increase in health care 
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expenditures, on the other hand. The pressure on public expenditure will have to be 
financed by loading the working population, through the raise in Social Security 
contributions and/or taxes increase, and/or by penalizing pension recipients through a 
reduction in benefits. 
A second key aspect of demographic aging will be its effect on the size of the 
population aged 15 to 64, the working-age population, and therefore on productivity and 
economic growth. In many OECD economies, the working-age population is expected to 
decline both in relative and absolute terms to the total population over the next 20 years. In 
the European Union it is projected a 17% decline by 2050 compared to 2005. According to 
the European Commission (2007), in the long run the effect of population aging on the 
size and structure of the labor force will be most problematic in countries such as Portugal, 
Spain, Greece, Germany, Italy and some Eastern Europe countries, because they will 
experience significant declines in the working-age population, ranging from 20% to 30% by 
2050, and almost all will face a 5 or over percentage points increase in the share of older 
workers in that population. 
Therefore, if there are no changes in labor force participation patterns, population 
aging will lead to a drop in labor force growth which, in turn, will slow down economic 
growth. Without changing both the participation patterns and the rate of labor productivity 
growth, growth in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in OECD economies would 
decline to around 1.7% a year over the next 30 years, which corresponds to a rate 30% 
smaller compared to the one in the 1970-2000 period (OECD, 2006). For the EU25, 
annual GDP growth will drop from 2.4% over the 2004-2010 period to 1.2% between 2030 
and 2050 (European Commission, 2007). Developed countries will have to endure labor 
productivity growth in order to achieve economic growth. Simultaneously, older workers 
will gain relevance as resources in a scarce labor force. 
 
2.4 Increasing participation rates of older individuals 
The impact of population aging on employment and on the labor market is one of the 
main challenges that developed countries face. Pressures to increase the official retirement 
age and to improve the employment rate of older workers are therefore in the spotlight of 
governments’ concerns. In effect, forecasting these new challenges, the European Union 
has imposed two major objectives to be accomplished by 2010: (a) at least 50% of the 
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European Union population in the 55-64 age group should be in employment, and (b) to 
attain a 5 year delay in the average age of exit from the labor force. 
In Europe, employment among people aged 55-64 is low and the employment rate has 
been improving modestly. In 2007, the employment rate for older workers in the EU15 is 
just about 47% (it was 39% in 2001), compared to 62% and 66% in the United States and 
in Japan1, respectively. Countries like Portugal, Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, 
Finland or the United Kingdom already achieved the 50% threshold on the employment 
rate of older workers. However, in Italy, France, Greece or Spain there is still a long path to 
go in order to achieve that goal for the employment rate (almost 17, 12, 8 and 5 percentage 
points behind, respectively) (European Commission, 2008). 
In addition, many withdraw from the labor market at early ages, due to early retirement 
schemes. However, in recent years, some penalties have been imposed to early retirees 
subsequent to stricter legislation on this matter. The average exit age from the labor force 
for the European Union was 61 years in 2003, and no Member State had an average exit 
age above the required by the end of the decade (65 years). 
Special attention has also been devoted to the activity rates. In the European Union the 
activity rate is bellow 70%, which suggests an underutilisation of the labor force potential 
and inactivity remains high in most Member States. The main reasons for inactivity are: (a) 
education and training (particularly among young people), (b) retirement, (c) family 
responsibilities and (d) illness/disability. Therefore, to prevent a shortage of the labor 
supply, either governments promote an early entry of young people into the labor market 
(reducing years of education and training) or delay the exit of older workers from the labor 
force. 
Thus, increasing the labor market participation of older workers is thought to be a 
requirement to increase the labor force in order to achieve full employment and, therefore, 
economic growth. Active aging policies that aim at postponing older workers’ exit from the 
labor force are being enforced. The increase in the legal retirement age was the most visible 
instrument used to delay retirement. Nevertheless, there is also call for action in other 
fronts. First, pension penalties for early retirement in order to discourage early exits from 
the labor market are already being adopted. Second, opportunities must be created for 
employers to hire and keep older workers. Additionally, promoting access to training for 
older workers, who are underrepresented in training should be a concern. The promotion 
of hiring and training opportunities for older employees is essential for career development 
                                                 
1 Data for the United States and Japan were obtained from the OECD Employment Outlook 2009 via 
www.oecd.org, November 2009. 
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prospects at older ages. Finally, attention must also rely on improving the quality in work to 
provide a secure, attractive and flexible work environment throughout the working life, 
including the possibility of working hours’ flexibility (part-time arrangements, gradual 
retirement). 
If older workers could be attracted towards delaying their exit from the labor force, 
three important goals could be achieved: first, it would increase labor force growth and 
compensate the negative effect of population aging on economic growth; second, it would 
enhance public finances through the reduction in expenditure associated with early 
retirement while improving tax revenues; and third, it would aid employers by smoothing 
the pace at which they will have to replace individuals near retirement with new employees. 
Additionally, early retirement is not always a voluntary option (Osberg, 1993; Dorn and 
Sousa-Poza, 2009) and may cause financial difficulties for many older workers in the form 
of social exclusion and lack of prospects to guarantee an appropriate income in retirement. 
Therefore, policies that help the elderly to remain longer in the labor force can also have a 
more direct effect on enhancing individual welfare. 
 
2.5 Labor market opportunities 
Facing an aging population there is need to remove disincentives and barriers to 
employment of older individuals and, hence, future developments in the labor market 
should be focusing on promoting longer working lives through the provision of more 
opportunities for older people. 
In effect, changes in the labor market over the last decades should work in favor of the 
employment of older workers. Technological change, world trade growth and shifts in 
consumer preferences altered the employment structure in developed countries. 
Employment shares in agriculture and manufacturing have declined significantly over time 
in all OECD countries while the employment share in the services sector rose. Overall, 
jobs in the services sector are less physically demanding than in agriculture or 
manufacturing. Reflecting, in part, this change in employment across sectors but also a 
change within each sector, manual work has been gradually replaced by non-manual work. 
Therefore, the share of older employees whose jobs are physically demanding has probably 
declined over time in most countries, and this trend will probably continue throughout the 
years. Also, better health conditions should work in favor of longer working lives. 
CHAPTER 2. POPULATION AGING: CONSEQUENCES, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 10 
 
Shifts in the characteristics and work experience of the younger generation of workers 
are also likely to contribute to higher participation rates compared to past generation, as 
these employees age. First, female labor force participation rose significantly over the last 
decades and this trend is expected to continue in the following years. Knowing that there is 
a strong cross-country correlation between participation rates of younger and older 
women, additional increases in participation rates of prime-age working women are likely 
to feed through to higher participation rates in the older age groups too. Second, future 
cohorts of older workers are likely to be better educated than present ones: whereas, on 
average, approximately 40% of older workers across OECD countries had less than an 
upper-secondary level of education in 2000, projections set it in 21% by 2050. On the other 
hand, the share of older individuals with a university degree is estimated to increase from 
22% to 31% over the same period (OECD, 2006). 
A better educated workforce will help to raise labor productivity which is essential for 
economic growth. Furthermore, considering that participation rates are positively 
associated with school attainment, increased levels of education are expected to have a 
positive impact on the participation rates of future cohorts of older individuals. 
Market forces are also likely to respond to demographic aging through the increase in 
employment opportunities for older workers. For example, assuming flexible wages, larger 
cohorts of older workers relative to younger employees should reduce older people’s 
relative wages and hence raise the demand for older employees. Moreover, as employers 
may find it difficult to obtain the skills they require throughout hiring younger workers, 
employers may be increasingly willing to offer greater training opportunities to older 
workers as well as to adapt working conditions closer to the needs of an aging workforce. 
Dychtwald et al. (2004) highlight that older workers are valuable assets with significant 
labor market experience and skills. The authors suggest that employers should take 
advantage of these capabilities through the promotion of opportunities for career changes 
at older ages as well as for mentoring or knowledge sharing programs. 
Active aging policies must employ a range of instruments beyond just retirement 
reforms. In order for people to consider the possibility of extending their working lives, 
they have to be in good physical and mental health and must face good opportunities for 
working longer, they must have access to more flexible retirement schemes and work 
arrangements such as part-time employment and flexible working schedules, they must 
have the opportunity to update skills, and they should have access to available employment 
opportunities and not be faced with discriminatory prejudices. 
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2.6 Concluding remarks 
Demographic aging poses major challenges to economic activity. On one hand, an 
elderly population will pressure Social Security sustainability. On the other hand, due to 
potential labor supply shortages, economic growth might be endangered if there is no 
increase in labor productivity. 
Therefore, in order to avoid the decline in labor force, older workers must gain 
relevance in the working population. For this to happen, the challenge relies on increasing 
participation rates of older cohorts. 
Population aging comprises both challenges and opportunities for developed countries. 
They will need to mobilise more fully the potential labor resources of older people as the 
key policy response to demographic aging. Implicit is the creation of better employment 
opportunities for older workers that go from encouraging employers to hire and retain 
older individuals, strengthen their employability and provide flexible working 
arrangements. 
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Chapter 3 
Hiring older workers: do firms prefer long-term 
commitments? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Population aging, due to decreasing fertility rates and increasing life expectancy, will 
influence the age composition of the labor force causing, on one hand, a reduction in labor 
supply (enhanced by the fact that young people are postponing their entry into activity due 
to participation in education and training), and on the other hand, a detrimental impact on 
Social Security systems. 
To overcome these demographic challenges, ‘active aging’ policies are being 
implemented focusing both on the rise of the employment rate of older workers and on 
delaying their exit from the labor force (for example, by an increase in the legal retirement 
age). For instance, the European Union (EU) has imposed two major objectives to be 
accomplished by 2010: (a) at least 50% of the EU population in the 55-64 age group should 
be in employment and (b) attainment of a 5 year delay in the average age of exit from the 
labor force. 
In this crusade for raising the labor market participation of older individuals, much of 
the focus has been on financial issues – such as strengthening the link between 
contributions and benefits, increasing the legal retirement age and adjusting the pension as 
a function of life expectancy – while less attention has been devoted to the analysis of older 
people’s labor market opportunities. 
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the hiring opportunities of older workers, 
focusing on the determinants of hiring older workers by Portuguese firms. I intend to 
answer the following questions: are older workers underrepresented among newly hired 
workers? If so, does evidence suggest that firms prefer long-term employment relationships 
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and, therefore, prefer to hire younger workers [as suggested by Oi (1962) and Lazear (1979, 
1981)]? 
Looking at the labor market situation of older workers and focusing on their labor 
market transitions, it is possible to see that workers aged 55-64 who become unemployed 
face more difficulties in finding a new job compared to prime-age or young workers. In 
effect, only 13% of older workers succeed in finding work within a one year time horizon, 
while the figures rise to 32% and 39%, respectively, in what regards prime-age and young 
unemployed. Additionally, more than 60% of the older unemployed (against 46% of the 
working-age population as a whole) face periods of unemployment equal or greater than 12 
months (European Commission, 2007). Due to these greater obstacles to get back into 
work if losing their job, almost half of unemployed older workers leave the labor force 
within a year. Furthermore, the hiring rate2 for older workers is clearly below that for 
prime-age workers, and for the EU as a whole it is only half of that for those aged 25-54 
(7% versus 14%, respectively) (European Commission, 2007). 
The interest in the Portuguese case comes from an apparent paradox. On one hand, I 
find evidence of a strong attachment of Portuguese older workers to the labor market that 
is confirmed by high activity and employment rates (54% and 50%, respectively). 
Nevertheless, and despite this high attachment of older individuals to the labor force, the 
country presents one of the lowest hiring rates for the age group 55-64 (less than 4%, 
compared to the 7% average for the EU), meaning that these workers face some difficulties 
in what recruitment is concerned (European Commission, 2007). Therefore, studying the 
hiring opportunities for Portuguese older workers should raise relevant questions 
concerning their labor market situation and the potential policy intervention of 
governments. 
The innovative contribution of this study relies, on one hand, in the fact that it makes 
use of longitudinal data – matched employer-employee data – from a good and reliable 
database, on the other hand, the use of fractional logit models applied to panel data is also 
a novelty in studying the hiring opportunities of older workers. Additionally, and to my 
knowledge, no such work has been done for the Portuguese labor market. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces previous literature 
concerning employment relationships and older workers’ hiring opportunities. Section 3.3 
presents an overview of the demographic trends in Portugal and the labor market situation 
of older individuals. Section 3.4 describes the data and the methodology used, and results 
                                                 
2 Hiring rate means the ratio of all those in employment with job tenure of 12 months or less (in the age 
category) relative to the total employment (in that age group). 
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are discussed in Section 3.5. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes and considers some policy 
implications. 
 
3.2 Employment relationships and hiring opportunities for older 
workers 
Previous empirical studies on employment relationships suggest that firms prefer long-
term commitments with their employees in order to overcome fixed employment costs, to 
disincentive workers’ shirking, cheating or reduction of effort, and to avoid monitoring 
costs. 
Oi (1962) considers that labor is a quasi-fixed factor and that its fixity character arises 
from hiring and training costs in which the firm incurs. According to the author, these 
fixed employment costs induce firms to lengthen the periods of employment with their 
employees. In a study of temporary layoffs, Feldstein (1976) also suggests that the 
commitment between employer and employee tends to be permanent. This lifetime 
employment relationship is the starting point of Lazear’s (1979) research explaining the 
existence of mandatory retirement. The theory of agency states that principal (firm) and 
agent (worker) may have different interests and this antagonism could work in favor of 
long-term employment commitments. To disincentive workers’ shirking, cheating or 
reduction of effort, and to avoid expensive monitoring costs, Lazear considers that “it pays 
both parties to agree to a long-term wage stream which pays workers less than their VMPs 
[value of the marginal product] when young and more than the VMPs when old” (Lazear, 
1979: 1283). In a later work, Lazear (1981) reinforces his conviction by presenting a model 
in which he shows that an upward-sloping age-earnings profile brings together the interests 
of the agent and the principal. 
For the above stated reasons, the preference for long-term employment relationships 
may indicate that while firms employ older workers they may tend not to hire new older 
workers. 
The literature on older workers’ hiring opportunities seems to be concurrent, 
suggesting that older workers do not face the same hiring opportunities as younger 
workers. Empirical evidence shows that firms employ older workers but when they hire 
new workers they prefer to hire younger workers (Daniel and Heywood, 2007; Heywood et 
al, 1999; Hutchens, 1986, 1988).  
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Hutchens (1988) suggests that job opportunities decline with age, by showing that 
“recently hired older workers are less equally distributed across industries and occupations 
than both recently hired young workers and all old workers” (1988:98). 
This negative discrimination towards older workers is theoretically explained by the 
existence of delayed compensation contracts, training and hiring costs that introduce a 
series of fixed costs, inducing firms to hire predominantly young, long-tenure workers 
(Daniel and Heywood, 2007; Heywood et al., 1999; Hutchens, 1986; Oi, 1962). When a firm 
hires older workers it does not expect long employment tenure. 
Hutchens (1986) focuses on jobs in which older workers are employed but not hired 
for and tries to assess if those jobs present features associated with delayed payment 
contracts (such as pensions, long-tenure employment, comparatively high wages for older 
workers, and mandatory retirement). His work is in line with Lazear’s (1981) research, 
which considers that it is optimal to construct a long employment relationship. Therefore, 
jobs characterized by long-tenure employment, comparatively high wages for older 
individuals, pensions and mandatory retirement do not hire older workers (Hutchens, 
1986). 
However, Hutchens was not in the possession of firm-level data which, as he clearly 
states, “would be ideal for this purpose” (1986:451). Nevertheless, he constructed a hiring 
opportunity index for older workers, which was computed in the following manner: 
( ) ( )( )jie
jih
jiI
,
,
, =  
where ),( jih  is the share of recently hired workers in industry i and occupation j that are 
over age 55, and ),( jie  is the share of employment in industry i and occupation j that are 
over age 55. 
This index identifies jobs that employ but do not hire older workers, that is, jobs 
characterized by low values of the index. It is used by Hutchens as an independent variable 
in his estimation procedure to assess its effect on some characteristics (pensions, tenure, 
wages, and mandatory retirement – the dependent variables) of jobs with delayed payment 
contracts. In a later research, using establishment level data, Heywood et al. (1999) use the 
index as a dependent variable. Using a variation of Hutchens (1986) methodology, 
Heywood et al. (1999) study the determinants of older workers’ hiring opportunities in 
Hong Kong. Evidence shows that occupations with greater skill requirements are 
negatively associated with hiring opportunities for older workers. Also, when the 
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establishments have a high proportion of long-tenure workers and when pensions are 
offered, older workers face reduced hiring opportunities. 
In a recent research conducted for the United Kingdom where nearly 1/3 of the firms 
which hired workers in the last five years did not hire older workers, Daniel and Heywood 
(2007) use the share of older workers’ hiring as the dependent variable to show that firms 
which use deferred compensation schemes hire a smaller share of older workers. This also 
happens with firms in which specific human capital is required. 
Therefore, empirical evidence suggests that firms prefer long-term employment 
relationships with their employees. This also implies difficulties for older workers in what 
concerns recruitment opportunities. In general, these studies use econometric methods that 
are not appropriate for dealing with a fractional dependent variable. Also, the data sets used 
are cross-sectional or even aggregate data that are not ideal for the analysis. 
 
3.3 Older workers and the Portuguese labor market 
Portugal faces the same scenario as the European Union or other developed economies 
regarding population aging and it can also be explained by the decline in fertility rates and 
the increase in life expectancy. Both in relative and in absolute terms, Portugal is at the top 
of the countries where the decrease in fertility rates and the increase in life expectancy are 
most significant. 
Despite this demographic framework, which will influence the composition of the 
labor force, attention has been centered on the sustainability of the Social Security System 
and not on labor market implications. A possible explanation for this apparent lack of 
interest on labor market issues may arise, as stated, from the fact that Portuguese older 
workers (55-64 years) present high activity and employment rates (54% and 50%, 
respectively), above the EU25 average (47% and 44%, respectively) and already above the 
50% threshold for the employment rate to be achieved until 2010 (European Commission, 
2007). 
Additionally, the country has a comparatively high average exit age from the labor force 
(63.1 years) (European Commission, 2007). According to the results obtained by a specific 
module – that focuses on workers’ transitions from professional life to retirement – of the 
Portuguese quarterly labor force survey Inquérito ao Emprego, 62% of all workers aged 50 to 
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69 who are in employment and receiving a retirement pension3 (or even though not 
receiving the pension were entitled to it)4, continue in the labor market due to the need of 
obtaining a sufficient family income (INE, 2007). Apparently, Portuguese older workers 
remain longer in the labor force, not because they want to, but because they need to. 
Income seems to be a particularly relevant variable in the decision to completely withdraw 
from activity. 
Purchasing power issues aside, in a country with such a strong attachment of older 
workers to the labor market, do these workers face the same employment opportunities as 
younger individuals? Once unemployed, the probability of finding a job is much lower for 
the older than for prime-age workers. If we look at the transitions between employment 
states for older workers (55-64) between 2005 and 2006, as depicted in Table 3.1, we can 
see that compared to the EU27, when a Portuguese older worker becomes unemployed he 
faces the same percentage of success in finding a new job (around 13%) within a one year 
period. 
 
Table 3.1: Transitions between economic states for older workers (55-64), 2005-2006 
Economic status in 2006 
Employed Unemployed Inactive 
Economic status in 2005 PT EU27(a) PT EU27(a) PT EU27(a) 
Employed 94.1 90.2 1.4 1.5 4.5 8.3 
Unemployed 12.8 12.8 64.5 37.7 22.7 49.4 
Inactive 0.4 3.0 0.1 0.7 99.4 96.3 
Source: European Commission (2007). 
Note: (a) EU27 covers the EU Member States excluding Belgium, Ireland, The Netherlands, and Sweden, for which 
data is not available in 2006 on status one year earlier. 
 
Furthermore, the shift into inactivity is very much a one-way street: once inactive, people 
remain inactive. However, while in the EU27 almost a half of the older unemployed 
become inactive in the next period, this only happens for 23% of the older Portuguese 
unemployed. Almost 65% of the older unemployed in Portugal remain unemployed 
(against 38% for the EU27). I am not in the possession of data on economic transitions for 
younger age-groups in Portugal. Nevertheless, that kind of data exist for the EU27 (Table 
3.2) and it shows that older workers face a greater challenge to get back into work if they 
lose their job. 
 
 
                                                 
3 The Portuguese law allows a worker who is entitled to a retirement pension at the legal retirement age (65 
years) to continue in the labor force, accumulating income from work and income from a pension. 
4 Under certain circumstances, early retirement schemes make it possible for workers to have access to a 
retirement pension before completing 65 years of age, although at the expense of a pension cut-off. 
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Table 3.2: Transitions between economic statuses in the EU27, by age group, 
2005-2006 
Economic status in 2006 
Economic status in 2005 Employed Unemployed Inactive 
Total Working Age Population    
Employed 94.6 2.5 2.9 
Unemployed 31.2 43.4 25.4 
Inactive 10.4 4.3 85.3 
15-24    
Employed 89.9 5.6 4.4 
Unemployed 38.9 40.4 20.7 
Inactive 13.0 5.2 81.8 
25-54    
Employed 95.7 2.3 2.0 
Unemployed 32.3 45.2 22.5 
Inactive 13.8 6.3 79.9 
55-64    
Employed 90.3 1.5 8.2 
Unemployed 12.8 37.7 49.4 
Inactive 2.9 0.7 96.4 
Source: European Commission (2007). 
Note: EU27 covers the EU Member States excluding Belgium, Ireland, The Netherlands, and Sweden, for 
which data is not available in 2006 on status one year earlier. 
 
Compared to the situation in other European economies, there is a high attachment of 
older workers to the labor market and it would be relevant to verify if that attachment 
results from long-tenure employment or if Portuguese older workers also have some 
opportunities in what concerns firms’ hiring behavior. 
Labor market mobility in terms of new hires is lower for older workers than for prime-
age individuals. According to data of the European Commission (2007), Portugal presents 
one of the lowest hiring rates (computed, for each age group, as the ratio of people in 
employment with tenure of 12 months or less relative to overall employment in that age 
group), under 4%, compared to an average of 7% for the European Union. 
Moreover, most new hires among older people are accounted for by “job changers”, 
that is older workers who were working in the previous year, rather than by shifts into 
employment by older workers who were previously unemployed or inactive. 
 
3.4 Data and methodology 
3.4.1 Matched employer-employee data set 
In order to study the determinants of hiring older workers in Portugal, I use a matched 
employer-employee data set known as Quadros de Pessoal (QP). QP is an annual mandatory 
survey conducted by the Ministry of Labor and Social Solidarity that gathers information 
on virtually all firms with wage-earners in Portugal. It includes information on firms (such 
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as location, industry, sales, number of employees, date of constitution, legal setting, 
ownership type), establishments (location, industry, number of workers) and workers 
(gender, age, education, hours of work, labor earnings, date of admission into the firm, etc). 
Civil servants and domestic service are not covered, and the coverage of agriculture is low 
given its low share of wage-earners. 
I use longitudinal data on firms and their workers from 1986 to 2005 to identify the 
determinants of hiring older workers by Portuguese firms. Matching firms and workers’ 
files, I use workers information to create some of the variables used in this research. I 
consider only firms with 5 or more years of existence (so that the tenure variable – see 
below – will be meaningful) and, additionally, firms that do some hiring in a given year (so 
that the hiring opportunity index for older workers would not be underestimated).5 For this 
latter restriction I consider just workers for whom I have – or can recover – information 
on the date of admission into the firm. I classify an employee as a hire whenever he/she 
was admitted into the firm during the last 12 months. For instance, if in the 1999 survey 
(collected in October) the firm reports June 1999 as a particular worker’s month and year 
of admission into the firm, then this worker is considered as new hire. These restrictions 
resulted in a sample of 20,910,160 workers. However, in order to avoid the overestimated 
influence of large firms in the estimation, I only keep one observation per firm in each 
year, which ended up in an unbalanced panel with 900,001 observations (firms/years), for a 
total of 258,588 firms. The construction of the data set used in this research is thoroughly 
described in Appendix 3.A. 
Trying to assess the hiring opportunities for older workers in the Portuguese labor 
market I started by computing the hiring opportunity index, constructed by Hutchens 
(1986) and introduced in Section 3.2, using aggregate data from Quadros de Pessoal. Table 3.3 
shows the hiring opportunity index for older workers in Portugal, for the period 1986-
2005: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 I computed the hiring opportunity index for all firms (that did some hiring or not) and just for firms that 
hired workers. The values of the index are always smaller when computed for all firms. 
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Table 3.3: The Hutchens’ hiring opportunity index (aggregate yearly data) 
Year % older hiring 
(1) 
% older employment 
(2) 
(3)=(1)/(2)(a) 
1986 2.9 8.9 0.33 
1987 3.0 9.0 0.33 
1988 2.9 9.0 0.32 
1989 3.3 9.1 0.36 
1991 3.1 9.1 0.35 
1992 3.2 8.9 0.36 
1993 3.3 8.7 0.38 
1994 3.5 8.3 0.42 
1995 3.3 8.2 0.40 
1996 3.6 8.3 0.43 
1997 4.1 8.3 0.50 
1998 3.9 8.5 0.47 
1999 3.8 8.4 0.45 
2000 4.1 8.4 0.49 
2002 3.9 9.0 0.44 
2003 4.3 8.5 0.51 
2004 4.1 7.8 0.53 
2005 4.1 8.6 0.48 
Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Notes: (a) This ratio is the hiring opportunity index developed by Hutchens (1986). 
Columns (1) to (3): data from firms (and their workers) with 5 or more years of existence 
that hired workers. 
 
Aggregate yearly data seems to indicate that younger workers have more hiring 
opportunities than older workers do (the hiring opportunity index for workers aged less 
than 55 is always greater than 1, meaning that the share of hires is greater than the share of 
employment for this age category). Portuguese firms hire older workers but they do not 
replicate the existing age composition of their work force, that is, on average for the 1986-
2005 period, older workers represented almost 9% of the labor force employed and only 
around 4% of hiring. However, in this period, hiring opportunities for older workers seem 
to be increasing, although in a non-monotonic way. 
Therefore, studying the hiring opportunities for older workers in a country where they 
have a strong attachment to the labor force should call upon the need of public policy 
measures towards improving labor market opportunities for older workers. 
 
3.4.2 A fractional logit model 
The dependent variable in this study (as in Daniel and Heywood, 2007) is the share of 
workers hired by firm i in year t who are above 54 years of age ( itShhir ). I have information 
on the date when the worker was hired. The distribution of the share of older hires (in 
percentage) across firms for the 1986-2005 period is depicted in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of the share of older workers hired 
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Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Notes: The share of older hiring (%) is computed as the ratio of the number of 
firm’s hires who are above 54 years old relative to the total number of workers 
hired, times 100. Number of observations: 900,001 (firms/years). 
 
Microeconomic data shows that, for 90% of the observations, Portuguese firms did not 
hire older workers. Also, of those, only 34% employ older workers, meaning that for more 
than a half of these observations firms neither hire nor employ workers with 55 or more 
years of age. Portugal presents employment and activity rates (both above 50%) that are 
relatively high compared to other European Union countries. However, in the event of a 
job loss, older individuals seem to face major difficulties in finding a new position. On one 
hand, a European Commission’s (2007) report underlines that Portugal has one of the 
lowest hiring rates of older workers and, on the other hand, descriptive statistics presented 
above strengthens the lack of hiring opportunities for the elderly in the Portuguese labor 
market. 
Why is it, then, that Portuguese firms do not hire older workers? Is it because firms 
prefer long-term employment commitments, as suggested by Oi (1962) and Lazear (1979; 
1981)? 
To answer these questions, I model the determinants of hiring older individuals using 
the share of workers hired who are above 54 years of age (Shhir) as the dependent variable. 
As independent variables I use the share of the workforce with more than 5 years of tenure 
(Shten5), the share of promotions in the firm (Shprom), the share of older employment 
(Shemp), the average education level of the firms’ work force (Aveduc), the size of the firm 
(Size), the location of the firm (Region), and the industry in which the firm operates 
(Industry). The next table presents the means, standard deviations (or percentages, for 
categorical variables) of the variables used in this study: 
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Table 3.4: Variables definition, means and standard deviations (or percentages) 
Variable Definition Mean or 
percentage 
Standard 
deviation 
Shhir 
Share of workers hired who are above 54 years of 
age 
0.47 0.18 
Shten5 
Share of the firms’ work force with more than 5 
years of tenure 
0.29 0.25 
Shprom Share of the work force who were promoted 0.17 0.26 
Size Log of the number of employees in the firm 2.25 1.25 
Shemp Share of employees who are above 54 years of age 0.07 0.13 
Aveduc Average education level of the firms’ work force 6.86 2.65 
Region 
Dummy variable for the region where the firm is 
located (Portuguese NUTS II) 
  
North  32.67 -- 
Algarve  5.26 -- 
Centre  21.43 -- 
Lisbon  29.31 -- 
Alentejo  7.26 -- 
Azores  2.08 -- 
Madeira  1.99 -- 
Industry 
Dummy variable for the industry in which the 
firm operates 
  
Agriculture  3.70 -- 
Extraction  0.60 -- 
Manufacturing  23.70 -- 
Electricity, gas and water  0.04 -- 
Construction  13.12 -- 
Commercial services, 
restaurants and hotels 
 
38.50 -- 
Transports, storage and 
communications 
 
3.58 -- 
Banking and insurance  7.01 -- 
Social and domestic 
services 
 
9.75 -- 
Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Note: Region and Industry are categorical variables and, hence, the values reported for these variables are percentages. 
 
I expect Shten5 to have a negative effect on the share of older hires (the dependent 
variable). This will indicate that firms which usually engage in long-term employment 
relationships prefer to hire younger workers. Heywood et al. (1999) found that indicators of 
long-term labor relations are associated with reduced hiring opportunities for older 
individuals. The coefficient on the variable Shprom is also hypothesized to have a negative 
sign. As shown by Daniel and Heywood (2007), firms using promotions to create an 
internal labor market hire less older workers. An internal labor market may be a vehicle to 
motivate workers but, as Adams (2002) suggests, older workers are less likely to be 
motivated by promotions. As for Aveduc, this variable is expected to influence negatively 
the hiring opportunity of older workers since that, by hypotheses, the higher the average 
education level in a firm the fewer older workers will be hired due to human capital 
depreciation. 
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To explain the determinants of hiring older workers I use a fractional logit model 
(Papke and Wooldridge, 1996 and 2005). Papke and Wooldridge (1996) propose models 
for the conditional mean of a fractional response variable for which the predicted values 
are kept in the unit interval. They consider that the mean function takes the logistic form 
and then apply a quasi-maximum likelihood estimation method to cross-section data. In 
recent work, Papke and Wooldridge (2005) develop methods for estimating fractional panel 
data models. 
The methodology I use follows closely the one proposed by Papke and Wooldridge 
(2005).6 The share of older workers hired, the dependent variable in my study, takes only 
values between zero and one ( 10 ≤≤ itShhir ). 
Considering longitudinal data with cross-sectional observation i and time period t, 
where the dependent variable is itShhir  and 10 ≤≤ itShhir , for a set of independent variables 
itx  it is assumed that 
 
( ) TtcGcShhirE iiit ,,1),(,| K=+= βxx itit  (3.1) 
 
where ( ) ( ) [ ])exp(1/)exp( zzzzG +≡Λ≡  is the logistic function satisfying 1zG0 << )(  for all 
ℜ∈z . Therefore, the predicted values of y  must lie in the interval )1,0( . In equation (3.1), 
ic  represents the unobserved effect which is additively introduced in the logistic function. 
The estimation procedure is conducted by using the pooled Bernoulli quasi-maximum 
likelihood estimator (QMLE). The explanatory variables are specified as ),,1( iit xx  where 
ix  is the time average of ix . I also use a generalized estimation equations (GEE) 
procedure to account for the presence of potential serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
Rather than attempting to find the variance ( )iiShhirVar x| , Papke and Wooldridge (2005) 
use a “working” version of this variance, which is expected to be misspecified. The GEE 
approach maintains the form of the working variance while varying the working correlation 
matrix. I assume an “exchangeability” correlation pattern where it is considered as if the 
standardized errors have a constant correlation. With this working correlation structure it is 
assumed that correlations are not a function of ix . 
 
 
                                                 
6 The same methodology has also been used by Hausman and Leonard (1997) and Wagner (2003), on 
proportion data. 
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3.5 Results 
The main results are presented in Table 3.5. The coefficients on both models are very 
similar and present the same signs. 
 
Table 3.5: Estimation results for the fractional logit model 
Variable Pooled QMLE GEE 
Shten5 
-1.874*** 
(.041) 
-1.856*** 
(.042) 
Shprom 
-.108*** 
(.031) 
-.107*** 
(.031) 
Logsize 
.442*** 
(.015) 
.440*** 
(.016) 
Shemp 
11.449*** 
(.065) 
11.400*** 
(.070) 
Aveduc 
-.150*** 
(.006) 
-.150*** 
(.006) 
Region   
North -.040 
(.124) 
-.044 
(.125) 
Algarve -.097** 
(.046) 
-.114** 
(.048) 
Centre -.043* 
(.025) 
-.044* 
(.026) 
Alentejo .099*** 
(.028) 
.095*** 
(.030) 
Azores -.582*** 
(.081) 
-.580*** 
(.085) 
Madeira -.101 
(.273) 
-.060 
(.276) 
Industry   
Agriculture .150** 
(.065) 
.143** 
(.068) 
Extraction .032 
(.071) 
.010 
(.075) 
Manufacturing .052 
(.039) 
.049 
(.040) 
Electricity, gas and water .253 
(.249) 
.263 
(.256) 
Construction .272*** 
(.019) 
.258*** 
(.021) 
Transports, storage and 
communications 
-.003 
(.030) 
-.007 
(.033) 
Banking and insurance .358*** 
(.032) 
.356*** 
(.034) 
Social and domestic services .242*** 
(.040) 
.223*** 
(.042) 
Log pseudolikelihood - 106,968.1239 -- 
Observations 899,995 899,995 
Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Notes: (a) Both models contain year dummies from 1987 through 2005. (b) Lisbon is the omitted 
category in Region. (c) Commercial services, restaurants and hotels is the omitted category in 
Industry. (d) The models include time averages of the seven independent variables. (e) Robust 
(pooled QMLE) and semi-robust (GEE) standard errors in parentheses (when using STATA®, 
the estimation of a GEE model that requires the “robust” option produces valid standard errors 
even if the correlations within group are not as hypothesized by the specified correlation structure. 
Nevertheless, it requires that the model correctly specifies the mean. The resulting standard errors 
are thus labelled “semi-robust” instead of “robust”). (f) Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses; ***/**/* means significance at 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. 
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However, standard errors are somewhat smaller in the pooled QMLE model, 
compared to the GEE procedure. This may occur because, when employing the Bernoulli 
QMLE, standard errors and test statistics need to be adjusted to allow for arbitrary serial 
dependence across t. The standard errors that are robust to violations in the specified 
conditional variance but assume serial independence tend to be relatively small (Papke and 
Wooldridge, 2005). 
As hypothesized, Shten5 has a negative impact on the share of older workers hired. This 
suggests that Portuguese firms prefer long-term commitments with their employees. 
Therefore, firms which usually engage in long-term employment relationships prefer to hire 
younger workers. 
The relationship between the share of older workers hired and the share of the 
workforce promoted (Shprom) presents also a negative sign. This indicates that firms using 
promotions to create an internal labor market hire less older workers. However, the size of 
a firm and the share of older employees seem to work in favor of older workers. In effect, 
the bigger a firm is (measured by the log of the number of its employees) the higher is the 
share of older workers hired. This is also the scenario if a firm presents a higher share of 
older workers employed. As for Aveduc its sign behaves as hypothesized. The higher the 
average education level in a firm the fewer older workers will be hired. Human capital 
depreciation is a possible explanation for this result. Therefore, this variable influences 
negatively the hiring opportunities for older workers. 
Relative to Lisbon, only Alentejo seems to give some opportunities to older workers. 
This might be so because of the demographic structure of that particular region with a high 
percentage of older population, compared to the other Portuguese regions. 
Looking at the results for the Industry variable, we see that compared to the Commercial 
services, restaurants and hotels’ sector7 all the other sectors provide more hiring 
opportunities for older workers. 
Nonetheless, computation of marginal effects8 for Shten5 and Shemp indicates that, 
although statistically significant, their magnitude is small and, as expected, very similar in 
both specifications (pooled QMLE and semi-robust GEE). Indeed, ceteris paribus, if the 
share of the firms’ workforce with more than 5 years of tenure (Shten5) increases by 0.1 (or, 
in percentage points (p.p.), a 10 p.p. increase) the share of older workers hired (Shhir) 
decreases on average 0.004 (or 0.4 p.p.). The variable that presents a stronger impact on the 
                                                 
7 This sector represents almost 39% of the firms in the sample. 
8 Marginal effects were computed using Stata. On the text I report their values for selected variables: Shten5 
and Shemp. 
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share of older workers hired is the share of older workers employed by a firm (Shemp). In 
effect, holding all other variables, if the share of older workers employed rises by 10 p.p., 
the share of older workers hired increases by 2.4 p.p. This seems to indicate that firms that 
employ older workers are more receptive to hiring older workers. However, their hiring 
behavior towards older workers does not seem to replicate their actual employment 
structure. 
 
3.6 Conclusion and policy implications 
Portuguese older workers present high activity and employment rates, suggesting a 
strong attachment to the labor market. Nevertheless, when they become unemployed, 
statistics show that these workers face more difficulties in finding a new job, compared to 
other age groups. Therefore, studying the hiring opportunities of older workers is relevant 
in an era of ‘active aging’ policies that aim at extending a workers’ active life. For these 
policies to be effective, older workers should face the same opportunities as other workers 
do. However, this seems not to be the case. 
The use of a fractional logit model applied to longitudinal data, a methodological 
novelty in the study of older workers’ hiring opportunities, shows that firms employ older 
workers but prefer to hire younger workers. In effect, the higher the share of a firms’ 
workforce with more than five years of tenure, the lower the share of older workers hired. 
This suggests that firms which favor long-term employment commitments with their 
employees are inclined to hire younger workers. This demand behavior by Portuguese 
firms reveals that if an older worker loses his/her job he/she will face major constraints to 
get back to work. 
Creating labor market opportunities for older workers that allow them access, in terms 
of hiring, comparable jobs as other age group workers should be a political concern. This is 
a matter of particular interest in order to achieve the goals set under active aging policies. 
There are other issues concerning labor market opportunities of older individuals that 
can be explored. For instance, studying the promotion prospects of the less young workers 
would also provide an insight of other sorts of labor market opportunities that are open to 
these workers. 
CHAPTER 3. HIRING OLDER WORKERS: DO FIRMS PREFER LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS? 28 
 
References 
Adams, S. (2002) “Passed over for promotion because of age: an empirical analysis of the 
consequences.” Journal of Labor Research, 23(3), 447-461. 
Daniel, K. and J. Heywood (2007) “The determinants of hiring older workers: UK 
evidence.” Labour Economics, 14(1), 35-51. 
European Commission (2007) Employment in Europe 2007. Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities. 
Feldstein, M. (1976) “Temporary layoffs in the theory of unemployment.” Journal of Political 
Economy, 84(5): 937-957. 
Hausman, J. (1997) “Superstars in the National Basketball Association: economic value and 
policy.” Journal of Labor Economics, 15(4): 586-624. 
Heywood, J.; L.-S. Ho and X. Wei (1999) “The determinants of hiring older workers: 
evidence from Hong Kong.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 52(3), 444-459. 
Hutchens, R. (1986) “Delayed payment contracts and a firm’s propensity to hire older 
workers.” Journal of Labor Economics, 4(4), 439-457. 
Hutchens, R. (1988) “Do job opportunities decline with age?” Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, 42(1), 89-99. 
Lazear, E. (1979) “Why is there mandatory retirement?” Journal of Political Economy, 87(6), 
1261-1284. 
Lazear, E. (1981) “Agency, earnings profiles, productivity, and hours restrictions.” American 
Economic Review, 71(4), 606-620. 
Oi, W. (1962) “Labor as a quasi-fixed factor.” Journal of Political Economy, 70(6), 538-555. 
Papke, L. and J. Wooldridge (1996) “Econometric methods for fractional response 
variables with an application to 401(k) plan participation rates.” Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, 11: 619-632. 
Papke, L. and J. Wooldridge (2005) “Panel data methods for fractional response variables 
with an application to test pass rates.” Mimeo. 
Portugal. Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) (2007) Obtained on October from 
www.ine.pt 
Portugal. Ministério da Segurança Social e do Trabalho (1986-2005) Quadros de Pessoal. 
Data in magnetic medium. 
Wagner, J. (2003) “Unobserved firm heterogeneity and the size-exports nexus: evidence 
from German panel data.” Review of World Economics, 139(1): 161-172. 
CHAPTER 3. HIRING OLDER WORKERS: DO FIRMS PREFER LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS? 29 
 
Wooldridge, J. (2002) Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
CHAPTER 3. HIRING OLDER WORKERS: DO FIRMS PREFER LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS? 30 
 
Appendix to Chapter 3  
Appendix 3.A Construction of the data set 
 
3.A1 Sample definition 
The data set used – Quadros de Pessoal – gathers information on firms, their 
establishments and workers. I used the files containing information on firms and their 
workers for the 1986-2005 period (18 years), with an exception in 1990 and 2001, because 
the data were not collected these years. Each firm and each worker is identified by a unique 
registration number which allows me to trace them over time and match them. All 
information contained in these files is reported by the firm. 
I started by “cleaning” some inconsistencies on the files for firms and workers 
separately. Afterwards, I merged firms and workers’ files in order to obtain a single data 
set. The matching variables were the year of the survey and the firm’s identification 
number. At this stage I ended up with 34,120,844 observations (workers/years). I call this 
data set 1 (DS1). 
Since the firm is the observation unit in the analysis, information on workers was 
aggregated at the firm level in order to compute mean values for the educational level of 
the firm’s workforce or to obtain other indicators such as the share of the workforce with 
more than 5 years of tenure, the share of promotions or the share of older employment in 
the firm. 
Considering that the aim of the study is to assess the hiring behavior of Portuguese 
firms towards older workers, in the sample I include only firms with 5 or more years of 
existence (in order to make one of the explanatory variables, associated with tenure, 
meaningful) and firms that do some hiring in a given year. For this latter restriction, I had 
to use information on the worker’s date of admission into the firm. These restrictions led 
to an unbalanced panel data set with 900,001 observations firm-year, for a total of 258,588 
firms. 
 
3.A2 Construction of the variables 
The dependent variable in the estimation is the share of workers hired by firm i in year 
t who are above 54 years of age ( itShhir ). This variable is not directly available on any of the 
data sets (firms or workers’ files). The starting point for its construction was DS1. The 
CHAPTER 3. HIRING OLDER WORKERS: DO FIRMS PREFER LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS? 31 
 
itShhir  variable was generated from the following expression: 
it
it
hired workers ofnumber total 
age of 54 years above are who hired workers ofnumber 
=itShhir . Using the “date of 
admission” of the worker into the firm I can assess when the worker was hired. Then, to 
obtain the numerator and the denominator of the expression above, the following steps 
were taken: 
1. For every worker at a firm in a given year I have created a temporary dummy variable 
that equals 1 whenever the year of admission at the firm corresponded to the year of 
the survey, and 0 otherwise; 
2. Since each worker is linked to a firm, the previous step allowed me to obtain the 
denominator of the itShhir  expression. This was made by summing the values of the 
temporary dummy variable by firm-year; 
3. As for the numerator, the procedure was similar to the one in step 2, that is, I added 
the values of the temporary variable but with a restriction: to be included in the sum, 
the age of the worker had to be equal or higher than 55. With this I obtained the 
number of workers hired by firm i in year t who are above 54 years old. 
The dependent variable itShhir  was build according to its expression. 
As for the independent variables, the Region and Industry variables are directly obtained 
from DS1 while the rest was derived. itShemp , representing the share of the firms’ 
workforce above 54 years of age, was computed as the ratio 
it
it
employees ofnumber total 
age of 54 years above are who employees ofnumber 
=itShemp . The data set presents the 
number of workers employed by a firm in each year and it is straightforward to obtain the 
number of those who are older than 54 years. To construct it5Shten , the share of the firms’ 
workforce with more than 5 years of tenure, I created a variable for tenure using the 
variable date of admission into the firm. I subtracted the date of admission to the year of 
the survey to get the tenure. Then, it was computed as 
it
it
employees ofnumber total 
tenure of  yearsmoreor  5 with employees ofnumber 
=it5Shten . The variable itShprom , the 
share of the workforce who was promoted at firm i in year t, used, as a starting point, the 
variable date of latest promotion, available on DS1. Therefore, that explanatory variable 
itShprom  was given by the quotient 
it
it
employees ofnumber total 
promoted employees ofnumber 
=itShprom . Finally, the 
variable itAveduc  refers to the mean of the educational level (this variable is available on 
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DS1, for each worker) of the work force and itSize  is simply the logarithmic of the number 
of employees at firm i in year t. 
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Chapter 4 
Age and opportunities for promotion 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As a response to the challenge of population aging, increasing the employment rate of 
older individuals and delaying their exit from the labor force are the core objectives of 
active aging policies. As the demographic prevalence of older cohorts grows, so does their 
relevance in the labor force. 
Older workers have been the major contributors to employment growth in the 
European Union (EU). Between 2000 and 2007, workers aged 55 to 64 experienced a 34% 
change in employment in the EU, compared to an increase of approximately 5% for prime-
aged workers (25-54 years) and a decrease in employment of over 2% for young workers 
(15-24 years); additionally, in 2007, older workers contributed 32% to the increase in total 
employment (European Commission, 2008). Despite these numbers suggestion that active 
aging policies are being effective, older individuals still face difficulties in what concerns 
employment9 and career development opportunities. Adams (2002) studies the effect of age 
discrimination in promotion on wage growth, separations and early retirement, and finds 
that in firms where older individuals report that younger workers are favored in 
promotions, older workers face lower wage growth and a greater likelihood of early 
retirement. Data used are based on reported perceptions by older individuals of their firms’ 
promotion practices. Johnson and Neumark (1997) also suggest that age discrimination is 
associated with a higher likelihood of job separation together with a smaller propensity to 
remain employed. Thus, age differences in promotion prospects have practical 
                                                 
9 As for employment opportunities, empirical studies show that firms employ older workers but, as the 
former favor long employment relationships, preference goes to hire younger individuals (Daniel and 
Heywood, 2007; Heywood et al, 1999; Hutchens, 1986, 1988). 
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consequences on the labor force status of older individuals, influencing their retirement 
decision. 
Since age appears to be a disadvantage factor in what labor market opportunities is 
concerned, this research aims to examine if there are any differences in career development 
between younger individuals and older ones. This is done employing survival analysis 
techniques on a sample of new firms and their workers. 
I take advantage of a comprehensive data set called Quadros de Pessoal (QP). QP is a 
matched employer-employee longitudinal database that, given the mandatory nature of the 
underlying survey, covers the population of firms and workers in the private sector. 
Contrary to other data sets (such as the ones used by McCue (1996), Pergamit and Veum 
(1999), Francesconi (2001)), the promotion events are not self-reported but are supplied by 
the firm. This allows defining a benchmark, at least within firms, that reduces measurement 
errors associated with self-reported data. 
Quadros de Pessoal has formerly been used to study the determinants of promotions in 
the Portuguese labor market. Lima and Pereira (2003) focus on workers’ career and wages 
using a sample of large firms, highlighting the effect of promotions on wage growth, while 
Lima and Centeno (2003) study the careers of top managers. However, since both these 
studies centre the attention on particular groups (the former in large firms and the latter in 
top managers) results cannot be generalized. Lima (2004), Silva and van der Klaauw (2006), 
and Ferreira (2009) produce a set of results that can be generalized. Yet, none of these 
studies focuses on the promotion opportunities faced by older individuals. 
Do older workers experience the same likelihood of promotion as younger ones? 
Considering a sample of new firms, my findings suggest that this is not the case: older 
employees are in fact in disadvantage when it comes to promotion opportunities. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents a theoretical synopsis on 
employment relationships and career development. The following section displays previous 
empirical results on the determinants of promotions. A description of the data set used is 
presented in Section 4.4 and some descriptive statistics are presented. This section also 
highlights the survival time characteristic of the data. Section 4.5 describes and discusses 
the estimation procedures used and Section 4.6 reports the empirical results. Finally, 
Section 4.7 concludes. 
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4.2 Theoretical overview 
The study of employment relationships in labor economics has grown in relevance over 
the last decades. Unequivocal is the statement that long-term employment relationships 
benefit both employers and workers. These benefits are highlighted, among other authors, 
by Oi (1962) and Lazear (1979, 1981). As job tenure increases, the employer becomes 
aware of the quality of the worker, measured by his productivity, and both recognize or not 
the quality of the match (Jovanovic, 1979). A mismatch leads to job separation while good 
matches may lead the worker through a defined career path within the firm’s hierarchy. The 
concept of a career is the basic feature of an internal labor market where careers are seen as 
a sequence of promotions to higher hierarchical levels with higher pay and responsibility 
(Baker et al., 1994a). 
Firms implement internal labor markets in which careers and wages are somewhat 
protected from external labor markets (Baker and Holmstrom, 1995) as a means to 
motivate workers and, thus, enhance their productivity. 
Gibbons (1996) provides an interesting review on the theory of wages and career 
dynamics within firms. The author mentions four underlying literatures: job assignment, 
tournaments, human capital and learning. 
The job assignment literature (Sattinger, 1975; Rosen, 1982 and Waldman, 1984a) 
focuses on the assignment of workers to jobs when firms consist of an array of potential 
job assignments and there exists full information about workers and jobs. The models are 
static and based on the idea that employees with higher ability should be assigned to jobs 
where decisions have an impact over a larger scale of operations. However, since the 
models are static, they cannot explain wage and career dynamics (Gibbons and Waldman, 
1999; 2006). Nevertheless, when the firm assigns the worker to a new job it signals 
information to competing firms about the worker’s ability (Waldman, 1984b; Bernhardt 
and Scoones, 1993). Therefore, the wage increase offered to the employee must be 
sufficiently high to disincentive competition by other firms. 
Lazear10 and Rosen (1981) and Rosen (1986) see promotions as a prize awarded the 
winner of a competition. They develop a tournament theory based on a rank-order 
                                                 
10 Lazear’s (1979) theory of deferred compensation can also be seen as a worklife incentive scheme. This 
theory argues that senior workers receive wages above their marginal product to motivate them during the 
initial years of their careers (when wages are below their marginal product). Lazear (1999) relates worklife 
incentive theory to tournament theory but, while tournaments emphasize relative comparisons between 
workers, worklife incentive schemes are not comparison-based. Also, tournaments highlight wage increases 
upon promotion, which correspond to job changes whereas worklife incentives focus on pay changes that 
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payment scheme that resembles a contest. Workers are paid a prize that is higher for 
workers in upper positions within the firm: the winner is the worker with the highest 
productivity. This type of incentives is particularly relevant when firms face substantial 
monitoring costs. Additionally, compensation schemes like rank-order tournaments seem 
to favor long-run employment relationships between employer and employee. However, 
there is a drawback associated with this category of incentive schemes: they may induce 
excess competition among employees and damage worker cooperation. Additionally, 
tournament theory does not take into consideration the possibility of external competition 
by other workers, for the same position. Chan (1996) compares the choice between internal 
promotion and external recruitment within the context of a tournament. He finds that 
when competition is open to external applicants, internal workers reduce their chance of 
promotion. But he also suggests that an external applicant is only hired whenever she/he is 
significantly better that the internal candidate. 
Manove (1997) concludes that firms can diminish incentive costs through the definition 
of a job ladder and offering promotion prospects. That is, it is in the interest of the 
employer to construct an internal job ladder that induces workers in low paying jobs (hired 
externally) to offer increased effort as a way of paying for promotion (internal) to high 
paying jobs. 
Investments in human capital may also result in promotions (Becker, 1962). While 
general training (general human capital accumulation) raises the future marginal product of 
employees in the firm providing it, it would also increase the workers’ marginal product in 
many other firms. Because of this, the wage of trainees is below their actual marginal 
product, meaning that employees pay for their general on-the-job training. Conversely, the 
accumulation of firm-specific human capital, through specific training, increases 
productivity more in firms providing it. Therefore, and since specific training involves 
investment by both firm and worker, they have an incentive to engage in a long-term 
employment relationship. Carmichael (1983) shows that when employers and employees 
invest in specific human capital, promotions are given to trained workers according to their 
seniority level. 
According to the learning literature, firms do not know about the worker’s ability when 
she/he enters the labor force but, as time goes by, the firm becomes aware of it. Therefore, 
as tenure in a job increases, the worker’s productivity is known more precisely (Jovanovic, 
                                                                                                                                               
occur within a job instead of the change between them. But, as Lazear (1999) states, both incentive designs 
can be at work within the same firm. 
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1979) and good performances will be rewarded with higher wages. A promotion may well 
be the firm’s response after learning about the worker’s productivity. 
Farber and Gibbons (1996) develop a dynamic model of learning and present it as a 
complement to the human capital model in the explanation of wage dynamics. 
Gibbons and Waldman (1999) show that a model that combines features of job 
assignment, human capital acquisition and learning can capture some of the empirical 
findings concerning promotion dynamics and wages within firms, such as the positive 
association between promotions and wage increases or that workers who get large wage 
increases at one particular job level are more likely to be promoted to the next level. 
 
4.3 Previous empirical findings 
Empirical studies on promotion and career dynamics inside firms do not focus on 
testing any of the above mentioned theories in particular. Instead, previous research 
combines features of each of those theories to examine mobility within firms. 
Summarizing the empirical results it is possible to verify that promotion rates fall with 
age and experience. McCue (1996) finds that age and experience are negatively associated 
with the promotion likelihood, while Pergamit and Veum (1999) present evidence of the 
statistical non-significance of these variables. However, Adams (2002) shows that in firms 
where older employees report that younger workers are favored in promotions, the former 
face lower wage growth and a greater likelihood of early retirement. Thus, promotion 
practices that favor younger workers are negatively correlated with wage growth of older 
workers and positively correlated with the retirement decision. 
Tenure effects are less consistent, with evidence both for positive and negative effects. 
McCue (1996), Francesconi (2001) and Lima and Centeno (2003) have found that tenure 
and promotion probabilities have an inverse U-shaped relationship. Conversely, Abraham 
and Medoff (1985) suggest that within-firm mobility declines with tenure. Education 
effects are generally not significant (e.g. Pergamit and Veum, 1999), but when they are, 
promotion is positively associated with higher levels of education (McCue, 1996).  
There is evidence of both higher promotion opportunities for men than for women 
(Olson and Becker, 1983; Pergamit and Veum, 1999) and of equal gender promotion 
likelihood (Booth et al., 2003). Lazear and Rosen (1990) conclude that, since the ability 
standard for promotion is higher for women, more able women will be passed over for 
promotion by less able men. The fact that women face more non-market opportunities 
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(such as household production) than men works as a penalty, lowering females’ promotion 
probabilities. According to Lazear and Rosen (1990), a higher expected value of home time 
raises the probability of separation for women which, in turn, increases the levels of ability 
for promotion by female employees. 
Consistent with the “fast-tracks” mentioned by Baker et al. (1994a), there is evidence of 
a positive association between prior promotions and current promotions (Pergamit and 
Veum, 1999). Workers who have been previously promoted are more likely to be promoted 
once again. 
As for firm characteristics, Pergamit and Veum (1999) and Francesconi (2001) find that 
larger firms provide better promotion prospects. A similar conclusion is suggested by 
Topel and Ward (1992) who argue that large firms comprise workers’ movements that 
would otherwise take place between smaller firms. In larger organizations, the existence of 
an internal labor market allows for career development within the firm, where individuals 
progress to higher level jobs through promotions (Baker et al., 1994a). 
Overall, as a consequence of promotions workers are rewarded with higher wages 
(Topel and Ward, 1992; Baker et al., 1994b; McCue, 1996; Pergamit and Veum, 1999; 
Francesconi, 2001). 
 
4.4 Data 
4.4.1 Quadros de Pessoal: a matched employer-employee data set  
I use data for the Portuguese economy from eighteen waves of Quadros de Pessoal, a 
matched worker-firm longitudinal data set. Annually, the Portuguese Ministry of Labor and 
Social Solidarity gathers information on all firms, from the private sector, with wage-
earners. Data collection is based on a mandatory response survey to firms. 
Quadros de Pessoal includes information on two hundred thousand firms a year, on 
average, and their workers (over two million a year). Each firm and worker is uniquely 
identified in the data set and this allows researchers to follow them over time. 
Firm level information includes the date of creation, number of establishments, 
number of workers, sales, industry, and region, among other. Workers’ files present data 
such as age, gender, date of admission into the firm, date of latest promotion, education, 
hierarchical level, occupation and wages. 
The information used in this study covers the 1986-2005 period, with the exceptions of 
1990 and 2001 since no worker data is reported for these years. After merging the cross-
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sectional worker’s and firm’s files and after some cleaning of the data set (see Appendix 
4.A for a detailed description), I obtain a sample with 1,033,767 observations, for 416,170 
workers, 44,920 firms and 437,498 matches firm-worker. 
The sample includes only new firms. This way, there is no past history of the worker 
within the firm that I cannot retrieve information about. However, with a sample of new 
firms, a problem may emerge: new firms experience high death rates. In effect, Mata and 
Portugal (1994) show that 20% of the firms created in the Portuguese manufacturing 
industry in 1983 died during the first year and that only half survived for four years. Thus, I 
keep in the sample firms that survived for at least two years after their creation. Table 4.B1 
in Appendix 4.B displays the distribution of these firms’ survival times. 
 
4.4.2 Promotion event data 
Allison (1984: 9) defines an event as “some qualitative change that occurs at a specific 
point in time”. In this research, the qualitative change under analysis is a promotion. To 
study the promotion event and its determinants, a collection of event history (or survival) 
data is needed. Using longitudinal data like Quadros de Pessoal that collects the date of 
promotion for workers within their firms makes such a study viable. Unlike other studies, 
the dates of promotion and, therefore, the promotion events are not self-reported. They 
are provided by the firm, thus less sensitive to measurement errors.  
Since I use a sample of newly created firms, the worker’s career within the firm is 
observed until he/she gets a promotion, and thereafter. The promotion event is defined by 
the variable “date of the latest promotion”, which refers to the year and month of the 
promotion. Due to the format of the variable, time elapsed until promotion is measured in 
months. Using 20 years of data from Quadros de Pessoal, the time to event (or spell length) 
ranges from 0 to 238 months.11 
Not only do I know how long it took a worker to get his/her first promotion, but I 
have also information concerning subsequent spells. This multiple spell data framework 
means that I can learn about the promotion history of the worker within the same firm. 
Nevertheless, if promotions measure the success of an employee within a firm, some 
workers fail to be successful. Effectively, for as long as data are available, some workers 
were not or have not yet been promoted (the spell end date is unknown), and so the total 
length of time is unknown. These right-censored observations are also taken into 
                                                 
11 October is the month of collection for the 2005 survey, the last survey year considered. 
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consideration in the treatment of the data. Also, for workers with previous promotion 
events, subsequent spells length may be censored if the follow-up period ends before 
promotion. Table 4.B2 in Appendix 4.B summarizes the distribution of promotions among 
workers. 
For uncensored observations, the spell lengths until the first promotion were computed 
as the difference between the date of the first promotion received and the date of 
admission at the firm. Subsequent spells were defined through the difference between the 
date of the present promotion and the date of the previously reported promotion. 
For right-censored observations, distinction has to be made between those who have 
never experienced a promotion and those who have previous events. As for the former, the 
length of the uncompleted spell is given by the date of collection of the survey minus the 
date of admission at the firm, while for the latter that length is obtained by the difference 
between the date of collection of the last survey and the date of the last reported 
promotion.  
The final structure of the data considers only one observation per worker and per 
event12, since it does not include time varying covariates. Because of this, the sample used 
in the empirical setting contains 479,308 observations, including 91,214 promotion events 
(complete spells). The observations refer to 402,463 workers and 44,728 firms. Summary 
statistics of the all events are shown in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of events 
Survival time Spells Frequency Percent 
25% 50% 75% 
Completed 91,214 19.03 12 16 30 
Right-censored 388,094 80.97    
Total 479,308 100    
Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Note: Survival time is measured in months. 
 
4.4.3 Promotions and workers’ characteristics 
Of the 91,214 promotion events considered, more than 70% were awarded to workers 
aged less than 35 years at hire while only 10% were given to older workers (with 45 or 
more years of age). The distribution of promotions by age group at hire is presented in 
Table 4.2 and it also displays gender differences in the distribution. One fact depicted in 
Table 4.2 is that men obtained more than half of the promotions and this distribution 
                                                 
12 For instance, a worker that did not receive any promotion during the observation period (right-censored 
observation) contributes with a single “censored” observation to the survival data. For a worker with multiple 
events, each event represents an observation, and it is assembled as pooled data. 
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towards men increases with the age group at hire (see column (1)). Moreover, it shows that 
older workers are promoted less often and this evidence is even stronger for older women 
(column (3)). 
 
Table 4.2: Distribution of promotion (%) by age group at hire and gender 
Age group at hire 
All 
(1) 
Men 
(2) 
Women 
(3) 
15-24 38.23 
35.94 
(49.84) 
40.81 
(50.16) 
25-34 35.24 
34.59 
(52.03) 
35.97  
(47.97) 
35-44 16.49 
17.07 
(54.89) 
15.83 
(45.11) 
45-54 7.70 
9.13 
(62.81) 
6.10 
(37.19) 
55-75 2.34 
3.27 
(74.10) 
1.29 
(25.90) 
Number of events 
(percent of total) 
91,214 
(100) 
48,352 
(53.01) 
42,862 
(46.99) 
Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Notes: 479,308 observations. In parentheses, columns (2) and (3) show the gender distribution 
of promotions within age group at hire.  
 
The suspicion of fewer chances for promotion for older individuals is reinforced by the 
data in Table 4.3 where promotion rates are summarized. Promotion rates decrease with 
age for both men and women but, with the exception of the 55-75 age group, women have 
a higher incidence of promotions than men. For instance, almost 21% of the women in the 
25-34 age group at hire receive a promotion against 17% of the men. Higher promotion 
rates for women are also found in the data for Britain used by Booth et al. (2003). 
 
Table 4.3: Promotion rates by age group at hire and gender 
Age group at hire 
All 
(1) 
Men 
(2) 
Women 
(3) 
15-24 22.70 21.04 24.62 
25-34 18.78 17.29 20.71 
35-44 16.44 14.89 18.82 
45-54 15.18 14.63 16.23 
55-75 12.76 13.26 11.52 
Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Note: 479,308 observations. Columns (1) to (3) report percentages. 
 
Analysis of the duration data also reveals differences in the survival probability by age 
group at hire and gender. Figure 4.1 compares survival probabilities for men and women. 
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Figure 4.1: Kaplan-Meier survival curves, by gender 
 
Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Note: 479,308 observations. ‘Time to event’ measures the time to promotion, 
in months. 
 
Survival curves by gender, presented in Figure 4.1, show that women face shorter 
survival times than men, although data from Table 4.2, column (2), indicates that men get 
more promotions than women. 
Figure 4.2 plots the Kaplan-Meier survival curves for each age group, showing that 
younger workers are more likely to receive a promotion than those who are older.  
 
Figure 4.2: Kaplan-Meier survival curves, by age group at hire 
 
Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Note: 479,308 observations. ‘Time to event’ measures the time to promotion, in 
months. 
 
Figure 4.3 also displays the fact that those who are older are less likely to be promoted 
than those who are younger, regardless of gender. 
CHAPTER 4. AGE AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROMOTION 43 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Kaplan-Meier survival curves, by gender and age group at entry 
 
Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Note: 479,308 observations. ‘Time to event’ measures the time to promotion, in months. 
 
It is plausible to think that firms promote younger workers because older workers have 
been promoted earlier in their careers and are already at higher levels in the hierarchy. 
However, in this sample of new firms the hierarchical level of entry into the firm is known 
and in accordance with the previous statement, older workers should be overrepresented at 
higher hierarchical levels. Table 4.4 displays the age distribution of employees by 
hierarchical level at hire and shows that higher levels (such as top managers or other 
managers) are predominantly occupied by employees aged 25 to 34. 
 
Table 4.4: Age distribution (%) by hierarchical level at hire 
Hierarchical level at hire 
Age 
group 
at hire 
Top 
managers 
Other 
managers 
Foremen/ 
supervisors 
Highly 
skilled 
workers 
Skilled 
workers 
Semi-
skilled 
workers 
Unskilled 
workers 
Apprenctices 
15-24 7.65 12.80 10.04 18.20 25.98 32.85 31.69 67.17 
25-34 48.82 47.38 36.59 50.40 38.95 34.69 30.04 22.53 
35-44 24.33 22.25 29.30 18.57 21.42 19.40 20.30 7.11 
45-54 13.60 12.51 17.23 9.36 10.29 9.82 12.25 2.50 
55-75 5.60 5.05 6.84 3.47 3.37 3.25 5.73 0.89 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Note: 479,308 observations. 
 
Additional descriptive statistics of selected variables is presented in Table 4.5. The 
sample comprises individuals mainly hired at younger ages where men account for more 
than half of the observations. Low educational levels is also a feature of the sample since, 
for almost 60% of the observations, 6 or less years of schooling is the highest attained level 
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of education. Workers enter the firm mainly at lower levels of the hierarchy and, on 
average, wait 27 months to be promoted. 
 
Table 4.5: Definition and summary statistics of selected variables 
 Definition 
Mean 
(standard 
deviation) 
Percent 
Age Age of the worker, in years 
33.244 
(10.821) 
-- 
Age group at hire Age interval, at the time of hiring   
15-24 =1 if the worker aged 15 to 24, inclusive -- 32.06 
25-34 =1 if the worker aged 25 to 34, inclusive -- 35.71 
35-44 =1 if the worker aged 35 to 44, inclusive -- 19.09 
45-54 =1 if the worker aged 45 to 54, inclusive -- 9.66 
55-75 =1 if the worker aged 55 to 75, inclusive -- 3.49 
Gender Gender   
Male =1 if men -- 57.76 
Female =1 if women -- 42.24 
Education Higher attained educational level   
No schooling =1 if the worker has not attended school -- .42 
2 years =1 if the worker has two complete years -- .82 
4 years =1 if the worker completed 4 years -- 29.86 
6 years =1 if the worker completed 6 years -- 27.50 
9 years =1 if the worker completed 9 years -- 18.71 
12 years =1 if the worker graduated from high school -- 16.90 
15 years =1 if the worker completed 15 of education -- 1.35 
16 years =1 if the workers completed 16 or more years -- 4.42 
Hierarchical level at entry Hierarchical level when the workers entered the 
firm 
  
Top managers =1 if top managers -- 3.75 
Other managers =1 if other managers -- 2.52 
Foremen/supervisors =1 if foremen or supervisors -- 2.32 
Highly skilled personnel =1 if highly skilled workers -- 3.99 
Skilled personnel =1 if skilled workers -- 45.06 
Semi-skilled personnel =1 if semi-skilled workers -- 14.03 
Unskilled personnel =1 if unskilled workers -- 13.68 
Apprentices =1 if apprentices -- 14.65 
Hierarchical level Current hierarchical level   
Top managers =1 if top managers -- 3.83 
Other managers =1 if other managers -- 2.73 
Foremen/supervisors =1 if foremen or supervisors -- 2.99 
Highly skilled personnel =1 if highly skilled workers -- 4.46 
Skilled personnel =1 if skilled workers -- 47.95 
Semi-skilled personnel =1 if semi-skilled workers -- 14.77 
Unskilled personnel =1 if unskilled workers -- 12.54 
Apprentices =1 if apprentices -- 10.73 
Previous events Number of prior promotions 
.176 
(.586) 
-- 
Tenure (in months) Tenure at the firm, in months 32.518 (32.834) 
-- 
Time to event (in months) Survival time to promotion, in months 26.944 (27.829) 
-- 
Firm size (log of number of 
employees) 
Size of the firm, as the logarithm of the number 
of employees 
2.836 
(1.531) 
-- 
Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Note: 479,308 observations. 
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4.5 Parametric models for survival analysis 
4.5.1 Choosing a model 
Parametric models for event data may assume two forms: accelerate failure time (AFT) 
models or proportional hazard (PH) models.13 
Consider t to be the survival time to an event. An AFT model starts by modelling ln t 
rather than t. In a log linear form, the regression model can be written as: 
ut += βx 'ln  
where x  is a vector of covariates, β  is the vector of regression coefficients, and u  
represents the error term with a probability density function given by (.)f . The 
distributional form of the error term u  determines the AFT model (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2005). If the function (.)f  has normal density, then the above model is called a lognormal 
regression model. Alternatively, if (.)f  is of logistic density, then a log-logistic regression 
model is in order. When (.)f  is an extreme-value density, an exponential or Weibull 
regression models are obtained. A generalized gamma model (that assumes a gamma 
distribution), nesting the Weibull or lognormal models, is also a parametric possibility.14  
AFT models change the time scale by a factor of ( )xβ−exp : if it is greater than 1, time 
is accelerated and if that factor is less than 1, time is decelerated. This means that if an 
individual at the baseline faces a probability of survival past time t equal to ( )tS , the 
survivor function, then an individual with covariates x  would experience probability of 
survival past time t equal to ( )tS  evaluated at the point ( )txβ−exp . This implies a 
deceleration of time with the increase of a covariate. Under AFT, the impact of the 
regressors is assumed to act additively on the log time scale and, thus, multiplicatively on 
the time scale itself. The parameters represent the effect of the covariates on the log time 
scale. 
AFT models measure the direct effect of the independent variables on the survival time 
instead of the hazard as in the PH models. This allows for an easier interpretation of the 
results because the parameters measure the effect of the correspondent covariate on the 
mean survival time. 
 
                                                 
13 A comparison between proportional hazards and accelerate failure time models is provided by Patel et al. 
(2006). 
14 The generalized gamma distribution has two ancillary parameters: sigma and kappa. The Weibull 
distribution is a special case of the generalized gamma when kappa equals 1. When kappa equals zero, it 
reflects the lognormal distribution. 
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In the PH model, the regressors have a multiplicative impact on the hazard function: 
( ) ( ) ( )xgthth 0=  
The function ( )th0  may assume a parametric form, such as Weibull, exponential or 
Gompertz. ( )xg  is a non-negative function of regressors. The model includes an intercept 
term 0β , and since letting ( ) ( )xβx exp=g  is a common option, ( ) ( )00 th βexp=  is the 
baseline hazard function. Thus, the baseline hazard function is the hazard when all 
covariates are zero. That is, the intercept term can be used to scale the baseline hazard. 
Nevertheless, if the function ( )th0  is not specified it yields the Cox proportional hazard 
model. The hazard of the event of interest in one group is a constant multiple of the hazard 
in the other group. In these models, the parameters represent the log hazard ratios which, 
exponentiated, provide the hazard ratios. 
Patel et al. (2006) underline that although the PH and AFT metrics are often thought of 
two distinct frameworks, they are connected since the exponential and the Weibull models 
can be implemented as both AFT and PH models. The authors additionally point out that 
the Weibull model often gives similar results to the more general PH model as for the 
effects of the covariates and, so, the AFT model can be considered as a very general 
approach that contains a specific class of PH models. 
Since there is an array of possible distributional forms and corresponding parametric 
models, how can selection be made? When parametric models are nested, likelihood-ratio 
or Wald tests may be used to choose between alternatives. This can be done to discriminate 
between Weibull versus exponential or between gamma versus lognormal or Weibull. 
Nonetheless, when nesting is not evidenced, likelihood-ratio or Wald tests are not 
appropriate and an alternative statistic has to be used. A popular one is the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC). Considering this, even though the model that best fits the data 
is the one with the largest log-likelihood, the preferred model is the one with smallest AIC 
value.  
 
4.5.2 Models with frailty and shared frailty15 
The above parametric models are able to explain the variability in observed time to 
failure. However, both observed and unobserved heterogeneity affect survival times. Due 
to omitted variables, some unexplained variability or overdispersion may remain and, 
                                                 
15 Gutierrez (2002), Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Stata (2007) provide a good explanation of these 
models. 
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hence, standard parametric survival models will not take into consideration why individuals 
with shorter times to failure are more frail than others. That is, controlling for observed 
heterogeneity, individuals with unobserved characteristics associated with shorter times to 
failure leave the state more quickly than others; in the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity even subjects with the same values of all regressors may experience different 
hazards. In this case, the estimate of the hazard will be an underestimate of the ‘true’ one 
(see Jenkins, 2004). When unobserved heterogeneity (also called ‘frailty’ in survival 
literature) is not account for, its effect is confounded with the baseline hazard. 
A frailty model is a survival model with unobserved heterogeneity for it attempts to 
measure that overdispersion. The frailty is included, in each row, as an unobservable 
multiplicative effect, α , on the hazard function: 
( ) ( )thth αα =|  
( )th  is a nonfrailty hazard function, α  is a random positive effect that, for identification, is 
assumed to have mean 1 and variance θ . 
Conditional on the frailty, the survivor function is now given by 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]
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where ( )tS  is the survivor function corresponding to the hazard function ( )th .  
Because α  is unobservable, it has to be integrated out of the conditional survivor 
function ( )α|tS  in order to achieve the unconditional survivor function. Considering that 
the probability density function of α  is given by ( )αg , a frailty model can be estimated 
following 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )∫∫
∞∞
==
00
dgtSdgtStS ααααα αθ |  
 
The unconditional hazard and density functions can be obtained from the 
unconditional survivor function as ( ) ( )( )tS
tf
th
θ
θ
θ =  and ( ) ( )
dt
tdS
tf θθ −= , respectively. 
Therefore, compared to a standard parametric model, a frailty survival model 
additionally estimates the parameter θ , which is an overdispersion parameter. 
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For mathematical tractability, the choice of the frailty distribution ( )αg  rests on either 
the inverse-Gaussian distribution, with parameters 1 and 
θ
1
, or the gamma distribution 
with 
θ
1
 and θ  as distributional parameters.  
In spite of the frailty distribution chosen, ( ) ( )tStS
0
=
→
θθ
lim . This means that, when there 
is no unobservable heterogeneity, the frailty model reduces to ( )tS . 
Using frailty models, distinction has to be made between the hazard faced by the 
individual, ( )thα , and the hazard for the population, ( )thθ . Correspondingly, an individual 
has a probability of survival past time t equal to ( )[ ]αtS , whilst ( )tSθ  measures the 
proportion of the population that survives past time t.16 
A shared frailty model is a generalization of the frailty models, where the frailty is 
considered to be group specific. Thus, in shared frailty models, where individuals are 
allowed to share the same frailty value, the frailty can be used to model intragroup 
correlation. It is the equivalent to a random effects panel data model (Gutierrez, 2002).  
For each observation from the ith group, in a shared frailty model the hazard becomes 
( ) ( )x|| thth ii αα =  
where iα represents the frailty shared among group i and ( )x|th  is the individual hazard 
given regressors x . 
Therefore, the subjects within a group are correlated since they share a common frailty. 
In this research I consider three possible “groups”: the worker, the firm, and the match 
worker-firm.  
Under an omitted variables scenario, a frailty model could be used when suspecting for 
the existence of unobserved heterogeneity within the group, while a shared frailty model 
could be specified in the presence of a latent common group effect. 
 
4.5.3 Occurrence dependence 
Dealing with multiple record/multiple events brings some concerns to the analysis. 
Specifically, it stresses the problem of event dependence. Hence, one assumption that has 
to be made is that the dependence of the hazard on time since last promotion has the same 
                                                 
16 Using the Stata 11 command – streg – to fit parametric survival models, when specifying the option – 
distribution( ) – a model for an individual with frailty equal to 1 will be specified; recall that when 
( )[ ] ( )tStS == αα 1, . However, specifying – frailty(distribution) – determines which of the two above 
forms for ( )tSθ   is used. 
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distributional form for each successive promotion. A second assumption required is that, 
for each individual, the multiple events must be independent. 
As suggested by Allison (1984), the consequences of violating the occurrence 
independence assumption can be minimized through the consideration, in the model, of 
covariates that capture the workers’ previous promotion history. To do so, I include in the 
specification a variable that accounts for the number of prior promotions: Previous events. 
Also, the length of the previous spell is set to zero when no previous spell is observed. 
For comparison, I estimate duration models for the first promotion as well as models 
for all promotions. This is done in order to examine potential differences between the 
distributions of time to first promotion and of all events. 
 
4.6 Estimation results 
4.6.1 First promotion 
The effect of selected covariates on the hazard (PH models) and on the survival time to 
first promotion (AFT models) is, respectively, exhibited in Tables 4.6 and 4.7.17 In the PH 
form, each regression coefficient indicates the proportional effect on the hazard of 
absolute changes in the respective covariate. Thus, a negative coefficient reflects a smaller 
hazard while a positive coefficient represents a higher hazard of promotion. Table 4.6 
presents the results for three different specifications: exponential, Weibull, and Gompertz.  
From Table 4.6, I conclude for the inappropriateness of the exponential model after 
performing a test (t-statistic=69.64, p-value=0) on the hypothesis that the ancillary 
parameter (the shape parameter) in the Weibull model is equal to 1. Additionally, the 
Weibull model performs better than Gompertz since the former shows both a higher log-
likelihood and a smaller AIC value. 
AFT metrics comparison is made in Table 4.7. In these models, positive coefficients 
reveal higher survival times or, which is the same, longer time elapsed until a promotion. 
On the other hand, negative coefficients mean shorter survival times. Additionally, an AFT 
regression coefficient relates proportionate changes in survival time to a unit change in a 
given covariate, ceteris paribus, since 
( )
k
k
x
t
∂
∂
=
lnβ . 
 
                                                 
17 I have also estimated a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards model. No significant differences in the 
coefficients were encountered. 
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Table 4.6: Proportional hazard models’ coefficients: first promotion 
Variables Exponential (1) 
Weibull  
(2) 
Gompertz 
(3) 
Age group at hire    
[15,25) .0538 
(.0100) 
.0621 
(.0100) 
.0560 
(.0100) 
[35,45) -.0615 
(.0120) 
-.0729 
(.0120) 
-.0653 
(.0120) 
[45,55) -.1112 
(.0161) 
-.1281 
(.0161) 
-.1163 
(.0161) 
[55,75] -.2326 
(.0258) 
-.2565 
(.0256) 
-.2399 
(.0258) 
Male -.0538 
(.0087) 
-.0528 
(.0087) 
-.0542 
(.0087) 
Education    
No schooling -.2542 
(.0758) 
-.2695 
(.0758) 
-.2580 
(.0758) 
2 years -.1555 
(.0521) 
-.1340 
(.0521) 
-.1492 
(.0521) 
6 years .1624 
(.0111) 
.1863 
(.0111) 
.1707 
(.0111) 
9 years .3076 
(.0131) 
.3629 
(.0131) 
.3244 
(.0131) 
12 years .4279 
(.0139) 
.4756 
(.0139) 
.4434 
(.0139) 
15 years .4782 
(.0357) 
.5526 
(.0357) 
.5022 
(.0357) 
16 years .5038 
(.0262) 
.5952 
(.0262) 
.5331 
(.0262) 
Hierarchical level at hire    
Top managers -.2978 
(.0263) 
-.3457 
(.0263) 
-.3118 
(.0263) 
Other managers -.2101 
(.0287) 
-.2537 
(.0287) 
-.2224 
(.0287) 
Foremen/ supervisors -.1291 
(.0272) 
-.1700 
(.0273) 
-.1416 
(.0273) 
Highly skilled .1591 
(.0202) 
.1489 
(.0202) 
.1562 
(.0202) 
Semi-skilled .1244 
(.0125) 
.1407 
(.0125) 
.1282 
(.0125) 
Unskilled .1705 
(.0138) 
.2088 
(.0138) 
.1803 
(.0138) 
Apprentices .4562 
(.0116) 
.4852 
(.0116) 
.4635 
(.0116) 
Firm size .2319 
(.0029) 
.2468 
(.0029) 
.2352 
(.0029) 
Constant -7.2673 
(.0200) 
-8.2459 
(.0255) 
-7.3831 
(.0213) 
Ancillary parameter -- 1.2223 
(.0035) 
.0027 
(.0002) 
Log-likelihood -188,523.53 -186,342.78 -188,387 
AIC  377,151.1 372,791.6 376,880 
Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Notes: Reference groups: [25-35) for the Age group at hire; female; 4 years of Education and skilled 
workers. All coefficients are statistically significant. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
AIC: Akaike information criterion. All models include Industry, Region and Year dummies. 
Number of observations: 422,738 observations. Number of failures: 64,239. Promotion events 
other than the first are not considered in this estimation. 
CHAPTER 4. AGE AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROMOTION 51 
 
Table 4.7: Accelerate Failure Time models’ estimates: first promotion 
Variables 
Weibull 
(1) 
Lognormal 
(2) 
Log-logistic 
(3) 
Generalized 
gamma 
(4) 
Age group at hire     
[15,25) -.0508 
(.0082) 
-.0494 
(.0089) 
-.0504 
(.0086) 
-.0509 
(.0086) 
[35,45) .0597 
(.0098) 
.0467 
(.0103) 
.0493 
(.0101) 
.0516 
(.0101) 
[45,55) .1048 
(.0132) 
.0853 
(.0136) 
.0928 
(.0135) 
.0939 
(.0134) 
[55,75] .2098 
(.0211) 
.1647 
(.0212) 
.1880 
(.0213) 
.1863 
(.0212) 
Male .0432 
(.0071) 
.0501 
(.0077) 
.0494 
(.0074) 
.0489 
(.0075) 
Education     
No schooling .2205 
(.0620) 
.1991 
(.0605) 
.2113 
(.0617) 
.2117 
(.0611) 
2 years .1096 
(.0426) 
.0832 
(.0422) 
.1016 
(.0428) 
.0972 
(.0424) 
6 years -.1524 
(.0091) 
-.1458 
(.0098) 
-.1534 
(.0095) 
-.1520 
(.0095) 
9 years -.2969 
(.0107) 
-.2759 
(.0115) 
-.2908 
(.0112) 
-.2882 
(.0112) 
12 years -.3891 
(.0114) 
-.3546 
(.0124) 
-.3769 
(.0119) 
-.3749 
(.0120) 
15 years -.4521 
(.0292) 
-.3920 
(.0317) 
-.4105 
(.0302) 
-.4180 
(.0306) 
16 years -.4870 
(.0214) 
-.4582 
(.0227) 
-.4770 
(.0220) 
-.4752 
(.0221) 
Hierarchical level at hire     
Top managers .2828 
(.0215) 
.2563 
(.0220) 
.2783 
(.0218) 
.2727 
(.0218) 
Other managers .2076 
(.0234) 
.2065 
(.0242) 
.2116 
(.0238) 
.2096 
(.0239) 
Foremen/ supervisors .1391 
(.0223) 
.0886 
(.0233) 
.1169 
(.0230) 
.1144 
(.0229) 
Highly skilled -.1218 
(.0166) 
-.0905 
(.0183) 
-.1233 
(.0173) 
-.1107 
(.0175) 
Semi-skilled -.1151 
(.0102) 
-.1061 
(.0109) 
-.1182 
(.0106) 
-.1130 
(.0106) 
Unskilled -.1708 
(.0113) 
-.1536 
(.0118) 
-.1714 
(.0115) 
-.1636 
(.0116) 
Apprentices -.3969 
(.0095) 
-.3675 
(.0107) 
-.3956 
(.0100) 
-.3894 
(.0101) 
Firm size -.2019 
(.0024) 
-.1824 
(.0025) 
-.1984 
(.0024) 
-.1950 
(.0025) 
Constant 6.7462 
(.0177) 
6.4372 
(.0176) 
6.4237 
(.0174) 
6.6037 
(.0180) 
Ancillary parameter 1.2223 
(.0029) 
1.3491 
(.0038) 
.7035 
(.0021) 
1.0901 
(.0071) 
Kappa -- -- -- .4644 (.0115) 
Log-likelihood -186,342.78 -186,064.71 -185,597.68 -185,341.33 
AIC  372,791.6 372,235.4 371,301.4 370,790.7 
Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005 
Notes: Reference groups: [25-35) for the Age group at hire; female; 4 years of Education and skilled workers. All 
coefficients are statistically significant. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. AIC: Akaike information criterion. 
All models include Industry, Region and Year dummies. Number of observations: 422,738 observations. Number of 
failures: 64,239. Promotion events other than the first are not considered in this estimation. 
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Relating the Weibull model, that can be specified both in the PH and the AFT metric, 
with other AFT models like the lognormal, the log-logistic or the generalized gamma allows 
for the conclusion that the generalized gamma is the preferred model (showing the highest 
log-likelihood and the smallest AIC values). The generalized gamma is useful for testing 
model specification. Hence, a Wald test on the hypothesis that the shape parameter in the 
generalized gamma model is equal to 1 (or, in other words, a test on the appropriateness of 
the Weibull) is rejected (Chi-squared=2163.12, p-value=0). Also, the lognormal does not 
provide a satisfactory fit to the data since the hypothesis that the shape parameter in the 
generalized gamma model equals zero is rejected. 
Coefficients on the categorical variable of interest Age group at hire, column (4) in Table 
4.7, show that the time to first promotion increases with age: relative to the 25-34 reference 
age group, the survival times are lengthened by 5.2%, 9.4% and 18.6%, respectively, for the 
age groups 35-44, 45-54 and 55-75. Therefore, younger employees are promoted at a faster 
pace than less younger ones. 
Another conclusion taken is that, compared to men, the time to first promotion is 
shortened by almost 5% for women. Also, the time to first promotion is reduced 
monotonically with the educational level: higher levels of education are associated with 
shorter survival times. McCue (1996) also reports a positive impact of education on the 
promotion hazard, but for all promotions not just the first one. 
Results suggest that entering the firm at low levels of the hierarchy provides more 
opportunities for promotion which is consistent with the existence of internal labor 
markets (Baker et al, 1994a). 
Finally, the firm size elasticity highlights the positive impact of the size on the 
promotion prospects: a 1% increase in firm size shortens by around 0.2% the survival time. 
Similar findings are presented by Pergamit and Veum (1999) and Francesconi (2001). 
To account for unobserved heterogeneity, I also attempted to estimate the generalized 
gamma model with gamma or inverse-gaussian distributed frailty. However, convergence 
was not obtained in either case. Therefore, I retried the same procedure using the log-
logistic model (which is the “second best” specification). The likelihood ratio test on the 
hypothesis that the overdispersion parameter equals zero presents a p-value of one. Thus, 
the frailty effect is not significant. Since the frailty variance is estimated to be near zero, the 
individual hazard function will resemble the population hazard function. In this situation, 
as Gutierrez (2002) suggests, the heterogeneity may be attributed to the passage of time. 
With the passage of time, the impact of the independent variables on the population hazard 
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will diminish in favor of the frailty effect; for instance, gender (or other covariate) becomes 
less significant and the frailty gains relevance in determining the chance of promotion. 
 
4.6.2 All promotions 
As in the previous subsection, for a multiple event framework, I start by comparing the 
PH with the AFT metric to determine the model that best fits the data. Therefore, Table 
4.8 shows the appropriateness of PH models while Table 4.9 presents AFT specifications. 
New to these tables is the introduction of the variables Previous events, Tenure and Tenure 
squared, compared to the covariates present in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. The variable Previous events 
is included to account for event dependence as described in Section 4.5.3. 
A concern using repeated events is that the hazard rate is expressed as a function of 
time since last event. Sometimes, it may be more adequate to let the hazard vary as a 
function of some common starting point. However, Allison (1984) refers that models for 
multiple events in which the hazard is a function of time since some fixed starting point 
may be inconvenient to estimate. As suggest by the author, to overcome this empirical 
inconvenience, I include in the model Tenure and its squared as independent variables. Also, 
its inclusion in the model intends to capture the influence of specific human capital 
accumulation and learning effects. 
Again, Table 4.8 indicates that the Weibull is the preferred model in the PH form. 
Since the Weibull satisfies both the PH and the AFT assumptions, Table 4.9 displays 
Weibull model results in the AFT form together with the other AFT models. This allows 
for the comparison between models and it reveals that the log-logistic specification shows 
the highest log-likelihood and the lowest AIC value. Therefore, the log-logistic model is the 
preferred one and, for this reason, I will comment only on the results presented for this 
particular model. 
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Table 4.8: Proportional hazard models’ coefficients 
Variables Exponential (1) 
Weibull  
(2) 
Gompertz 
(3) 
Age group at hire    
[15,25) .0003† 
(.0084) 
-.0109† 
(.0084) 
-.0034† 
(.0084) 
[35,45) -.0290 
(.0102) 
-.0146† 
(.0102) 
-.0117† 
(.0102) 
[45,55) -.0670 
(.0137) 
-.0624 
(.0137) 
-.0635 
(.0137) 
[55,75] -.2127 
(.0229) 
-.2075 
(.0229) 
-.1926 
(.0229) 
Male -.0468 
(.0073) 
-.0600 
(.0073) 
-.0564 
(.0073) 
Education    
No schooling -.2131 
(.0624) 
-.2494 
(.0625) 
-.2570 
(.0626) 
2 years -.1963 
(.0450) 
-.1777 
(.0450) 
-.1602 
(.0450) 
6 years .0912 
(.0093) 
.1218 
(.0093) 
.1317 
(.0093) 
9 years .1580 
(.0112) 
.2185 
(.0112) 
.2193 
(.0112) 
12 years .2629 
(.0118) 
.3257 
(.0119) 
.3284 
(.0118) 
15 years .2460 
(.0304) 
.3088 
(.0304) 
.3161 
(.0304) 
16 years .2332 
(.0228) 
.3041 
(.0228) 
.3196 
(.0228) 
Hierarchical level at hire    
Top managers -.1794 
(.0235) 
-.2178 
(.0245) 
-.2070 
(.0234) 
Other managers -.0978 
(.0248) 
-.1166 
(.0248) 
-.1141 
(.0248) 
Foremen/ supervisors -.0127† 
(.0233) 
-.0458 
(.0233) 
-.0429 
(.0233) 
Highly skilled .1869 
(.0175) 
.1713 
(.0175) 
.1832 
(.0175) 
Semi-skilled .1054 
(.0105) 
.1231 
(.0105) 
.1160 
(.0105) 
Unskilled .1012 
(.0116) 
.1426 
(.0116) 
.1295 
(.0116) 
Apprentices .3043 
(.0095) 
.3257 
(.0095) 
.3195 
(.0095) 
Previous events .6088 
(.0038) 
.7391 
(.0036) 
.7693 
(.0037) 
Tenure -.0118 
(.0003) 
-.0407 
(.0003) 
-.0236 
(.0003) 
Tenure squared x 10-2 -.0037 
(.0002) 
.0068 
(.0002) 
-.0043 
(.0002) 
Firm size .1600 
(.0023) 
.1752 
(.0024) 
.1682 
(.0023) 
Constant -5.8953 
(.0189) 
-7.7968 
(.0224) 
-6.1421 
(.0190) 
Ancillary parameter -- 1.7812 
(.0023) 
.0271 
(.0002) 
Log-likelihood -238,714.73 -220,292.33 -229,505.04 
AIC  477,539.5 440,696.7 459,122.1 
Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Notes: Reference groups: [25-35) for the Age group at hire; female; 4 years of Education and skilled 
workers. All coefficients are statistically significant with the exception of those signalled with †. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. AIC: Akaike information criterion. All models 
include Industry, Region and Year dummies. Number of observations: 479,308 observations. 
Number of failures: 91,214. 
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Table 4.9: Accelerate Failure Time models’ estimates 
Variables 
Weibull 
(1) 
Lognormal 
(2) 
Log-logistic 
(3) 
Generalized 
gamma 
(4) 
Age group at hire     
[15,25) .0061† 
(.0047) 
.0001† 
(.0051) 
-.0021† 
(.0045) 
.0013† 
(.0048) 
[35,45) .0082† 
(.0057) 
.0161 
(.0059) 
.0167 
(.0053) 
.0148 
(.0056) 
[45,55) .0350 
(.0077) 
.0363 
(.0078) 
.0381 
(.0071) 
.0375 
(.0075) 
[55,75] .1165 
(.0129) 
.1039 
(.0124) 
.1079 
(.0115) 
.1127 
(.0122) 
Male .0337 
(.0041) 
.0279 
(.0044) 
.0264 
(.0039) 
.0291 
(.0041) 
Education     
No schooling .1400 
(.0337) 
.1532 
(.0348) 
.1423 
(.0322) 
.1451 
(.0340) 
2 years .0998 
(.0252) 
.1097 
(.0247) 
.1123 
(.0230) 
.1089 
(.0242) 
6 years -.0684 
(.0052) 
-.0504 
(.0056) 
-.0451 
(.0050) 
-.0542 
(.0053) 
9 years -.1227 
(.0063) 
-.0850 
(.0066) 
-.0798 
(.0059) 
-.0951 
(.0063) 
12 years -.1829 
(.0066) 
-.1392 
(.0071) 
-.1296 
(.0063) 
-.1513 
(.0067) 
15 years -.1734 
(.0171) 
-.1185 
(.0182) 
-.1138 
(.0160) 
-.1355 
(.0171) 
16 years -.1707 
(.0128) 
-.1162 
(.0132) 
-.1109 
(.0118) 
-.1318 
(.0126) 
Hierarchical level at hire     
Top managers .1223 
(.0132) 
.0634 
(.0129) 
.0824 
(.0118) 
.0911 
(.0126) 
Other managers .0655 
(.0139) 
.0383 
(.0139) 
.0476 
(.0127) 
.0523 
(.0135) 
Foremen/ supervisors .0257 
(.0131) 
-.0119† 
(.0133) 
-.0026† 
(.0121) 
.0053† 
(.0128) 
Highly skilled -.0961 
(.0098) 
-.0638 
(.0106) 
-.0670 
(.0093) 
-.0762 
(.0100) 
Semi-skilled -.0691 
(.0059) 
-.0444 
(.0062) 
-.0453 
(.0055) 
-.0537 
(.0065) 
Unskilled -.0800 
(.0065) 
-.0439 
(.0068) 
-.0479 
(.0061) 
-.0552 
(.0065) 
Apprentices -.1828 
(.0054) 
-.1560 
(.0059) 
-.1568 
(.0052) 
-.1699 
(.0055) 
Previous events -.4149 
(.0022) 
-.5639 
(.0030) 
-.5454 
(.0027) 
-.4939 
(.0027) 
Tenure .0228 
(.0002) 
.0291 
(.0002) 
.0295 
(.0002) 
.0265 
(.0002) 
Tenure squared x 10-2 -.0038 
(.0001) 
-.0071 
(.0001) 
-.0071 
(.0001) 
-.0054 
(.0001) 
Firm size -.0984 
(.0013) 
-.0864 
(.0014) 
-.0848 
(.0013) 
-.0911 
(.0013) 
Constant 4.3773 
(.0113) 
4.0048 
(.0118) 
3.8266 
(.0110) 
4.1227 
(.0117) 
Ancillary parameter 1.7812 
(.0045) 
.8930 
(.0023) 
.4388 
(.0013) 
.6948 
(.0031) 
Kappa -- -- -- .5184 (.0073) 
Log-likelihood -220,292.33 -220,046.37 -216,118.36 -217,950.62 
AIC  440,696.7 440,204.7 432,348.7 436,015.2 
Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Notes: Reference groups: [25-35) for the Age group at hire; female; 4 years of Education and skilled workers. All coefficients are statistically 
significant with the exception of those signalled with †. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. AIC: Akaike information criterion. All 
models include Industry, Region and Year dummies. Number of observations: 479,308 observations. Number of failures: 91,214. 
CHAPTER 4. AGE AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROMOTION 56 
 
Relative to younger workers, aged 25 to 34 at hire (the reference group), workers hired 
at older ages face longer times to promotion. In effect, column (3) in Table 4.9 shows that 
workers aged 35 to 44 at hire experience a 1.7% higher survival time than the reference 
group. Also, survival times monotonically increase with age at hire. Compared to 
employees hired at ages 25 to 34, workers in the 45 to 54 age group and those in the 55 to 
75 years cohort at hire present longer times to promotion (3.8% and 10.8%, respectively). 
These results suggest that firms seem to favor younger workers in promotions. Stronger 
effects were obtained when considering the distribution of time to first promotion. This 
preference in promotion opportunities towards younger employees may influence older 
workers’ motivation as well as their employment status. Effectively, evidence shows that 
age discrimination practices at the firm level are consistent with lower wage growth for 
older workers, with early retirement behavior and job separations (Adams, 2002; Johnson 
and Neumark, 1997).  
Considering gender, men are found to have a 2.6% higher survival time than women, 
meaning that women are more likely to receive a promotion than men. Ferreira (2009), 
using the same data set, reports similar results for overall promotions. 
Better educated individuals see their survival times to promotion shortened. This is 
consistent with the returns to education associated with human capital theory. However, if 
education can be considered an indicator of general human capital accumulation, tenure 
may also be regarded as a characteristic of specific human capital accumulation and of 
learning. Results suggest that time to promotion increases with tenure but at a decreasing 
rate. McCue (1996) finds a similar result regarding the effect of tenure on the promotion 
hazard.  
Considering the Hierarchical level at hire, estimates show that compared to employees 
hired as skilled workers, those getting into the firm at lower hierarchical levels (apprentices, 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers) experience shorter times to promotion. Nevertheless, 
although at a higher hierarchical level, highly skilled workers also present a 6.7% smaller 
survival time in comparison with skilled workers at hire. 
The occurrence dependence variable Previous events clearly suggests that past 
promotions are a stronger indicator of subsequent ones. Previous promotions contribute 
to significantly shorten survival times: the receipt of one (previous) promotion reduces by 
54.5% the time to promotion. Thus, previously promoted workers are more likely to be 
promoted once again which is consistent with the promotion fast-tracks documented in 
the literature (Baker et al., 1994a; Pergamit and Veum, 1999).  
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As for firm characteristics, Firm size is negatively associated with survival times, as the 
elasticity of the survival time relative to the number of firm employees presents a negative 
sign. Workers in large firms face shorter periods to promotion than those in small firms. 
Firms with a larger workforce have overall structured hierarchical levels that open to the 
set of an internal labor market. In the existence of an internal labor market, medium to 
high levels of the hierarchy are filled in through promotions from lower levels. This result 
is in agreement with previous empirical findings (Pergamit and Veum, 1999; Francesconi, 
2001).  
Table 4.10 shows the results for log-logistic models with frailty and shared frailty. 
Columns (1) and (2) report the estimates for the frailty models with gamma and inverse-
gaussian distribution for the frailty, respectively. Comparing these with the results 
presented in Table 4.9 for the log-logistic model no striking differences occur: coefficients 
are very similar in each of the models. Nonetheless, the frailty effect is always statistically 
significant considering the results of the likelihood ratio tests. 
The model that best fits the data is the one with the gamma distributed frailty and it is 
also the preferred model because it has the lowest AIC value. This is the reason why in the 
shared-frailty models I use the gamma distribution for the frailty. 
In a shared-frailty model, the frailty is specific to a particular group. Columns (3), (4) 
and (5) in Table 4.10 present the estimates for models where the frailty is shared by the 
match worker/firm, by the worker and by the firm, respectively. The results of columns (3) 
and (4) do not differ substantially and both are similar to the results obtained for a non-
frailty specification. The major difference occurs when allowing for correlation within 
firms. In effect, considering the overall specifications, the one that uses a frailty shared at 
the firm level is the one producing the best fit (it presents the largest log-likelihood and the 
smallest AIC value). 
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Table 4.10: Estimates from the log-logistic models with frailty 
Frailty Shared-frailty (Gamma) 
Variables Gamma 
(1) 
Inverse gaussian 
(2) 
Match 
(3) 
Worker 
(4) 
Firm 
(5) 
Age group at hire      
[15,25) -.0025† 
(.0045) 
-.0024† 
(.0045) 
-.0029† 
(.0046) 
-.0030† 
(.0046) 
-.0132 
(.0044) 
[35,45) .0168 
(.0053) 
.0168 
(.0053) 
.0173 
(.0054) 
.0175 
(.0054) 
.0227 
(.0052) 
[45,55) .0381 
(.0071) 
.0381 
(.0071) 
.0384 
(.0072) 
.0386 
(.0072) 
.0517 
(.0071) 
[55,75] .1064 
(.0114) 
.1067 
(.0114) 
.1066 
(.0116) 
.1068 
(.0116) 
.1357 
(.0114) 
Male .0260 
(.0039) 
.0261 
(.0039) 
.0255 
(.0040) 
.0256 
(.0040) 
.0430 
(.0044) 
Education      
No schooling .1420 
(.0320) 
.1422 
(.0320) 
.1466 
(.0327) 
.1474 
(.0328) 
.0370† 
(.0326) 
2 years .1105 
(.0229) 
.1109 
(.0229) 
.1131 
(.0233) 
.1132 
(.0234) 
.0177† 
(.0241) 
6 years -.0440 
(.0050) 
-.0443 
(.0050) 
-.0440 
(.0051) 
-.0439 
(.0051) 
-.0141 
(.0052) 
9 years -.0775 
(.0059) 
-.0780 
(.0059) 
-.0772 
(.0060) 
-.0768 
(.0061) 
-.0334 
(.0063) 
12 years -.1260 
(.0063) 
-.1268 
(.0063) 
-.1252 
(.0064) 
-.1248 
(.0065) 
-.0169 
(.0068) 
15 years -.1095 
(.0160) 
-.1104 
(.0160) 
-.1075 
(.0163) 
-.1068 
(.0163) 
-.0203† 
(.0154) 
16 years -.1075 
(.0118) 
-.1082 
(.0118) 
-.1072 
(.0120) 
-.1066 
(.0120) 
-.0283 
(.0124) 
Hierarchical level at hire      
Top managers .0791 
(.0118) 
.0797 
(.0118) 
.0767 
(.0120) 
.0761 
(.0120) 
.0949 
(.0121) 
Other managers .0461 
(.0127) 
.0464 
(.0127) 
.0451 
(.0129) 
.0444 
(.0129) 
.0960 
(.0127) 
Foremen/ supervisors -.0043† 
(.0121) 
-.0039† 
(.0121) 
-.0052† 
(.0123) 
-.0060† 
(.0123) 
-.0024† 
(.0119) 
Highly skilled -.0638 
(.0093) 
-.0644 
(.0093) 
-.0641 
(.0094) 
-.0642 
(.0095) 
.0699 
(.0096) 
Semi-skilled -.0433 
(.0055) 
-.0437 
(.0055) 
-.0424 
(.0056) 
-.0424 
(.0057) 
.0078† 
(.0060) 
Unskilled -.0458 
(.0060) 
-.0462 
(.0060) 
-.0456 
(.0062) 
-.0454 
(.0062) 
.0148 
(.0068) 
Apprentices -.1534 
(.0052) 
-.1541 
(.0052) 
-.1566 
(.0053) 
-.1565 
(.0053) 
-.1031 
(.0054) 
Previous events -.5593 
(.0030) 
-.5566 
(.0029) 
-.5227 
(.0035) 
-.5202 
(.0036) 
-.2521 
(.0025) 
Tenure .0301 
(.0002) 
.0300 
(.0002) 
.0301 
(.0002) 
.0302 
(.0002) 
.0290 
(.0002) 
Tenure squared x 10-2 -.0076 
(.0001) 
-.0075 
(.0001) 
-.0075 
(.0001) 
-.0075 
(.0001) 
-.0082 
(.0001) 
Firm size -.0833 
(.0013) 
-.0836 
(.0013) 
-.0845 
(.0013) 
-.0845 
(.0013) 
.0021† 
(.0034) 
Constant 3.7815 
(.0115) 
3.7900 
(.0114) 
3.7957 
(.0112) 
3.7934 
(.0112) 
3.5514 
(.0150) 
Ancillary parameter .4291 
(.0014) 
.4308 
(.0014) 
.4306 
(.0013) 
.4301 
(.0013) 
.4231 
(.0013) 
Overdispersion 
parameter 
.1119 
(.0098) 
.0961 
(.0101) 
.1768 
(.0115) 
.1902 
(.0117) 
3.5156 
(.0503) 
Log-likelihood -216,037.94 -216,054.8 -215,849 -215,819.67 -175,232.38 
AIC 432,189.9 432,223.6 431,812 431,753.3 350,578.8 
Number of groups -- -- 422,738 402,463 44,728 
Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Notes: Reference groups: [25-35) for the Age group at hire; female; 4 years of Education and skilled workers. All coefficients are statistically significant with the exception 
of those signalled with †. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. AIC: Akaike information criterion. All models include Industry, Region and Year dummies. Number 
of observations: 479,308 observations. Number of failures: 91,214 
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Figure 4.4 shows the estimated individual and population hazard functions for the 
three different levels of frailty. 
 
Figure 4.4: Estimated individual and population hazard functions 
 
Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Note: ‘Time to event’ measures the time to promotion, in months. 
 
When the frailty is significant, the population hazard will tend to begin falling past a 
certain time, independently of the shape of the individual hazard. This is explained by the 
frailty effect: with the passage of time, the frailer individuals will fail and only the less frail 
will remain in the population hence generating a more homogeneous population. This is 
reflected in Figure 4.4. 
The stronger firm frailty effect shows that firms’ unobservable characteristics are 
relevant in the determination of the promotion process. Controlling for firms’ 
unobservable heterogeneity, the magnitude of the impact of the Age group at hire on the time 
to promotion is even stronger. Within firms, compared to workers hired with 25 to 34 
years old, when workers are hired above the age 34 threshold they find their time to 
promotion lengthened and this length is amplified with age: workers aged 35 to 44 at hire 
experience a 2.3% higher survival time than the reference group, with times to promotion 
enhanced to 5.2% and 13.6%, respectively, for workers aged 45 to 54 and older than 55. 
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Overall results18 suggest that older individuals have less promotion opportunities than 
younger workers, controlling for firm, worker or match effects. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Using a sample of new firms and their workers, this research shows that age harms 
workers’ promotion opportunities. Duration models’ results suggest that older individuals 
experience longer survival times to promotion than their younger counterparts. The 
magnitude of this effect is even stronger when considering just the time to first promotion. 
Older employees are left for last in promotion. 
Facing uneven promotion prospects, older employees may face discouragement in the 
workplace, less appreciation and become more attracted by early retirement schemes. 
These results seem to demonstrate that active aging policies should be more focused at 
endorsing labor market opportunities for older workers. If the aim is to delay the exit from 
the labor force, in order to raise the employment rate of older workers, then attention 
must be given to the improvement of older individuals’ chances in all employment related 
dimensions. 
Left for future research is the analysis on how the employment history of older 
individuals influences their future career development. That is, knowing if older workers 
entering new firms are “job changers” or individuals that come from a spell of non-
employment should have an impact on their promotion prospects. Moreover, the study of 
how uneven promotion opportunities influence the labor market outcomes of older 
workers, with particular interest on the exit decision, remains a topic for future research. 
This can be tested within a competing risks framework in which retirement is one of the 
alternative paths. Knowing the factors that influence the decision of leaving the labor force 
is crucial for the development of policy measures that aim at postponing the exit from the 
labor market. 
                                                 
18 I have also estimated the models for a sample of workers aged 15 to 65, since 65 is the legal retirement age 
in Portugal. Nevertheless, results remain the same: older workers experience greater times to promotion than 
younger workers do. 
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Appendices to Chapter 4 
 
Appendix 4.A  Construction of the sample 
 
To get the sample used in the study I started by creating a panel of firms merging the 
cross-sectional 1986 to 2005 files available on Quadros de Pessoal. The aim was to obtain a 
panel including just new firms. Thus, the variable Year of Creation available on each cross-
sectional file for firms is crucial. 
From the above panel I started by eliminating the firms reporting two or more 
different years of creation (4% of the observations dropped), to avoid misinterpretations. 
After identifying the year in which the firm firstly appears in the dataset and signalling the 
moment when the firm is created, I kept the firms for which the year of creation coincides 
with the first year of appearance in the dataset (Panel A). 
Next, I turned my attention to the workers’ panel. In situations where there existed 
more than one observation for worker/year I kept just the observation related to the main 
job (the one with higher reported hours of work). Workers with 3019 or less hours/week of 
work were removed from the sample. This was done in order to assure some attachment to 
the labor market. Also I keep just employees aged 15 to 7520. A relevant variable in this 
panel is the Date of Admission at the Firm since it is used to create the Promotion indicator as 
well as the Tenure variable. Therefore, I checked for inconsistencies in the variable such as: 
Date of Admission higher than the year of the survey. Also, if the reported Date of Admission 
for the pair worker/firm was always the same, missing values on Date of Admission for that 
pair were replaced by the reported non-missing value. I have also replaced inconsistencies 
(like decreasing Date of Admission over time) with the value reported more than half of the 
times. The remaining inconsistencies and missing values on this variable were dropped 
(Panel B). 
Afterwards, sorted by firm and year, I merged Panel A with Panel B obtaining a panel 
of new firms and their workers. Firms that did not present information on workers from 
the year of creation and firms that had workers hired (Date of Admission) before the year of 
                                                 
19 In Van Bastelaer et al. (1997) a definition of part-time work is presented for international comparison. In 
some countries, like the United States, 35 hours of work a week is the normal threshold for a worker to be 
classified as a part-timer. That is the benchmark in the papers by Blank (1988) and Hirsch (2005). In other 
countries, like the United Kingdom, working 30 or fewer hours per week is the boundary in the definition of 
part-time employment. I consider this 30 hours threshold to define part-time employment in Portugal. 
20 For comparison, in the empirical analysis I have also used a subsample of workers aged 15 to 65. 
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creation were excluded. Finally, I include firms with more than two years of survival in the 
market. The above exclusions resulted in a sample with 1,033,767 observations, for 416,170 
workers, 44, 920 firms and 437,498 spells firm/worker. 
 
Appendix 4.B Tables 
 
Table 4.B1: Distribution of firms’ survival times 
Number of years of survival Frequency Percent 
3 9,407 20.94 
4 9,685 21.56 
5 2,285 5.09 
6 5,231 11.64 
7 3,941 8.77 
8 3,530 7.86 
9 2,862 6.37 
10 2,245 5.00 
>10 5,734 12.77 
Total 44,920 100 
Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
 
Table 4.B2: Distribution of promotions 
Number of promotions Frequency Percent 
0 352,473 84.69 
1 46,158 11.09 
2 11,817 2.84 
3 3,619 .87 
4 1,255 .30 
5 470 .11 
6 204 .05 
7 85 .02 
8 36 .01 
9 32 .01 
10 7 .00 
11 6 .00 
12 3 .00 
13 2 .00 
14 1 .00 
15 2 .00 
Total 416,170 100 
Source: Computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
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Chapter 5 
Flexible hours of  work and retirement behavior 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Facing the challenge of population aging, policy makers find measures that postpone 
labor market exit of older individuals attractive. These are expected to relieve the burden 
on Social Security systems. The ratio of population aged 65 and over to the total 
population was 14% in OECD countries in 2005, a 2 percentage point increase over a ten 
year period. Since population aging is increasing the ratio of retirees to workers, 
sustainability issues arise to Social Security systems as well as potential labor supply 
shortages. In fact, the ratio of inactive population aged 65 or older to the total labor force 
was as high as 26% in 2005 for the OECD countries (OECD, 2007). Johnson and 
Zimmermann (1993) address those two concerns related to an aging population and, 
additionally, stress that an aging labor force will place upward pressure on labor costs, due 
to the positive association between age and earnings, and may have a negative impact on 
productivity. Börsch-Supan (2003) considers that labor productivity will have to grow to 
compensate the impact of population aging on domestic production. 
To ease the pressure on Social Security and to increase the participation rates of older 
individuals, governments have been promoting the expansion of working lives. This has 
been enforced through the elimination of mandatory retirement, the adoption of age 
discrimination legislation21 and/or increasing the legal retirement age. All these measures 
aim at raising the employment of older individuals. What are their effects in the labor 
market? Shannon and Grierson (2004), based on legal differences in mandatory retirement 
in Canada, show that making compulsory retirement illegal would have a small impact on 
the size of the older workforce and, for that reason, such a policy alone would not solve 
                                                 
21 Age discrimination laws prohibit discrimination in hiring, promotion, wages or firing on the grounds of 
age. These laws may also forbid the inclusion of statements or specifications in job notices, or advertisements, 
of age preference and limitations; the laws can additionally prohibit mandatory retirement based on age. 
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the problems associated with an aging population and the consequent reduction in the 
share of the population employed. Nevertheless, for the United States, Ashenfelter and 
Card (2002) study the effect of the elimination of mandatory retirement at age 70 on faculty 
retirement patterns and conclude that such elimination decreased by approximately 67% 
the retirement rates of 70 and 71 year olds. 
Adams (2004) suggests that age discrimination legislation increases employment among 
individuals that are in the legally protected age ranges and that there is a decline in 
retirement among the protected workers. Nonetheless, according to Lazear (1979) these 
sorts of measures would endure efficiency losses that affect all workers and firms. In 
Lazear’s model of long-term incentive contracts, older workers earn more than their 
marginal product and more than their reservation wage, whereas younger workers receive 
less than their marginal product (steep age-earnings profile); hence the need for mandatory 
retirement. Even so, Neumark and Stock (1999) show that age discrimination laws lead to 
steeper age-earnings profiles in the labor market and that they strengthen the relationship 
between workers and firms, leading to the adoption of Lazear contracts. Furthermore, the 
authors find that age discrimination legislation increases the relative employment of older 
workers. 
Focusing on the labor demand implications of a change in the legal retirement age for 
women in Portugal, Martins et al. (2009) find that older women affected by the new law 
faced virtually no change in wages and working hours. The authors also find that firms 
employing older women reduced their hirings in a significant way, especially of younger 
women. 
There seems to be no unique and effective recipe to achieve a longer and higher 
participation of older individuals in the labor force. This research brings another variable to 
the discussion surrounding active aging policies. The aim of this chapter is to examine the 
impact of the reduction of hours of work before retirement on the age of exit from the 
labor force. Combining a reduction in working hours with increased leisure time at older 
ages may motivate individuals to work longer while gradually withdrawing from the labor 
market. But, as Hutchens and Grace-Martin (2006) suggest, that decision is not always up 
to the worker: employers play a relevant role. 
Overall, retirement decisions are influenced by financial incentives, individual 
characteristics, demographic factors and labor market constraints. This chapter examines 
the influence of working hours’ reduction before retirement on the retirement decisions of 
older individuals. I aim at answering the following questions: is the reduction in hours of 
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work associated with retirement at later ages? Can it be used to extend older workers’ labor 
force participation and delay the complete withdraw from the labor force? 
I find that a voluntarily reduction of working hours is associated with exit from the 
labor market at earlier ages. 
The main contribution of this research is to evaluate the relevance of working hours’ 
reduction on the retirement behavior of older individuals. Older workers may want to 
withdraw gradually from the labor force through the reduction of hours of work towards 
the end of their working lives. It is thought that reduced working hours would help 
increase employment levels among older people (European Commission, 2007). The 
literature on the impact of working hours flexibility on the labor supply of older individuals 
is very recent (Gielen, 2009; Blau and Shvydko, 2007; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2004) and 
finds that working hours flexibility generates only small net increases in older worker’s 
labor force participation. As far as I am aware, no such study exists for Portugal. Therefore, 
besides the novelty of this research for the Portuguese labor market it is also a new 
contribution to the incipient literature on the subject. 
I take advantage of a recent and, to my knowledge, not yet used inquiry called 
“Transition to Retirement”, conducted simultaneously with the 2006 Portuguese Labor 
Force Survey. To study the effect of working hours’ reduction before retirement on the age 
of retirement I initially use a sample that includes only retired individuals and then use 
another sample which considers both retirees and nonretirees.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of the major 
legislation changes on retirement benefits eligibility in Portugal. Section 5.3 reviews the 
literature related to the retirement behavior of older individuals with major focus on the 
influence of hours of work on their labor force participation. Section 5.4 describes the data 
and Section 5.5 presents the model and the empirical strategy. Results are shown in Section 
5.6. Sensitivity analysis is performed in Section 5.7. A summary and discussion conclude 
the chapter. 
 
5.2 Legal setting on retirement in Portugal 
Over the last 15 years, the Portuguese government has approved several legislation 
changes concerning retirement. These were made to accommodate demographic changes, 
namely population aging, and its impact on Social Security’s sustainability. Since 1999, 65 
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years is the minimum legal age that grants access to full retirement pension both for male 
and female workers in Portugal. 
By the end of 1993, the promulgation of a legal diploma set a gradual standardization 
of the legal retirement age (LRA) for both men and women, with effectiveness from 1994 
onward. Until then, the LRA was 65 years for men and 62 years for women, and this law 
increased the LRA for women by six months every year until reaching 65 years old (the 
LRA by 1999). Other major changes introduced by the law were a raise from 10 to 15 in 
the required number of years with payments to Social Security for a worker to become 
eligible for retirement benefits and a modification on the pensions’ method of 
computation. 
At the beginning of 1999, and in the course of macroeconomic growth, the age of 
access to retirement was rendered more flexible, according to contributions’ profiles. In 
this sense, a new law made it possible for workers at least 55 years old and a working career 
of 30 complete calendar years to have the right to pension benefits. Even though there was 
a reduction factor linked to early retirement pensions, this flexibility imposed significant 
financial pressure on the Social Security system. As a consequence, the legal norms that 
allowed access to a pension before the worker reached the legal retirement age were 
suspended in 2005. Early retirement schemes became once again possible in 2007, over a 
new law that was published for discussion in November 2006, but with severe penalties 
imposed to pensions. The 2007 law also prohibits the accumulation of early retirement 
pension earnings with labor earnings if the worker remains in the same firm or corporation. 
All these institutional changes certainly had an influence on the retirement behavior of 
Portuguese older individuals. Therefore, in the empirical analysis, I control for the year of 
retirement to capture the effect of changes in the institutional setting.  
A comprehensive synopsis of retirement legislation changes in Portugal is presented in 
Appendix 5.A. 
 
5.3 Previous literature on retirement behavior 
5.3.1 General studies 
Financial incentives are major determinants of retirement (Mitchell and Fields, 1984 
and Dugan, 1984). The worker’s retirement age depends on his wage and pension benefits. 
According to the theory, high-wage workers have larger opportunity sets and would prefer 
to consume more leisure, so that they will want to retire earlier. Simultaneously, higher 
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wages imply that the price of retirement is also higher, and hence the worker will want to 
postpone retirement. The final impact on the age of retirement will depend on which effect 
dominates: the substitution or the income effect. An increase in pension benefits, however, 
generates income and substitution effects that work in the same direction; the increase in 
benefits expands the worker’s opportunity set, raises the demand for leisure and induces 
early retirement. It additionally reduces the price of retirement, increasing the demand for 
leisure and thus inducing early retirement. Belloni and Alessie (2008), using data for Italy, 
find that when workers become eligible for pension benefits, changing their financial 
incentives, they experience a considerable increase in their retirement probability. 
The seminal work by Mitchell and Fields (1984) studies the influence of economic 
factors in determining retirement behavior. The authors use a subsample of the Benefit 
Amounts Survey, developed by the United States (US) Department of Labor, which 
includes only individuals who have reached the age of mandatory retirement by the time of 
the survey in 1978. The dataset contains 8,733 males in 10 firms who have retired between 
the ages 60-68, meaning that it surveys workers from different firms covered by different 
pension plans. Data show that different pension plans provide different retirement 
incentives. They estimate two equations: the age of retirement is the dependent variable in 
the first regression (estimated by OLS) and the probability of choosing a given retirement 
age is the outcome of interest in the second one (estimated by the use of conditional logit 
models). Independent variables such as the present value of income or base wealth and the 
gain in the present value of income obtained from a longer working life were included in 
the first equation. Variables like the present discounted value of expected lifetime income 
and the number of leisure years were included as covariates in the second equation. Results 
suggest that those individuals with higher base income retire earlier and that people who 
have more to gain by postponing retirement retire at later ages. Additionally, income and 
leisure are both relevant determinants of retirement ages. A 10% increase in earned income 
is predicted to raise the average retirement age by slightly more than a month. Also, 
increasing retirement benefits by 10% would lower the retirement age by less than a month, 
on average. 
Using 238 observations from pooled time-series cross-section taken from the US 
Current Population Survey (1978-80), Dugan (1984) examines the impact of economic and 
demographic influences on the labor force participation rate of older individuals. The focus 
rests on the effects of cohort crowding and social security incentives on the labor supply of 
the elderly. This research concludes that a relative increase in young individuals leads to a 
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decline in relative wages and living standards of older female workers and, consequently, to 
an increase in female labor force participation. Furthermore, retirement incentives have a 
negative effect on female and male labor force behavior. As for the impact of individual 
characteristics, higher educational levels result in higher participation rates of people aged 
65 and over and of women aged 55-64. The differential found between men’s and women’s 
participation rates was largely a result of the female response to marital status and 
retirement incentives. 
The decision to retire or the decision to remain in the labor force may be seen as a 
simple individual and voluntary decision that is influenced by economic and demographic 
factors. However, the voluntary nature of that decision may not be as straightforward as it 
appears. Labor demand constraints and/or technological change sometimes push older 
individuals towards involuntary retirement (Osberg, 1993; Bartel and Sicherman, 1993 and 
Friedberg, 2003). Using international microdata for 19 industrialized countries, Dorn and 
Sousa-Poza (2009) find that ‘involuntary’ early retirement is particularly widespread in 
Continental Europe; countries facing economic recessions and having rigid employment 
protection laws show higher shares of ‘involuntary’ retirement amongst early retirees. Also, 
early retirement incentive schemes induce both individuals to ‘voluntary’ early retirement 
and firms to push employees into early retirement. 
To study the effects of technological change on the careers of older people, especially 
in what concerns the decision to retire, Bartel and Sicherman (1993) combine data from the 
1966-83 US National Longitudinal Survey of Older Men, data from Jorgenson et al. (1987)22 
and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Using logit models they estimate the probability 
of retirement against measures of technological change (expected and unexpected), the 
amount of training required, individual characteristics (like age, health status, education, 
tenure and self-employment), industry unemployment rate and output growth (to capture 
industry cyclical changes). The authors find that workers in industries with high rates of 
technological change will retire later if there is a net positive correlation between 
technological change and on-the-job training; also, individuals in industries undergoing 
technological change have longer working careers. An unexpected change in the rate of 
technological change will induce older workers to retire sooner because the required 
amount of retraining will be an unattractive investment. Finally, there is a negative 
correlation between on-the-job training and the likelihood of retirement, i.e. training delays 
retirement. In the same line of research, but using the US Current Population Survey and 
                                                 
22 Cited from Bartel and Sicherman (1993). 
CHAPTER 5. FLEXIBLE HOURS OF WORK AND RETIREMENT BEHAVIOR 73 
 
the Health and Retirement Study, Friedberg (2003) uses evidence from computer use to 
infer the effect of technological change on older workers employment, and concludes that 
computer users retire later than non-users. 
Osberg (1993) examines the importance of labor demand for hours of work and labor 
force participation among older workers. Using data from the 1986 Labour Market Activity 
Survey of Statistics Canada, findings on the probability of retirement suggest that there is a 
lower propensity for university educated men to retire before 55 and that the availability of 
jobs is a significant determinant of retirement for males under 65. Moreover, a significant 
fraction of retirement decisions are influenced by the belief that there are no jobs available, 
hence affecting labor supply decisions. 
Focusing on the period between the end of a career and permanent retirement, Ruhm 
(1990) examines the employment patterns of older individuals in the near end of their 
working lives. Using data from a Social Security Longitudinal Survey and introducing the 
possibility of partial retirement, the author studies the age at which career job ends, the 
postcareer labor force participation and the number of years of postcareer labor market 
participation. He finds that highly paid and better educated individuals remain in career 
jobs until later ages, have low rates of postcareer labor force participation and infrequently 
reverse retirement status. Conditional on remaining in the labor force, educated workers 
present long durations of partial retirement. Married individuals tend to work in career 
positions until later ages, hold bridge jobs (the job between career job and permanent 
retirement) longer, more frequently partially retire and are more likely to reverse retirement 
status. Finally, departures from career jobs may be induced by the economic incentives in 
private pension plans or due to involuntary layoffs. 
 
5.3.2 Hours of work and the retirement decision 
As individuals age, their preference for work and leisure experience a change since 
older workers may get higher satisfaction from additional hours of leisure and less hours of 
work than younger workers. Also, due to health constraints or care obligations, as workers 
age they may want to reduce their hours of work. This change in the valuation of time 
implies a change in reservation wages over the life cycle, which influences the labor force 
participation decision.23  
                                                 
23 Stylized facts show that labor force participation rates are smaller for older workers (aged 55-64) than for 
prime-age workers (25-54 years old). 
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If workers could freely choose hours of work they would prefer to gradually reduce 
their time at work as they age (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2004). Since the decision does not 
depend solely on the individual’s will, gradual retirement is not as common as workers 
would like it to be (Hutchens and Grace-Martin, 2006). Although there is evidence for the 
United States that some workers engage in ‘part-time’ retirement by working fewer hours in 
the years prior to complete withdrawal from the labor force (Ruhm, 1990; Burtless and 
Moffit, 1985; Gustman and Steinmeier, 1984), most people move directly from full-time 
work to full-time retirement (Hutchens and Grace-Martin, 2006). As Gielen (2009) notes, a 
discrete drop in hours of work is only observed at the time of retirement, not before. 
Given that most often workers face the choice of working full-time or no time 
(retirement), the constraint in hours of work may influence the labor force participation 
decision. In fact, there are broad indications suggesting that reduced hours of work would 
contribute to raise employment rates of older individuals. In the European Union, older 
workers are already over-represented in part-time employment and Member States, like 
Sweden, with higher shares of older workers in part-time employment tend to present 
higher employment rates for the 55-64 age group. However, part-time employment is not 
very common in the Portuguese labor market (representing 10% of the employment in 
2007) and, nevertheless, older workers present high employment rates (above the 50% 
threshold of the Stockholm target) (European Commission, 2007). 
Despite the fact that flexibility in hours of work is perceived to be a relevant policy 
mechanism to increase older individuals’ labor force participation, few studies focused on 
its effect on labor supply. Gustman and Steinmeier (2004) show that working hours’ 
flexibility extends the working lives of older workers, but produces only a small net 
increase in labor supply. Gielen (2009) finds that, especially for full-time workers, over-
employed older women (those reporting that they wish to work fewer hours than the actual 
hours of work) leave the labor force prematurely due to the absence of gradual retirement 
opportunities. Nonetheless, a striking finding is that flexibility in hours of work would 
result in a reduction of older workers’ labor supply since the increase in labor participation 
of older workers due to the extension of their working careers is cancelled out by a decline 
in working hours of over-employed older individuals. 
From a labor demand point of view, the work by Hutchens and Grace-Martin (2006) 
studies how and why establishments differ in their willingness to permit an older worker to 
take phased retirement. Phased retirement is perceived to be a way of encouraging older 
workers to extend their working lives. In this sense, workers reduce their working hours 
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without changing employers (Hutchens and Papps, 2005). Based on an establishment-level 
telephone survey, the authors model the probability that an employer permits phased 
retirement and they conclude that employers are willing to permit phased retirement but 
primarily as an informal arrangement. Opportunities for phased retirement are greater in 
establishments that employ part-time workers, allow job sharing and have flexible starting 
times. There are also industry and region differences in opportunities for phased 
retirement. 
If flexibility in hours of work, as a means of gradual retirement, can effectively delay 
the exit from the labor force then workers who actually take advantage of such flexibility 
are expected to leave the labor market later in their lives.  
 
5.4 Data 
The data used in the empirical analysis comes from a specific module of the Portuguese 
Labor Force Survey (Inquérito ao Emprego) called “Transition to Retirement”. The aim of the 
module is to obtain exhaustive and comparable information on the transition from active 
life into retirement, in order to keep track of the progresses made in achieving the goals 
defined in the European Union towards promoting active aging and postponing the exit 
from the labor force. 
These data were collected by the Portuguese Statistics Office (INE) as part of the 
Labor Force Survey and they refer to the second quarter of 2006. The module was 
addressed to individuals aged 50 to 69, inclusive, employed and non-employed. Non-
employed individuals must have left the last job with 50 or more years of age. Table 5.1 
shows the sample values for the Labor Force Survey (second quarter of 2006) and the 
“Transition to Retirement” module. 
 
Table 5.1: Sample values, Labor Force Survey (LFS) (second quarter 2006) 
 Men Women 
 
Total 
Total % Total % 
Individuals surveyed in the LFS 45,166 21,584 47.79 23,582 52.21 
Individuals aged 50 to 69 in the LFS 11,685 5,439 46.55 6,246 53.45 
Individuals surveyed in the module 9,485 5,044 53.18 4,441 46.82 
Source: Explanation document from the Labor Force Survey’s 2006 module “Transition to Retirement”, INE. 
 
Women represent more than half of the Labor Force Survey sample, and this is also the 
case for the subsample of individuals aged 50 to 69. However, gender representation is 
reversed in the “Transition to Retirement” module, with men accounting for 53% of the 
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responses. Therefore, the module sample does not reproduce accurately the Labor Force 
Survey’s gender composition. 
From the initial sample I have excluded the military for they face a specific labor 
market (22 individuals), students (26 observations), and also unpaid household workers 
(371 observations - 99% of which are women) or other inactive older individuals (386 
observations) due to a fragile involvement in the labor market. Also, I left out the 
unemployed (236 observations) because their motivation towards the reduction in hours of 
work is naturally biased, since they want to increase their actual number of hours of work 
(and, therefore, may report the intention of no reduction in hours of work just because 
they are currently out of employment), and the self-employed (2871 observations) since 
they can more freely alter hours of work than employees. 
I include in the sample just the individuals with 15 or more years of work (80 
observations deleted) because this is the minimum required number of years with payments 
to Social Security for a worker to become eligible for retirement benefits. 
Finally, miners and fishermen were also excluded (73 observations) since, due to the 
legally recognized weary nature of these occupations, they are subject to specific retirement 
legislation and may withdraw from the labor force before age 65. 
The above exclusions led to the sample sizes depicted in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2: Study sample 
 Sample 
Labor market status Total % 
Employed 3,319 62.94 
Retired (a) 1,954 37.06 
Total 5,273 100 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition 
to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Note: (a) These have completely withdrawn from the labor force.  
 
The questionnaire of the “Transition to Retirement” module is presented in Appendix 
5.B. Besides the variables collected through the questionnaire, the database includes 
additional information taken from the Labor Force Survey like gender, age, marital status, 
education, labor market situation (employed, unemployed, retired, home worker, student, 
other inactive) and nationality. For employed individuals it also presents information on the 
location, industry and dimension of the firm where they work and on the occupation, type 
of contract, date of admission into the firm, regime of work (part-time or full-time), hours 
of work and earnings. For those non-employed it shows the reason for leaving the last job, 
occupation held and the industry where he/she worked. Information on labor earnings 
before retirement is inexistent. Unfortunately, non-employed respondents were not asked 
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about their labor income prior to retirement or unemployment. Also, the survey does not 
include any measure of the individual’s wealth. This is regrettable since income and wealth 
are important determinants of the retirement decision (Hanoch and Honig, 1983; Mitchell 
and Fields, 1984; Dugan, 1984; Ruhm, 1990). 
Question 2 of the “Transition to Retirement” survey is the question of interest in this 
research: “Did you reduce or do you intend to reduce your working schedule before exiting 
the labor force?” The inquiry’s instructions state that “exiting the labor force” means 
having no professional occupation with earnings as motivation, regardless of the legal 
retirement age. A summary of the possible answers is illustrated in Table 5.3 according to 
the individuals’ labor market status. Answering “Yes, I have reduced it” means that the 
individual has intentionally reduced his/her working hours to prepare the exit from the 
labor force.  
 
Table 5.3: Working hours’ reduction before retirement, by labor market status 
Hours’ reduction (before retirement) Employed Retired(1) 
(a) Yes, I have reduced it 3.25% 20.98% 
(b) No, but I intend to reduce it in the next 5 years 11.96% -- 
(c) No, and I have no intention to do so in the next 5 years / Did not reduce 30.37% 79.02% 
(d) Will not reduce 54.41% -- 
Observations 3,319 1,954 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Note: (1) Retired individuals that have answered “No, but intends to reduce it in the next 5 years” or “Won’t reduce” were reclassified 
into the category “Did not reduce” for they are already out of the labor force. 
 
As Table 5.3 shows, one in five retirees have reduced hours of work before retirement. 
These individuals averaged 64 years of age in 2006 and 59 years old when they started 
collecting a retirement pension, which is clearly below the legal retirement age. Tables 5.C1 
to 5.C3 in Appendix 5.C display the average age of the respondents and the mean 
retirement age for retirees, according to the reduction status (reduced hours, intends to 
reduce and did/will not reduce).  
Since both those who did and did not reduce hours of work present the same age 
average, one may start wondering about the efficacy of hours’ reduction on postponing the 
exit from the labor force. Nevertheless, early retirement was very attractive in Portugal until 
2005. Negligible penalties on pension benefits associated with labor market exit before age 
65 made early retirement very appealing. Hence, this sample feature of labor force 
withdrawal before reaching the legal retirement age may be explained by Social Security 
incentives.  
As for employed older individuals, only a little more than 3% report a reduction in 
hours of work to prepare their exit from the labor force and their mean age is 59 years old. 
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On average, these individuals are older than the ones who have not reduced their working 
hours.24 
Other two questions of relevance are: Question 3b “At what age do you intend to leave 
the labor force?” and Question 7b “At what age did you start collecting a retirement 
pension?” Question 3b is addressed to individuals who are still in the labor force, in this 
case employed older individuals, while Question 7b is directed both at people who might 
already be retired and at employed individuals. The mean intended age of retirement is 64 
years old and 59 is the mean and median age of start of pension collection. Conditional on 
being in the labor force, employed individuals report a higher “expected” age of retirement 
when compared to the average age of retirement of retirees (64 versus 59 years old, 
respectively). Considering that in 2005 (see Appendix 5.A) a legal diploma suspended all 
early retirement schemes, making the collection of pension benefits only possible at age 65 
or later, retirement expectations of active individuals are surely influenced. 
Table 5.4 provides detailed descriptive statistics of the sample used in the empirical 
analysis by gender and labor force status.  
The average working career of Portuguese workers is considerably long. Retired 
individuals have worked for almost 40 years and they started collecting retirement pension 
benefits before age 60, on average. Women have shorter careers in the labor force but they 
retire at slightly later ages than men. 
Overall, Table 5.4 also shows that a reduction of hours of work is not very common in 
the Portuguese labor market: less than 10%25 of the individuals report a reduction in hours 
of work as a way of gradual retirement. Women reduce hours of work to a greater extent 
than men, and this difference is more pronounced for those still in the labor force (i.e, 
employed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Tables 5.C1 to 5.C3 in Appendix 5.C present detailed descriptive statistics by gender and labor market 
status, according to the reduction status. 
25 Of the individuals reporting hours’ reduction 1/3 work in full-time jobs. Overall, only 8% of the 
individuals in the sample are in part-time employment. 
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Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics, by gender and labor force status 
Variable All Men Women 
Labor force  
Status 
All Retired Employed All Retired Employed All Retired Employed 
Age(a)  56.84 
(4.86) 
58.82 
(4.72) 
55.68 
(4.56) 
56.85 
(4.82) 
58.67 
(4.69) 
55.75 
(4.56) 
56.84 
(4.91) 
59.02 
(4.74) 
55.59 
(4.57) 
Years of work(a) 37.95 
(7.93) 
39.60 
(7.95) 
36.98 
(7.76) 
39.30 
(7.20) 
40.81 
(7.22) 
38.39 
(7.04) 
36.35 
(8.45) 
38.11 
(8.53) 
35.33 
(8.23) 
Reduction(b) 
(Yes) 9.82 20.98 3.25 8.45 19.96 1.51 11.46 22.23 5.29 
Activity sector          
Agriculture 5.59 7.37 4.55 5.17 4.92 5.31 6.10 10.38 3.66 
Industrial 28.43 31.83 26.42 37.52 39.00 36.63 17.61 23.03 14.50 
Services 65.98 60.80 69.03 57.31 56.08 58.05 76.29 66.59 81.84 
Blue-collar 54.45 53.89 54.78 59.23 55.15 61.69 48.75 52.34 46.70 
Education          
0 years 11.87 19.75 7.23 8.62 12.91 6.04 15.74 28.16 8.62 
4 years 51.55 46.88 54.29 56.37 55.25 57.05 45.81 36.60 51.08 
6 years 6.77 5.73 7.38 7.19 6.59 7.55 6.27 4.68 7.18 
9 years 11.06 11.21 10.97 11.55 12.53 10.96 10.47 9.58 10.97 
High school 6.92 6.45 7.20 6.70 6.87 6.60 7.18 5.93 7.90 
University 11.83 9.98 12.93 9.56 5.85 11.80 14.53 15.05 14.24 
Region          
 North 24.50 22.72 24.83 25.55 24.88 25.95 22.26 20.07 23.51 
Centre 12.90 10.39 14.37 13.16 10.21 14.93 12.58 10.60 13.72 
Lisbon 22.57 25.74 20.70 21.40 26.18 18.51 23.96 25.20 23.25 
Alentejo 15.91 17.86 14.76 14.21 15.04 13.70 17.94 21.32 16.00 
Algarve 9.84 9.77 9.88 9.56 10.03 9.28 10.17 9.46 10.58 
Azores 6.96 7.47 6.66 8.48 8.82 8.28 5.15 5.82 4.77 
Madeira 7.78 6.04 8.80 7.64 4.83 9.34 7.93 7.53 8.16 
Active spouse(c) 62.58 23.45 85.94 67.73 39.62 87.86 59.48 11.74 84.91 
Observations 5,273 1,954 3,319 2,865 1,077 1,788 2,408 877 1,531 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Notes: For retired individuals, the variable Age refers to the age of start of pension benefits’ receipt. (a)Continuous variables: standard 
deviations are presented in parenthesis. All other variables are dummies and values reported are percentages. (b)Answers (b), (c) and (d) of 
Question 2 were gathered into a single category “Did not reduce”. (c)There are 2,670 observations for the variable Active spouse.  
 
Almost 2/3 of the individuals in the sample work in Services, which is also the activity 
sector where a reduction in hours of work before retirement is more prevalent, both for 
men and women (see Tables 5.C1 to 5.C3 in Appendix 5.C). For 54% of the individuals the 
occupation held was classified as blue-collar. The definitions of blue/white collar and the 
industries included in each of the activity sectors are presented in Appendix 5.C (Tables 
5.C4 and 5.C5). Moreover, Table 5.C6 in Appendix 5.C shows the distribution of 
employment, by occupation held for the Portuguese labor force. 
The sample is characterized by low educational levels: more than 60% of the 
individuals have 4 or less years of school attainment. This feature of the sample is not 
surprising given the age range of the individuals, 50 to 69 years old (which means that they 
were born between 1937 and 1964) and the fact that until 1986 mandatory schooling in 
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Portugal comprised just 6 years.26 However, almost 12% of the individuals show higher 
education attainment, with women reporting a higher incidence of this higher educational 
level. For comparison with the sample, Table 5.C7 in Appendix 5.C displays the 
distribution of active population by educational level, age group and gender, for the second 
quarter of 2006. Around 11% of the individuals aged 45 to 64 have a university degree 
while this is the scenario for only 3% of individuals aged 65 or older.27 Unfortunately, I 
could not get information on the 50-69 age group in particular in order to obtain a more 
accurate comparison. 
A worker’s participation in the labor force may be modelled using survival analysis 
where survival is interpreted as the presence in the labor market. The use of survival 
analysis techniques to describe the data, which is done in Figure 5.1, shows that, as 
expected, the estimated survival curve declines sharply with age, facing a considerable drop 
at age 65. Also, the cumulative hazard28 in Figure 5.2 is rising with age at an increasing rate. 
As shown in Table 5.5, after age 65 the probability of survival is around 0.17, indicating 
that at that age roughly 83% of the sampled individuals were out of the labor force.  
 
Figure 5.1: Kaplan-Meier survival function estimates 
 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
 
 
                                                 
26 In 1929, mandatory schooling in Portugal comprised 3 years and, in 1955, it increased by 1 year for men. 
Only in 1961 mandatory schooling was standardized in 4 years for both men and women and, three years 
later, it was increased by 2 years; a law passed in 1986 set it at 9 years for students with first school 
registration in the 1987/1988 academic year and subsequent years. Hence, in 1995/1996 mandatory schooling 
comprised 9 years. 
27 Aggregating the two age groups (45-64 and 65 or more), 10% have a university degree. 
28 The Nelson-Aalen estimator is a non-parametric estimator of the cumulative hazard function consisting of 
a staircase function. The steps are located at each observed death time and the vertical size of the steps is 
computed as 1/(number at risk), where (number at risk) is the count of subjects just before the death that are 
still observed to be alive. 
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Figure 5.2: Nelson-Aelen cumulative hazard estimates 
 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
 
Table 5.5: Kaplan-Meier survival and Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard functions 
Age Beginning 
total 
Failures Survivor 
function 
Standard 
error 
Cumulative 
hazard 
Standard 
error 
50 5,273 70 .9867 .0016 .0133 .0016 
51 4,868 57 .9752 .0022 .0250 .0022 
52 4,471 83 .9571 .0029 .0435 .0030 
53 4,066 90 .9359 .0036 .0657 .0038 
54 3,638 101 .9099 .0043 .0934 .0047 
55 3,261 179 .8600 .0055 .1483 .0062 
56 2,803 124 .8219 .0062 .1926 .0074 
57 2,465 108 .7859 .0068 .2364 .0085 
58 2,159 117 .7433 .0075 .2906 .0099 
59 1,877 105 .7017 .0081 .3465 .0113 
60 1,623 177 .6252 .0090 .4556 .0140 
61 1,282 88 .5823 .0095 .5242 .0158 
62 1,097 119 .5191 .0101 .6327 .0186 
63 874 83 .4698 .0105 .7277 .0213 
64 694 54 .4333 .0108 .8055 .0238 
65 565 346 .1679 .0098 1.4179 .0406 
66 164 32 .1352 .0095 1.6130 .0533 
67 98 13 .1172 .0094 1.7456 .0648 
68 53 6 .1040 .0098 1.8588 .0796 
69 23 2 .0949 .0108 1.9458 .1006 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
 
Relating the Age of exit from the labor force with the Reduction variable, Figure 5.3 plots 
the survival function by reduction status (that is, if the individual reduced or not his/her 
hours of work) and gender. It shows that those with a reduction in hours are more likely to 
exit the labor market at earlier ages. This is true for both men and women, but the 
difference in survival times by reduction status is higher for men than for women. 
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Figure 5.3: Kaplan-Meier survival function estimates, by reduction status and gender 
 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
 
The Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard functions, by reduction status, shown in Table 5.6, 
reveal that the hazard increases at a higher rate for those who reduce hours of work than it 
does for the individuals who do not reduce hours of work. 
 
Table 5.6: Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard 
functions, by reduction status 
Age No reduction Reduction 
50 .0120 .0251 
52 .0378 .0928 
54 .0824 .1838 
56 .1762 .3191 
58 .2655 .4710 
60 .4169 .7135 
62 .5730 .9986 
64 .7329 1.2380 
66 1.5332 2.0601 
68 1.7280 2.7030 
Source: Computations from the author based on the 
“Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
 
5.5 Econometric setup 
5.5.1 Transition data models: a parametric approach 
Transition or duration analysis models the length of time spent in a given state (for 
instance, in the labor force) before transition to another state (e.g. retired). The time of 
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transition to retirement is called “failure time”. A “state” is a qualitative characteristic of an 
individual at a specific point in time, “transition” is the change from one state to another, 
and a “spell” length or duration is the time spent in a given state. 
In the empirical analysis there are two possible states a person can be in: active (in the 
labor force) or retired (out of the labor force). By failure time I mean the age of retirement 
(the age of exit from the labor force). The hazard rate is defined as the probability that 
retirement will occur at a particular age to an individual, given that the individual is at risk 
(i.e. in the labor force) at that age. The hazard is an unobserved variable, but it controls 
both the occurrence and the timing of events (or state transitions). Therefore, it is the 
fundamental dependent variable in transition data models. If the hazard is known to 
depend strongly on age but only weakly on time since other starting point (the date of entry 
in the labor force), then age is the most appropriate way to define the time scale (Allison, 
1984). 
Due to the nature of the data used, some individuals are already in the initial state (thus 
I do not observe the date of entry into the labor market). This is relevant for the definition 
of the “spell”. With age as the time scale and because the starting times are not observed, 
the spell is the duration of an individual’s life until retirement. From now on I will call this 
duration a “spell of activity” (although it does not measure the number of working years). 
I assume that, once an individual leaves the initial state (becomes retired), he/she 
remains in inactivity (that is, there is no reversed retirement; individuals do not come back 
to the labor force after retirement) which is not a very strong assumption considering that, 
according to the European Commission (2007), more than 99% of the people that were 
inactive in a given year remain inactive in the following year (see Table 5.C8 in Appendix 
5.C). 
Transition or survival data are usually censored since some spells are incompletely 
observed. A complete spell of activity can be seen for retirees29 but for subjects that are still 
in the labor force I do not observe the complete spell of activity. That means that data are 
right-censored or censored from above. Censoring is the main reason for modelling 
transitions instead of the mean duration as weaker distributional assumptions are needed to 
obtain consistent estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).  
A Weibull parametric regression model is used to study the effect of a reduction in 
hours of work on the age until which a person remains in the labor force. The Weibull has 
                                                 
29 A subsample of retirees does not face censoring issues. 
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a hazard function given by 1)( −= ααγλ tt ,30 where γ  is the hazard rate, α  is a shape 
parameter indicating the monotonicity of the function and t is a time variable. The hazard 
function will be monotonically increasing if 1>α  and monotonically decreasing if 1<α . 
The Weibull distribution assumes that 0>γ  and 0>α . In other words, it considers a 
hazard that it is not constant over time. 
Estimation of the Weibull model is made by maximum likelihood. Following Cameron 
and Trivedi (2005), with censored data the observed survival time t is the age at an 
incomplete spell, and the data are augmented by a censoring indicator variable. For right-
censored observations it is known that the age of retirement exceeded t so the contribution 
to the likelihood is 
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )θxθxθx ,|,|1,|Pr tStFduuftT
t
=−==> ∫
∞
 (5.1) 
where T denotes the age of retirement without censoring, x  are regressors that can vary 
across individuals but do not vary over a spell for a given individual and θ  is a 1×q  
parameter vector. ( ).S  represents the survivor function. 
The conditional density for the i th observation is ( ) ( ) ii iiii tStf δδ −1,|,| θxθx , where 
iδ  is a right-censoring indicator with  
( )
( )

=
censoringrightspellincompleteif,0
censoringnospellcompleteif,1
iδ  
Taking logs and summing, assuming independence over i, the maximum likelihood 
estimator θˆ  maximizes the likelihood function 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∑
=
−+=
N
i
iiiiii tStfL
1
,|ln1,|lnln θxθxθ δδ   (5.2) 
In the Weibull model, regressors are usually introduced by letting ( )βx'exp=γ , 
ensuring that 0>γ  while α , the shape parameter, does not vary with regressors. Then,  
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ααα αααα tttttf βxβxβxβxβx 'expln1ln''expexp'expln,,|ln 1 −−++=−= −  
and 
( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ααα tttS βxβxβx 'exp'expexpln,,|ln −=−=  
 
Then, the likelihood function in (5.2) becomes 
                                                 
30 The survivor function is given by ( )αγ t−exp  
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( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( )[ ]∑ −−−−++=
i
iiiiiiii tttL
αα δααδ βxβxβx 'exp1'expln1ln'ln  (5.3). 
The key policy variable in the model is the reduction of hours of work before 
retirement and its impact on the retirement hazard is of relevance for this analysis.  
 
5.5.2 Variables used in the estimation 
To study the effect of a reduction in hours of work (before leaving the labor force) on 
the moment of retirement, I start by using a subsample of retired individuals. This implies 
the absence of censoring problems while employing transition data techniques. Then, I 
evolve to a sample that considers both retired and active individuals, with the associated 
censoring considerations. 
 
5.5.2.1 Uncensored observations 
In this uncensored subsample, almost 21% of the retirees report the use of a reduction 
in hours of work as a deliberate strategy to gradually retire. 
I use the age at which the individual started receiving a retirement pension as a proxy 
for the age of retirement, since the survey does not ask when he/she actually withdrew 
from the labor force (the retirement age) but it asks the age he/she started collecting a 
pension.31 Another limitation as a consequence of the questionnaire’s design is that it is not 
possible to know when the reduction started (close or far from the effective age of exit) or 
the amount of hours reduced (for example, if the worker made a transition from full-time 
to part-time employment, or if it was just a 1 hour reduction). Such information would 
contribute to the enrichment of the analysis. 
Working hours’ reduction is the explanatory variable of interest in a model that aims at 
studying the length of activity through the age of exit from the labor force. Reduction is a 
binary variable that equals 1 if the retiree did reduce his/her hours of work before 
retirement, and 0 otherwise. Other control variables were also introduced in the model. 
Mean values and standard deviations of all the variables are depicted in Table 5.7. 
The main reason for retirement was mandatory retirement; poor health was the next 
most common reason. Almost 49% of the retirees reported mandatory retirement as the 
reason for leaving the labor force, of whom 19% reduced hours of work before retirement. 
                                                 
31 If this module is to be surveyed in the future I suggest the inclusion of a question to obtain the age of 
retirement. 
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Moreover, one in ten individuals reported favorable financial conditions as the cause of 
retirement. Job loss was the motive for 2% of the retirees. 
 
Table 5.7: Definition of the variables and mean characteristics: uncensored observations 
Variable Definition 
Mean or 
percentage 
Standard 
deviation 
Retirement age Age of exit from the labor force, in years; the age 
of start of pension benefits is used as a proxy for 
the retirement age 
59.02 4.84 
Age Age of the individual, in years 63.72 4.35 
Years of work Number of working years 39.74 8.07 
Reduction =1 if the individual reduced his/her hours of 
work before exiting the labor force (dummy 
variable) 
19.49 -- 
Male =1 if the individual is a men (dummy variable) 56.30 -- 
Education Dummy variable   
0 years =1 if the person has no complete degree of 
education 
16.38 -- 
4 years =2 if the person completed 4 years of education 43.84 -- 
6 years =3 if the person completed 6 years of education 6.16 -- 
9 years =4 if the person completed 9 years of education 12.83 -- 
High school =5 if the person a high-school diploma 8.04 -- 
University =6 if college degree 12.75 -- 
Blue-collar =1 if the individual works or has worked in an 
occupation classified as blue-collar (dummy 
variable) 
47.03 -- 
Activity sector Dummy variable   
Agriculture =1 if the person worked in the agriculture sector 5.65 -- 
Industrial =2 if the person worked in the industrial sector 27.68 -- 
Services =3 if the person worked in the services sector 
(omitted category) 
66.67 -- 
Reason for retirement Dummy variable   
Lost job =1 if retirement was induced by job loss 2.25 -- 
Mandatory retirement =2 if the person reached the mandatory age of 
retirement 
48.99 -- 
Poor health =3 if the individual retired because of poor health 16.59 -- 
Childcare or other 
dependents 
=4 if retirement was due to child care or other 
dependents’ care 
0.80 -- 
Problems at work =5 if the person retired because of problems at 
work 
2.25 -- 
Favorable financial 
conditions 
=6 if favorable financial conditions was the 
reason for retirement 
10.94 -- 
Other reasons =7 if other reasons were the cause of retirement 18.19 -- 
Region Dummy variable   
 North =1 if the person resides in the North of Portugal 
(omitted category) 
18.55 -- 
Centre =2 if the person resides in the Centre 10.43 -- 
Lisbon =3 if resides in Lisbon  27.32 -- 
Alentejo =4 if he/she resides in Alentejo 17.61 -- 
Algarve =5 if he/she resides in Algarve 10.72 -- 
Azores =6 if he/she resides in Azores 8.26 -- 
Madeira =7 if he/she resides in Madeira 7.10 -- 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Note: In the estimation model, I also introduce dummies for the Year of Retirement to capture institutional changes on retirement 
incentives. Number of observations: 1,380. 
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At the moment of the survey, individuals averaged almost 64 years of age having 
started collecting retirement pension at 59 years old, on average. Pension benefits were 
obtained at relatively early ages, which gives some hints on the attractiveness of early 
retirement schemes. However, notice must be made to the fact that individuals have a close 
to complete working career: 40 years.  
Most of the retirees had white-collar occupations and 2/3 worked in the services’ 
sector. Also, the majority of retirees are men with low educational levels. Nevertheless, it is 
somewhat surprising that almost 13% of these subjects have a university degree. Recalling 
Table 5.C7 in Appendix 5.C, only 3% of the individuals aged 65 or more in 2006 had a 
college degree. Despite the fact that the average age of the retirees is slightly smaller than 
that interval, this difference may raise some concerns about sample selection. Perhaps 
those with higher levels of education were the ones more willing to answer the written 
questionnaire. 
 
5.5.2.2 Censored observations 
To overcome the possible selection bias from the exclusion of nonretirees, next I use a 
sample that combines both retired and employed individuals. 
Question 2 of the survey allows four possible answers (see Table 5.3). I consider 
answers (c) and (d) as being the same for those employed, meaning that they will not 
reduce hours of work before exiting the labor force. The main issue is how to treat the 
workers’ ‘intentions of reduction’ (answer (b)). For retirees this problem does not arise 
since they either reduced or did not reduce their hours of work before leaving the labor 
market. As for employed individuals the treatment is not as straightforward. Nevertheless, 
in order to explore this variable I use three different classifications for it. First, I consider 
just the actions that have occurred so far, that is, treat the intentions as non-actions. I 
therefore construct a variable called Reduction A which equals 0 if the person did not/will 
not reduce hours of work or if he/she intends to do so, and 1 if the individual has already 
reduced. Age is the analysis time variable and it refers to the actual age for the people that 
are still active (incomplete spells) but, for retired individuals (complete spells), it is the age 
of retirement.32 This is done in order to capture the approximate moment of failure (exit) 
for retirees. 
                                                 
32 Once again, I use the age of start of pension receipt as a proxy for the retirement age. 
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If, however, intentions can predict future actions, treating intentions as actions might 
be useful to study the influence of an action (reduction in hours of work) on an outcome 
(labor force participation) when the specific action has not yet occurred. The study of 
intentions and subsequent behavior is a subject of relevance in Psychology. The theory of 
reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980;33 Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) postulates that a 
person’s intention to engage in a behavior is the immediate determinant of that behavior. 
In other words, people are expected to behave in accordance with their intentions. 
Evidence also provides support to the theory by showing high correlations between 
intentions and actual behavior that range from 0.72 to 0.90 (Ajzen, 2005). In the light of 
this theory, as a second alternative, I treat reported intention of reducing hours of work as 
an action in order to study its effect on the elderly ‘survival’ in the labor force. The 
resulting variable is Reduction B which is equal to 0 if the person will not reduce hours of 
work and 1 if the individual did reduce or intends to do so. Answering to Question 3b of 
the survey people report the age at which they intend to retire and this age intention is used 
as the analysis time variable for employed subjects when using the Reduction B as the 
covariate of interest. 
As a last alternative, I could separate intentions from actions through a variable that I 
name Reduction C that includes three categories: it equals 0 if the individual will not reduce 
her/his hours of work before leaving the labor force, 1 if the individual has already reduced 
her/his hours of work, and 2 if the person intends to reduce her/his hours of work in the 
next five years. There is, however, a problem concerning the use of this variable: the 
category associated to intentions possesses only censored observations.  
I expect that using these alternative Reduction variables will enable me to see how 
sensitive the age of exit from the labor force is to the assumptions made for the variable of 
interest.  
Besides the Reduction variable I also include in the model regressors like gender, activity 
sector, type of occupation, education and region of residence. Additionally, for married (or 
cohabiting) people I include the spouse/partner labor force status (active or retired). Table 
5.8 shows some descriptive statistics of the variables used. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Cited from Ajzen (2005). 
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Table 5.8: Definition of the variables and mean characteristics: censored observations 
Mean or percentage Variable Definition 
All Men Women 
Age (time) Person’s age if employed or, if retired, the age 
of start of pension receipt  
56.84 
(4.86)(a) 
58.66 
(5.85)(a) 
58.59 
(5.96)(a) 
Retired (failure) =1 if the person already exit the labor force 37.06 37.59 36.42 
Reduction A =1 if the individual has effectively reduced 
his/her hours of work 
9.82 8.45 11.46 
Reduction B(b) =1 if the individual did reduce or intends to 
reduce hours of work 
20.12 19.20 21.21 
Reduction C     
Will not reduce =0 if the individual will not reduce her/his 
hours of work before leaving the labor force 
(omitted category) 
82.65 84.29 80.69 
Did reduce =1 if the individual has already reduced 
her/his hours of work 
9.82 8.45 11.46 
Intends to 
reduce 
=2 if the person intends to reduce her/his 
hours of work in the next five years 
7.53 7.26 7.85 
Male =1 if the person is of male gender 54.33 -- -- 
Activity sector     
Agriculture =1 if the person works or worked in the 
agriculture sector 
5.59 5.17 6.10 
Industrial =2 if the person works or worked in the 
industrial sector 
28.43 37.52 17.61 
Services =3 if the person works or worked in the 
services sector (omitted category) 
65.98 57.31 76.29 
Blue-collar =1 if the individual works or has worked in an 
occupation classified as blue-collar 
54.45 59.23 48.75 
Education     
0 years =1 if the person has no complete degree of 
education 
11.87 8.62 15.74 
4 years =2 if the person completed 4 years of 
education 
51.55 56.37 45.81 
6 years =3 if the person completed 6 years of 
education 
6.77 7.19 6.27 
9 years =4 if the person completed 9 years of 
education 
11.06 11.55 10.47 
High school =5 if the person has a high-school diploma 6.92 6.70 7.18 
University =6 if college degree 11.83 9.52 14.53 
Region     
 North =1 if the person resides in the North of 
Portugal (omitted category) 
24.05 25.55 22.26 
Centre =2 if the person resides in the Centre 12.90 13.16 12.58 
Lisbon =3 if resides in Lisbon  22.57 21.40 23.96 
Alentejo =4 if he/she resides in Alentejo 15.91 14.21 17.94 
Algarve =5 if he/she resides in Algarve 9.84 9.56 10.17 
Azores =6 if he/she resides in Azores 6.96 8.48 5.15 
Madeira =7 if he/she resides in Madeira 7.78 7.64 7.93 
Active spouse(c) =1 if the spouse is still in activity 62.58 67.73 59.48 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Note: (a)Standard deviation of the variable Age.; (b)There are 2,738 observations for this variable. (c)There are 2,670 
observations for the variable Active spouse. Number of observations: 5,273. 
 
There are 37% of failures (retired individuals) in the sample which means that the rest 
of the observations in the sample are censored. 
The overall sample is also characterized by low educational levels. Younger individuals 
are more educated than older ones. In effect, only 5% of the individuals aged 65 to 69 have 
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a university degree, against 8%, 13% and 15% for those in the age groups 60-64, 55-59 and 
50-54, respectively. Women are overrepresented both at the bottom (0 years) and at the top 
(university) of the education ladder, and more than ¾ work in the Services. Also, women 
reduce hours of work more often than men. As benchmark, Table 5.C7 in Appendix 5.C 
shows the educational level by gender for the Portuguese labor force and Table 5.9 
provides additional labor market statistics concerning hours of work, activity sector and 
gender. It shows that women work fewer hours than men regardless of the activity sector. 
Finally, from Table 5.8, both the likelihood of retirement and the probability of 
reducing hours of work rise with age. 
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Table 5.9: Distribution of employed population by regular hours of work, activity sector and gender (second quarter, 2006) 
Activity sector 
Agriculture Industrial Services Total 
Regular hours of work All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women 
1-10 10.39 6.85 14.10 0.43 0.36 0.62 1.31 0.49 1.99 2.12 1.16 3.26 
11-30 39.12 35.58 42.85 2.56 1.75 4.57 8.38 4.59 11.52 10.26 6.94 14.15 
31-35 1.90 2.06 1.73 1.40 1.11 2.12 22.02 17.43 25.82 13.37 9.13 18.34 
36-40 20.39 23.52 17.11 79.18 77.12 84.34 48.67 52.10 45.82 54.58 58.95 49.82 
41 or more 25.20 29.10 21.11 15.54 18.60 7.83 18.83 24.20 14.37 18.58 22.51 14.37 
Source: INE. Labor Force Survey, 2nd quarter 2006. 
Note: Values reported are percentages. Some columns do not sum 100%, due to missing values. 
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5.6 Results 
5.6.1 Effect of hours’ reduction on the retirement hazard: uncensored observations 
Table 5.10 reports the results of the Weibull model and also estimates from an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) model.34  
 
Table 5.10: Results on the age of retirement (coefficients) 
Variable 
Weibull  
(1) 
Weibull  
(2) 
OLS(a)  
(3) 
OLS(a)  
(4) 
Reduction .016 
(.071) 
.042 
(.057) 
-.122 
(.246) 
-.093 
(.213) 
Male .101* 
(.061) 
-.006 
(.049) 
-.391* 
(.208) 
.042 
(.182) 
Education     
0 years -.322*** 
(.087) 
-.331*** 
(.067) 
1.558*** 
(.309) 
1.644*** 
(.253) 
6 years .123 
(.124) 
.123 
(.106) 
-.814* 
(.427) 
-.709* 
(.390) 
9 years .285*** 
(.098) 
.319*** 
(.085) 
-.895*** 
(.343) 
-.964*** 
(.315) 
High school .281** 
(.115) 
.268*** 
(.103) 
-1.420*** 
(.405) 
-1.182*** 
(.390) 
University .248** 
(.103) 
.164** 
(.091) 
-1.079*** 
(.361) 
-.484 
(.341) 
Blue-collar -.271*** 
(.077) 
-.155** 
(.065) 
1.417*** 
(.280) 
.872*** 
(.246) 
Activity sector     
Agriculture -.183 
(.134) 
-.182* 
(.101) 
.799* 
(.477) 
.777** 
(.383) 
Industrial -.211*** 
(.069) 
-.082 
(.056) 
.832*** 
(.248) 
.223 
(.215) 
Reason for retirement     
Lost job .503*** 
(.193) 
-- -2.276*** 
(.666) 
-- 
Bad health .651*** 
(.084) 
-- -3.076*** 
(.289) 
-- 
Childcare or other 
dependents 
.178 
(.312) 
-- -1.926* 
(1.091) 
-- 
Problems at work .501*** 
(.191) 
-- -2.464*** 
(.661) 
-- 
Favorable financial 
conditions 
.637*** 
(.098) 
-- -2.479*** 
(.336) 
-- 
Other reasons .499*** 
(.080) 
-- -2.011*** 
(.276) 
-- 
α  20.545 
(.0442) 
19.840 
(.364) 
-- -- 
Observations 1,380 1,954 1,380 1,954 
Log likelihood 1,988.749 2,724.788 -- -- 
R-squared -- -- .48 .38 
Root mean squared error -- -- 3.53 3.75 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Note: (a) The dependent variable in the OLS regression model is the age of retirement. Standard errors are presented 
in parentheses. ***/**/* means significance at 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. The model includes 18 dummies 
for the Year of retirement and 6 Region dummies.  
                                                 
34 I present OLS estimates because the procedure has been used in the literature to model the age of 
retirement (e.g. Mitchell and Fields, 1984; Ruhm, 1990). 
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The problem with using OLS lies in the assumed distribution of the residuals. In linear 
regression, the residuals are assumed to be normally distributed. However, the normality of 
time to an event is not a reasonable assumption when the event is retirement. Effectively, 
the risk of retirement increases with age. One other drawback is that age of failure 
(retirement) occurrence is always positive, while in theory the normal distribution supports 
all possible real values (Cleves et al., 2008). Linear regression results are not robust to these 
violations. Considering this I will comment only on Weibull results. 
Estimates on the Weibull parameter α  suggest that the hazard is increasing over time 
1>α , at an increasing rate ( 2>α ).35 
Results show that those who have reduced hours of work before leaving the labor force 
have higher hazard rates, ceteris paribus, that is higher conditional early exit rates and hence 
shorter survival times in the labor force. Nevertheless, this result is not statistically 
significant. Thus, a reduction in hours of work before retirement seems to produce no 
effect on the moment of exit from the labor force, with no contribution for delaying 
retirement. 
One may wonder if the reduction of hours of work was the result of the will of the 
worker or if it was initiated by the employer. In the eminence of a layoff firms often reduce 
hours of work before permanent shutdown and the reduction of working time could be 
capturing this effect. Nevertheless, a glance at the reason for retirement (Question T10 of 
the survey) highlights that only 1.5% of the retirees who report a reduction in hours of 
work before retirement answer “job loss” as the reason for retirement (see Table 5.C2 in 
Appendix 5.C). Therefore, the fear of a potential endogeneity problem can be mitigated. 
As an additional check to the robustness of this result I looked at Question 4 of the 
survey that asks “Would the possibility of a more flexible working schedule contribute (or 
would it have contributed) to make you work longer?”. 94% of the retirees answered 
negatively to this question meaning that flexible hours of work is not attractive enough to 
induce an increase in labor force participation of older individuals. 
The coefficient for Male is statistically significant in model (1), Table 5.10, indicating 
that men exit at earlier ages than women from the labor force. Weibull estimates show that 
men face a 11% ( ( )101.exp -1) higher hazard of retirement than women. Recall that men 
have longer working careers than women suggesting that men start working earlier. 
Therefore, women become eligible to retirement benefits at later ages than men. 
                                                 
35 Older people have a higher hazard of exit from the labor force. 
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Contrary to what has been reported in the literature (Bartel and Sicherman, 1993; 
Osberg, 1993; Ruhm, 1990) higher levels of education are associated with retirement at 
earlier ages. Compared to individuals with 4 years of education, the reference category, only 
those with zero years of education stay longer in the labor force. At each survival time, the 
hazard rate for those with no years of education is only 72% of the hazard rate for the 
subjects with 4 years of education. Those with compulsory schooling (9 years), high school 
and university degrees experience a 33%, 32% and 28% higher hazard rate, respectively, 
than the reference group. A test on the equality of coefficients for 9 or more years of 
completed education does not reject the null hypothesis.36 Since education is positively 
correlated with labor earnings and, hence, with Social Security pension benefits (variables 
that I cannot observe within the survey) this result may be capturing the effect of financial 
incentives on the retirement age. Mitchell and Fields (1984) find that retirement benefits 
are negatively associated with the retirement age. Also, Dugan (1984) concludes that 
retirement incentives have a negative effect on labor force participation and that the decline 
is stronger for men than for women. 
As documented in the literature, health conditions are a strong determinant of 
retirement (Burtless and Quinn, 2000; Bartel and Sicherman, 1993; Hanoch and Honig, 
1983; Quinn, 1977): the hazard rate for those with health problems is 92% ( ( )651.exp -1) 
higher than the hazard for those who are compulsory retired. The Reason for retirement 
variable additionally shows that if an older worker loses his/her job he/she will tend to 
retire earlier; this finding is consistent with previous literature that shows that when the 
elderly experience job loss they face major difficulties in getting back to work, due to 
reduced hiring opportunities (Daniel and Heywood, 2007; Heywood et al, 1999; Hutchens, 
1986, 1988), and this pushes older workers to premature retirement (Osberg, 1993). 
Relative to people that were compulsory retired, those with “Favorable financial 
conditions” have a 89% ( ( )637.exp -1) higher hazard of retirement.  
Finally, consistently with the findings of Dorn and Sousa-Poza (2005), white-collar 
workers or individuals formerly employed in the services’ sector also withdraw sooner from 
the labor force. 
Given the potentially endogenous nature of the Reason for retirement variable, I have also 
estimated the models without it (models (2) and (4)). The effect of the key policy variable, 
                                                 
36 The p-value for the null hypothesis that the coefficient for 9 years of education equals the one for 12 years 
is 0.9746 (Chi-squared=0.00); for the equality between the 9 years and the university coefficients the p-value 
equals 0.7388 (Chi-squared=0.11); finally, 0.7918 is the p-value for the test on the equality between the 12 
years and university education estimates (Chi-squared=0.07). 
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Reduction, remains unchanged but the Male variable becomes not statistically significant. In 
general, the models present similar estimates for the effect of each covariate on the hazard. 
Nonetheless, the retirement hazard increases for individuals with 9 years of education and 
diminishes for subjects with a university degree. Also, the statistical significance of the 
categories of the activity sector variable is altered. In effect, while not significant in model 
(1), the category agriculture becomes statistically significant in model (2). Here, those 
working in the agricultural sector face a hazard rate that is 83% of the hazard rate 
experienced by an individual employed in services (the reference category). There is no 
statistical difference in the hazard rate between those employed in the industrial and 
services sectors.  
From the subsample of retirees, 59 years old is the average age at which an individual 
started receiving a retirement pension. This suggests that early retirement was common in 
the Portuguese labor market. Nevertheless, until 2007, workers were allowed to combine 
old-age pension income with work income (in the same firm) which made early retirement 
schemes very attractive.37 Older individuals could remain in the labor force past the age of 
starting collecting their retirement pension and, therefore, the age of start of pension 
collection may not be a good proxy for the actual retirement age. This constitutes a 
limitation of the data that will still remain in the presence of censored observations. 
 
5.6.2 Effect of hours’ reduction on the age of retirement: with censored 
observations 
Tables 5.11 and 5.12 present the results for the Weibull model in the presence of 
censoring. Despite the assumptions made for the Reduction variable, results remain 
unchanged: the reduction of hours of work before leaving the labor market shortens an 
individual’s presence in the labor force. In fact, in Table 5.11 the coefficient on Reduction A 
at column (1) suggests that reducing hours of work increases the hazard rate by 61% 
compared to the subjects that did not reduce hours of work. Gielen (2009) finds that 
working hours flexibility have a positive effect on labor force participation of older women, 
but increasing working hours flexibility has little effect on raising older workers total labor 
supply. Nevertheless, Gielen (2009) considers that increasing the legal retirement age would 
be more effective in raising older workers’ labor force participation and concludes that 
working hours’ flexibility may not be a suitable instrument to improve older workers’ labor 
                                                 
37 Especially since, until 1999, there was no penalty on early retirement pensions. Reduction factors on early 
retirement pensions were only introduced by a 1999 law.  
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supply. Using simulations, Gustman and Steinmeier (2004) suggest that if firms allowed 
partial retirement at the same hourly wage, this would impact retirement outcomes: partial 
retirement would increase from 30% to 67%. When there is no restriction in partial 
retirement, the percentage completely retired declines by 4.7 to 14.1 percentage points at 
each year of age between 58 and 65. Additionally, the number fully retired falls by 15.3 and 
13.8 percentage points, respectively, for ages 67 and 69. Nevertheless, half the increase in 
partial retirement comes from full-time work, reducing total hours of work. The authors 
conclude that, among those aged 62 to 69 who have a long term commitment to the labor 
market, the flexibility in hours of work would contribute to reduce by 10 to 15 percentage 
points the fraction completely retired. Partial retirement in that age group would increase 
by 20 percentage points. If hours’ constraints were abolished, partial retirement would 
increase significantly but full-time employment and full-time retirement would reduce, 
resulting in a small net increase in full-time equivalent employment. This suggests that 
working hours’ flexibility plays a marginal role in the expansion of overall older workers’ 
labor force participation. 
The variable Reduction that I use is more limited and less informative than the 
approaches used in literature. I use only an indicator variable and other studies use hours of 
work to assess the reduction. Additionally, these studies take advantage of longitudinal data 
while I use cross-sectional data. Also, previous literature focuses on the labor force 
participation and not on the age of retirement. 
For blue-collar workers the hazard rate is only 72% of the hazard for white-collar 
workers. 
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Table 5.11: Weibull regression coefficients using Reduction A 
Variable 
All 
(1) 
All 
(2) 
All 
(3) 
Men 
(4) 
Women 
(5) 
Reduction A .477*** 
(.057) 
.330*** 
(.079) 
.343*** 
(.082) 
.637*** 
(.080) 
.330*** 
(.083) 
Male .018 
(.049) 
.068 
(.069) 
-.036 
(.054) 
-- -- 
Reduction A x Male -- -- .265** 
(.112) 
-- -- 
Activity sector      
Agriculture .018 
(.098) 
.020 
(.133) 
.012 
(.098) 
-.397*** 
(.153) 
.359*** 
(.133) 
Industrial .255*** 
(.056) 
.291*** 
(.082) 
.248*** 
(.056) 
.026 
(.072) 
.620*** 
(.088) 
Blue-collar -.330*** 
(.062) 
-.331*** 
(.094) 
-.324*** 
(.062) 
-.437*** 
(.079) 
-.154 
(.102) 
Active spouse -- -.886*** 
(.077) 
-- -- -- 
α  15.749 
(.251) 
15.615 
(.365) 
15.760 
(.251) 
15.475 
(.334) 
16.275 
(.383) 
Observations 5,273 2,670 5,273 2,865 2,408 
Log likelihood 1,000.678 629.093 1,003.460 556.010 494.336 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***/**/* means significance at 1%/5%/10% level, 
respectively. All models have Education and Region dummies. 
 
Figure 5.4 clearly shows that the hazard of retirement increases with age at an 
increasing rate and that it is higher for individuals that reduced hours of work. The same 
pattern is obviously reflected in the survival curve in Figure 5.5. Those that do not reduce 
working time on average stay longer in the labour market. 
 
Figure 5.4: Retirement hazard, by reduction status (Reduction A) 
 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” 
module data, 2006. 
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Figure 5.5: Survival curve, by reduction status (Reduction A) 
 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” 
module data, 2006. 
 
Looking at column (2) in Table 5.11, for those who are married or live with a partner, 
having a wife/husband that is still in the labor force reduces the retirement hazard. 
Effectively, the hazard of retirement for those who have an active spouse is just 41% of the 
hazard for those who have a spouse who is already out of the labor force. Dorn and Sousa-
Poza (2005) and Johnson et al. (2000) present similar findings. The former authors 
conclude that the odds of retiring early are 44% higher for those with a non-active partner. 
While the latter find that individuals were less likely to retire if their spouses were still 
working than if their spouses were already retired. 
The variable Male shows no statistical significance, which means that there is no 
difference in the retirement hazard between men and women. Those working in the 
industrial sector face a 34% higher hazard than those working in services. 
Column (3) introduces an interaction term between the Reduction variable and gender. 
Results show that those who reduce hours of work face a hazard 41% higher than those 
who do not reduce hours. Additionally, men who reduce hours of work increase the hazard 
of retirement by 30%. 
Dividing the sample by gender, separate estimates for men and women are presented in 
columns (4) and (5) of Table 5.11. Both for men and women, a reduction in hours of work 
before retirement is associated with a higher retirement hazard. A Chow test38 performed 
on these models rejects the null hypothesis of the equality of coefficients between men and 
women. Also, for a 95% confidence level, the difference between the gender coefficients 
on the Reduction A variable is statistically significant. For the Swiss case, Dorn and Sousa-
                                                 
38 Chi-squared statistic for 15 degrees of freedom is equal to 90.91 (p-value=0). 
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Poza (2005) find that men are more likely to retire earlier than women. There are statistical 
differences in the explanatory power of the covariates for men and women. For men, the 
retirement hazard of those who reduced hours of work compared to those who did not 
(1.89) is 60 percentage points higher than the hazard obtained for women (1.39). The 
interaction term estimate in Column (3), Table 5.11, highlights the above reported 
difference in the hazard for men and women, between those who reduced hours of work 
and those who did not. 
Comparing, columns (4) and (5) in Table 5.11, I find relevant gender differences 
concerning the impact of the variable Activity sector on the hazard. Effectively, men 
employed in agriculture experience a retirement hazard that is only 67% of the hazard for 
men that work in services. There are no differences in the hazard between men employed 
in services and those in the industrial sector. However, for women, the effect is quite the 
opposite: women in agriculture and in the industrial sectors face, respectively, a 43% and 
85% higher hazard than women employed in services. It seems that being employed in 
services is associated with retirement at earlier ages for men while, for women, working in 
services delays retirement. Because work in agriculture and in the industrial sectors is more 
physically demanding, women may want to exit the labor force earlier. The impact of the 
variable Blue-collar is also different between genders. Men in blue-collar occupations have a 
smaller retirement hazard compared to men in white-collar occupations (the hazard for 
blue-collars is only 65% of the retirement hazard for white-collar men). Since wages are 
particularly low in blue-collar occupations, these workers probably do not have the 
financial support needed to exit the labor force at early ages. As for women, there are no 
statistical differences between the hazards experienced by female employees in white or 
blue-collar occupations. 
Treating intentions as the best predictor of future actions, Table 5.12 reports the same 
effect of the Reduction variable on the retirement hazard as in the previous analysis. 
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Table 5.12: Weibull regression coefficients using Reduction B 
Variable 
All 
(1) 
All 
(2) 
Men 
(3) 
Women 
(4) 
Reduction B .124*** 
(.048) 
.145** 
(.070) 
.133** 
(.067) 
.162** 
(.070) 
Male .033 
(.041) 
.041 
(.045) 
-- -- 
Reduction B x Male -- -.041 
(.096) 
-- -- 
Activity sector     
Agriculture -.026 
(.084) 
-.026 
(.084) 
-.224* 
(.126) 
.101 
(.117) 
Industrial .098** 
(.048) 
.099** 
(.048) 
-.012 
(.061) 
.316*** 
(.078) 
Blue-collar -.277*** 
(.053) 
-.277*** 
(.053) 
-.402*** 
(.069) 
-.099 
(.083) 
α  15.290 
(.203) 
15.290 
(.234) 
15.170 
(.315) 
15.686 
(.355) 
Observations 2,738 2,738 1,484 1,254 
Log likelihood 3,128.664 3,128.754 1,690.526 1,462.922 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***/**/* means significance at 1%/5%/10% 
level, respectively. All models have Education and Region dummies. 
 
From Table 5.12, column (1), those who have reduced hours of work before leaving 
the labor market face a 13% higher hazard of retirement than those who did not. Again, it 
indicates that the reduction in working hours is associated with retirement at earlier ages. 
These results are reflected in Figures 5.6 and 5.7 for the estimated hazard and survival 
curves, respectively. 
When intentions are treated as effective actions (Reduction B, Table 5.12) the retirement 
hazard declines by 48 percentage points compared to the hazard in column (1) of Table 
5.11 (Reduction A), but it is still higher for those who reduced hours of work. Therefore, 
working hours’ flexibility will have no effect in expanding older workers’ labor force 
participation. Those who reduce hours of work leave activity earlier than those who do not. 
As Gielen (2009) suggests, other instruments, like the increase in the legal retirement age, 
seem to be more effective in delaying the exit from the labor market. 
Like in Table 5.11 columns (3) and (4), Table 5.12, show separate estimates by gender. 
Once again, a Chow test39 performed on these models rejects the null hypothesis of the 
equality of coefficients between men and women. However, in this sample, the gender 
difference for the Reduction B is not statistically different from zero (Chi-squared=.09 and 
p-value=.7634). This is in accordance with the statistical significance of the coefficient of 
the interaction term. 
                                                 
39 Chi-squared statistic for 15 degrees of freedom is equal to 53.96 (p-value=0). 
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As in Table 5.11, being employed in the industrial sector reduces the likelihood of 
remaining in activity: Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5.12 suggest that the hazard of 
retirement is 10% higher for those working in the industrial sector compared to those 
employed in services. However, the coefficients on this variable are smaller in Table 5.12; 
in fact, the hazard is reduced by 18-19 percentage points40 when considering Reduction B 
rather than Reduction A. Once again, this difference is mainly due to women. 
 
Figure 5.6: Retirement hazard, by reduction status (Reduction B) 
 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” 
module data, 2006. 
 
Figure 5.7: Survival curve, by reduction status (Reduction B) 
 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” 
module data, 2006. 
 
I have also used the Reduction C variable to study its effect on the retirement hazard. 
Empirical results of the use of this variable are presented in Appendix 5.C (Table 5.C9). 
                                                 
40 The difference results from comparing estimates for the “Industrial” category in Columns (1) and (2), 
Table 5.12, with columns (1) and (3) of Table 5.11. 
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Previous conclusions remain unchanged.41 Compared to the workers who did not reduce 
hours of work, those who reduced experience a 45% higher retirement hazard. The effect 
of the category “Intends to reduce” on the hazard is not statistically significant and it 
shows an extremely high standard deviation. This is due to the fact that for those who 
report the intention to reduce there are only uncensored observations. Therefore, for this 
category, there is no possible comparison between the likelihood functions for censored 
and uncensored observations. Hence, results on the Reduction C variable are not the most 
appropriate and must be read with care. 
The evidence discussed so far indicates that a reduction in hours of work before 
retirement seems to be associated with retirement at earlier ages. In fact, when asked 
(Question 4 of the survey) if working hours’ flexibility would work as an incentive to 
expand labor force participation, more than 90% of the elderly responded negatively.  
Portuguese older workers (55-64 years) present high activity and employment rates 
(54% and 51%, respectively), above the European Union (EU25) average and already 
above the 50% threshold for the employment rate to be achieved in EU countries by 2010 
(European Commission, 2008). Table 5.4 shows a strong link between older workers and 
the labor market: current and past working careers average above 35 years. 
Until August 2005, Portuguese workers were eligible to early retirement benefits as long 
as they comprise the following conditions: at least 55 years old and a working career of 30 
complete calendar years. Although eligible, more than half of the workers who remain in 
the labor force state the need of obtaining a sufficient household income as the main 
reason to keep working (see Table 5.C3 in Appendix 5.C). Conditional on being in the 
labor force, more than 2/3 of the workers who did not reduce hours of work report the 
above reason to remain in the labor force while it is the reason pointed by 50% of those 
that have reduced hours of work. Additionally, more than 30% of the employed individuals 
that have reduced hours of work say they continue to work to increase retirement benefits 
against 20% of the answers for those that have not reduced working hours. The percentage 
that keeps working for non financial reasons is higher (14%) for subjects with hours’ 
reduction than for those that have not reduced hours of work (9%). There seems to be 
different financial motivations between individuals that reduce hours of work and those 
who do not. 
When someone chooses to reduce hours of work he/she knows that their labor 
earnings will suffer a reduction. In a country with low average wages, like Portugal, that 
                                                 
41 I have also run each regression excluding the public sector. Results are not different from the ones 
reported. 
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decision embodies relevant financial implications. Therefore, either the individual has a 
financial safety net that allows him/her to supplement the drop in labor income with 
savings from previous periods or has other types of income (such as rents, interests, etc) 
allowing him/her to accommodate a wage reduction. If this is the case, the same individual 
will be willing to retire at early ages despite the pension reduction. 
Those who do not reduce hours of work may face stronger financial constraints. They 
may have to work full-time for as long as possible and, therefore, exit from the labor force 
later. 
 
5.7 Sensitivity analysis 
Parametric models for survival analysis may be implemented in the proportional hazard 
(PH) form or in the accelerated failure time (AFT) metric. In the PH form, the covariates 
have a multiplicative impact on the hazard function: 
( ) ( ) ( )xgthth 0=  
The function ( )th0  may assume a parametric form, such as Weibull, exponential or 
Gompertz. In the PH form, each regression coefficient indicates the proportional effect on 
the hazard of absolute changes in the respective covariate.  
An AFT model models ln t rather than t such as: 
ut += βx 'ln  
where t is the survival time to event, x  is a vector of regressors, β  is the vector of 
coefficients, and u  represents the error term with a probability density function given by 
(.)f . The distributional form of the error term u  determines the AFT model (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2005). If the function (.)f  has normal density, then the above model is called 
a lognormal regression model. Alternatively, if (.)f  is of logistic density, then a log-logistic 
regression model is in order. When (.)f  is an extreme-value density, an exponential or 
Weibull regression models are obtained. AFT models change the time scale by a factor of 
( )xβ−exp : if it is greater than 1, time is accelerated and if that factor is less than 1, time is 
decelerated. This means that if an individual at the baseline faces a probability of survival 
past time t equal to ( )tS , the survivor function, then an individual with covariates x  would 
experience probability of survival past time t equal to ( )tS  evaluated at the point 
( )txβ−exp . This implies a deceleration of time with the increase of a covariate. An AFT 
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regression coefficient relates proportionate changes in survival time to a unit change in a 
given covariate, ceteris paribus. 
Choosing between different distributional forms is straightforward when parametric 
models are nested. Likelihood-ratio or Wald tests can be used to choose between 
alternatives. This can be done to discriminate between Weibull versus exponential or 
between lognormal versus Weibull. 
However, when models are not nested, likelihood-ratio or Wald tests are not 
appropriate and an alternative statistic has to be used. The most common is the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC). Considering this, even though the model that best fits the data 
is the one with the largest log-likelihood, the preferred model is the one with smallest AIC 
value. Exponential and Weibull models are the only ones that can be implemented both in 
PH and AFT metrics. 
Tables 5.13 and 5.14 display the log-likelihood and the AIC statistics for PH and AFT 
models, respectively, both for the models where the covariate of interest is Reduction A and 
for the models with Reduction B. 
In Table 5.13, the Weibull model is the preferred specification in the PH form, 
regardless of the Reduction variable used, since it shows the highest log-likelihood and the 
smallest AIC value. 
 
Table 5.13: Proportional hazard models, selected statistics 
Reduction A model Reduction B model Selected statistics 
Exponential Weibull Gompertz Exponential Weibull Gompertz 
Log likelihood -3,661.597 1,000.678 964.849 -2,746.811 3,128.664 3,123.951 
AIC 7,357.193 -1,965.355 -1,893.697 5,527.621 -6,221.329 -6,211.902 
Observations 5,273 5,273 5,273 2,738 2,738 2,738 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Note: AIC, Akaike information criterion. 
 
Since the Weibull can be specified both in the PH and AFT forms I can compare it 
with other AFT distributional forms. Table 5.14 performs this comparison and it reveals 
that the preferred specification is sensitive to the Reduction variable considered. The Weibull 
model is once again preferred in a specification that includes the Reduction B variable but, 
when the covariate of interest is Reduction A the model that best fits the data is the 
lognormal. In the previous section, I chose to present the results for the Weibull model for 
both specifications, in the PH form. Nevertheless, I have also computed estimates using 
the lognormal and also the log-logistic but it produced no relevant differences compared to 
the Weibull estimates (Table 5.15). This is why I report the estimates on the PH Weibull 
model, measuring the effect of each covariate on the hazard and not on the survival time. 
CHAPTER 5. FLEXIBLE HOURS OF WORK AND RETIREMENT BEHAVIOR 105 
 
 
Table 5.14: Accelerated failure time metric, selected statistics 
Reduction A model Reduction B model Selected statistics 
Weibull Lognormal Log-logistic Weibull Lognormal Log-logistic 
Log likelihood 1,000.678 1,034.287 1,004.726 3,128.664 3,004.129 2,925.192 
AIC -1,965.355 -2,032.574 -1,973.452 -6,221.329 -5,972.267 -5,814.385 
Observations 5,273 5,273 5,273 2,738 2,738 2,738 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Note: AIC, Akaike information criterion. 
 
Table 5.15: Comparison between parametric specifications: selected estimates 
 Weibull 
(1) 
 Lognormal 
 (2) 
Log-logistic 
(3) 
Weibull 
 (4) 
Lognormal  
(5) 
Log-logistic 
(6) 
Reduction A -.030 
(.004) 
-.037 
(.004) 
-.038 
(.004) 
-- -- -- 
Reduction B -- -- -- -.008 
(.003) 
-.009 
(.004) 
-.010 
(.004) 
Log-likelihood 1,000.678 1,034.287 1,004.726 3,128.664 3,004.129 2,925.192 
AIC -1,965.355 -2,032.574 -1,973.452 -6,221.329 -5,972.257 -5,814.385 
Observations 5,273 5,273 5,273 2,738 2,738 2,738 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Note: AIC, Akaike information criterion. Selected variables are statistically significant. 
 
Whatever the specification adopted, a reduction in hours of work before retirement 
increases the retirement hazard (PH form) or shortens the survival time in the labor force 
(around 3% to 3.8% for the Reduction A variable and about 0.8% to 1% for the Reduction B 
variable, in the AFT form). 
As Cameron and Trivedi (2005) point out, estimation of parametric models for single-
spell transition data is straightforward in the presence of censored observations but it 
produces inconsistent estimates if the parametric model is not correctly specified. 
Therefore, as an empirical alternative, I have also used the semiparametric Cox model to 
check the robustness of the results presented in the previous section. They remain 
unaltered. 
A Piecewise-Constant Exponential model was another semiparametric strategy 
adopted. This specification does not completely characterize the shape of the hazard 
function; it is left to be fitted from the data and not specified a priori. The model was used 
to incorporate the existing ties on the age of retirement at ages 55, 60 and 65. Again, results 
remained unchanged. These and the Cox model results for selected variables are presented 
in Table 5.C10 in Appendix 5.C. 
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5.8 Summary and discussion 
Reducing hours of work before permanently leaving the labor force is believed to be a 
potentially useful measure to improve the attractiveness of work for older workers. This 
research, however, shows that the reduction leads to retirement at earlier ages. Workers 
that choose to reduce their working schedule appear to be preparing their exit from the 
labor force rather than delaying it. 
A reduction of hours of work is not very usual in the Portuguese labor market and this 
is, perhaps, the result of deficient opportunities provided by employers when it comes to 
flexibility in hours of work. If that is true, those older workers that actually reduce hours of 
work may be employed in firms that can offer phased retirement opportunities. 
On the other hand, reducing hours of work implies a decline in labor earnings. In 
Portugal there are no partial retirement mechanisms, that is the possibility of accumulating 
part-time wage with part-time retirement. However, until 2007, older people could 
accumulate retirement benefits, at a small pension penalty, with labor earnings from the 
same employer. With these data I cannot tell if those that have reduced hours of work have 
more income sources. In effect, the lack of variables associated with financial incentives is a 
major drawback in the analysis. Also, the static, cross-sectional nature of the data does not 
allow me to explore some dynamic features of relevance in the study of the retirement 
behavior. These include the evolution of working hours in the latest years in the labor force 
as well as the correspondent change in wages, supplemented by information on Social 
Security incentives. 
The use of panel data with information on income and wealth variables, on Social 
Security benefits, on hours of work and also on the moment that the reduction took place 
would allow me to get more solid conclusions on the relevance of hours’ flexibility among 
active aging policies. Disentangle what is behind this positive association between 
reduction and the retirement hazard for the Portuguese labor market remains a topic for 
future research. 
Since financial incentives are significant determinants of retirement behavior, as a 
broad analysis for future research, and if I am to be granted access to anonymous Social 
Security data (that I have already asked for), I intend to combine these data with matched 
longitudinal employer-employee data. Doing so, it would be possible to know how much 
the reduction in the working hours was, as well as to know if there are wage losses 
associated and what is their magnitude. Also, with Social Security data I can have 
information on the individuals’ payments records and on their incentives to retirement. 
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Knowing how much a worker would receive of pension in each moment of time would be 
an informative variable in the study of retirement decisions. 
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Appendices to Chapter 5  
Appendix 5.A Overview of relevant legislation changes on retirement pension’s access 
Flexibilization of the retirement age 
Legal diploma 
Old-age pension’ s access 
conditions Before LRA(b) After LRA 
Combining old-age 
pension income 
with work income 
Relevant changes 
Date of 
effectiveness 
Decreto no. 45266, 23rd of 
September 1963 
• Age: 65 years old (no distinction is 
made for men or women); 
• Eligibility period(a): 10 years 
Only in situations of disability There is no additional 
benefit in old-age 
pension income 
Not allowed between the 
ages of 65 to 70 years: 
implies the suspension of 
old-age pension. 
--------------------------- 
September 1963 
Decreto-Lei no. 329/93, 25th 
of September 1993 
• Age(c):  
Men: 65 years old 
Women: 62 years old + 6 months 
annual increase until reaching 65 years 
old (1999) 
 
• Eligibility period: 15 years. 
Never before 60 years of age. 
Situations covered: 
• Long-term unemployment; 
• According to the nature of 
the activity performed; 
 
There is no penalization in old-
age pension income 
There is no additional 
benefit in old-age 
pension income 
Accumulation is possible, 
and there exists an 
annual actualization of 
the pension. 
• Gradual standardization of the 
LRA for men and women; 
• Increase of the eligibility period 
from 10 to 15 years; 
• Changes the pension’s method of 
computation. 
1st of January 
1994 
(to applications 
presented after 
the date of 
effectiveness) 
 
Decreto-Lei no. 9/99, 8th of 
January 1999 
• Age: 65 years old both for men 
and women 
 
• Eligibility period: 15 years. 
Conditions: 
• Eligibility period; 
• At least 55 years old; 
• A working career of 30 
complete calendar years.  
 
Penalizes pensions through a 
reduction factor (rate of 
reduction: 4.5% year for the 
number of years of 
anticipation) 
After the age of 65 and 
with 40 years of 
contributions: there is 
an additional benefit in 
the pension of 
10%/year, until the 
worker reaches the age 
of 70. 
Accumulation is possible, 
and there exists an 
annual actualization of 
the pension. 
• Flexibility of the age of access to 
retirement according to 
contributions’ profiles; 
• Penalizes early retirement 
pensions; 
• Creates an additional pension’s 
benefit when retirement occurs 
after the age of 65 with a working 
career above 40 years. 
1st of April 1999 
Decreto-Lei no. 125/2005, 3rd 
of August 2005 
• Age: 65 years old both for men 
and women 
 
• Eligibility period: 15 years. --------------------------- 
After the age of 65 and 
with 40 years of 
contributions: there is 
an additional benefit in 
the pension of 
10%/year, until the 
worker reaches the age 
of 70. 
Accumulation is possible, 
and there exists an 
annual actualization of 
the pension. 
• Suspends the legal norms which 
allowed access to old-age pension 
before the worker reached the 
LRA. 
4th of August 
2005 
Decreto-Lei no. 187/2007, 10th 
of May 2007 
• Age: 65 years old both for men 
and women 
 
• Eligibility period: 15 years. 
Conditions: 
• Eligibility period; 
• At least 55 years old; 
• A working career of 30 
complete calendar years.  
 
Penalization: rate of reduction: 
0,5% month for the number of 
months of anticipation) 
The additional benefit is 
variable depending on 
the number of years 
with payment records 
It is forbidden to 
accumulate early 
retirement pension 
income with work 
income in the same firm 
for a 3 year period since 
the date of access to 
early retirement pension. 
• Changes the pension’s method of 
computation; 
• Penalizes early retirement pensions; 
• Prohibits the accumulation of early 
retirement pension income with 
work income in the same firm or 
group. 
1st of June 2007 
(published for 
public discussion 
in November 
2006) 
 
Source: Authors’ synopsis based on Portuguese legislation published at Diário da República (dre.pt). Notes: (a) Eligibility period: years of work need to become eligible for retirement benefits; (b) Legal retirement age. (c) A 1977 
government’s decree (Decreto Regulamentar no. 26/77, 4th of May) had introduced a positive discrimination in the legal retirement age for women, reducing it to 62 years. 
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Appendix 5.B Questionnaire of the module “Transition to 
Retirement” 
 




→
→≤≤
Endotherwise
2Filter69age50if
1Filter  




→
→
Endotherwise
1 Questionage of  yearsmoreor  50 with joblast  theleft  has (who dnonemployeor  employed l is individuathe if
2Filter
 
Question 1. For how many years have you been working or how many years did you work? 
 
 
Question 2. Did you or do you intend to reduce your working hours before leaving the labor 
force? 
(a)Yes, I reduced working hours 
(b)No, but I intend to do it in the next 5 years 
(c)No, and I have no intention to reduce it in the next 5 years/ I did not reduce 
(d)No, and I do not have plans for the next 5 years or do not consider the possibility 
(e)Refuse to answer 
(d)Do not know 
 
 
Question 3a. Can you state the exact age at which you intend to leave the labor force? 
(a)Yes 
(b)No → Question 3c 
(c)Already left the labor force → Question 4 
 
 
Question 3b. At what age do you intend to leave the labor force? 
 
 
Question 3c. Despite the fact that you cannot tell the exact age at which you intend to leave the 
labor force, do you have an idea of when it will occur? 
(a)I do not know the exact age, but it will be before 60 
(b)I do not know the exact age, but it will be between 60 and 64 years of age 
(c)I do not know the exact age, but it will be at 65 or later 
(d)Do not know 
(e)Refuse to answer 
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Question 4. Would the possibility of a more flexible working schedule contribute (or would it have 
contributed) to make you work longer? 
(a)Yes 
(b)No 
(c)Refuse to answer 
(d)Do not know 
 
Question 5. Would more opportunities to develop your knowledge or your professional skills 
contribute (or would it have contributed) to make you work longer? 
(a)Yes 
(b)No 
(c)Refuse to answer 
(d)Do not know 
 
Question 6. Would better hygiene, health and/or security at the workplace contribute (or would it 
have contributed) to make you work longer? 
(a)Yes 
(b)No 
(c)Refuse to answer 
(d)Do not know 
 





→
→
7c Questionotherwise
7a Questionpensionanyreceivingisindividualtheif
3Filter
 
 
Question7a. Was your pension a retirement pension? 
(a)Yes 
(b)No → Question 7c 
 
Question 7b. At what age did you start collecting a retirement pension? → Filter 4 
 
Question 7c. Are you entitled to collect a retirement pension? 
(a)Yes, although I am not receiving it yet 
(b)No or not yet 
(c)Refuse to answer 
(d)Do not know 
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



→
→
5Filterotherwise
8 Questionage of years moreor 50withjoblastthelefthaswhodnonemployeisindividualtheif
4Filter
 
Question 8. Did you receive any disability pension, illness benefit, benefits due to other early 
retirement schemes or income supplements? 
(a)Yes, disability pension or illness benefit 
(b)Yes, benefits due to other early retirement schemes 
(c)Yes, income supplements 
(d)Yes, a combination of the previous options 
(e)No 
(f)Refuse to answer 
(g)Do not know 
 
Question 9. After leaving your last job or business, what was your occupational status? 
(a)Unemployed → End 
(b)Retired (old-age or early retirement) 
(c)Illness or disability → End 
(d)Other status → End 
(e)Refuse to answer → End 
(f)Do not know → End 
 
Question 10. Why did you retire? (the reason) 
(a)Lost job → End 
(b)Mandatory retirement age → End 
(c)Illness or disability → End 
(d)Childcare or other dependents’ care → End 
(e)Problems at work → End 
(f)Favorable financial conditions → End 
(g)Left work for other reasons than those previously mentioned → End 
(h)Other reason → End 
(i)Refuse to answer→ End 
(j)Do not know→ End 
 





→
→
Endotherwise
11  Questionittoentitledishe/sheit,receivingnotalthougthor
pension,retirementareceiving employed,isindividualtheif
5Filter  
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Question 11. Why are you still working? 
(a)To raise retirement pension’s benefits 
(b)To have sufficient household income 
(c)It is not related to financial motives 
(d)Refuse to answer 
(e)Do not know 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.C Tables 
 
Table 5.C1: Descriptive statistics, by reduction status and gender 
Variable Reduced Intents to reduce(b) Did not/Will not reduce 
 All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women 
Age(a)  62.50 
(4.94) 
62.84 
(4.54) 
62.22 
(5.25) 
57.27 
(5.12) 
58.14 
(5.40) 
56.31 
(4.62) 
58.29 
(5.90) 
58.29 
(5.85) 
58.30 
(5.96) 
Retired 79.19 88.84 70.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 35.52 35.69 35.10 
Activity sector          
Agriculture 6.94 4.96 8.70 4.53 5.77 3.17 5.55 5.13 6.02 
Industrial 31.79 41.74 23.19 27.71 37.98 16.40 28.07 37.06 16.93 
Services 61.27 53.31 68.12 67.76 56.25 80.42 66.38 57.81 77.05 
Blue-collar 58.38 54.55 61.96 55.67 67.79 42.33 53.85 58.96 47.50 
Education          
0 years 19.85 11.16 27.54 9.57 10.10 8.99 11.16 8.24 14.72 
4 years 49.33 54.13 44.93 52.64 59.13 45.50 51.67 56.36 45.96 
6 years 5.78 7.02 4.71 5.54 4.81 6,35 6.99 7.41 6.48 
9 years 10.02 14.05 6.52 10.08 8.17 12.17 11.30 11.59 10.86 
High school 2.89 2.89 2.90 6.05 6.73 5.29 7.49 7.08 7.98 
University 12.14 10.74 13.41 16.12 11.06 21.69 11.39 9.32 14.00 
Region          
 North 30.44 33.88 27.17 31.99 33.65 30.16 22.57 24.02 20.79 
Centre 14.84 16.94 13.04 12.59 12.98 12.17 12.67 12.80 12.56 
Lisbon 26.78 28.51 25.36 20.15 15.38 25.40 22.27 21.20 23.62 
Alentejo 12.33 9.09 15.22 10.83 9.62 12.17 16.82 15.11 18.89 
Algarve 6.94 5.37 8.33 10.08 12.02 7.94 10.20 9.77 10.65 
Azores 3.08 4.13 2.17 8.31 9.13 7.41 7.29 8.86 5.35 
Madeira 5.59 2.07 8.70 6.05 7.21 4.76 8.18 8.24 8.13 
Active spouse(c) 36.96 46.81 32.04 78.40 73.61 80.85 64.22 69.57 60.94 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Notes: (a) Age is the only continuous variable in the table; standard deviations are presented in parenthesis. All other variables are dummies 
and values reported are percentages. (b) Statistics refer to employed individuals. (c) There are 2,670 observations for the variable Active 
spouse.  
All: 5,273 observations; Men: 2,865 observations; Women: 2,408 observations. 
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Table 5.C2: Descriptive statistics, by reduction status and gender (retired individuals) 
Variable Reduced Did not reduce 
 All Men Women All Men Women 
Age(a)  63.50 
(4.25) 
63.28 
(4.22) 
63.75 
(4.28) 
63.69 
(4.32) 
63.55 
(4.41) 
63.85 
(4.21) 
Retirement age(a) 58.85 
(4.62) 
58.70 
(4.46) 
59.01 
(4.80) 
58.82 
(4.74) 
58.66 
(4.75) 
59.22 
(4.73) 
Number of years of work(a) 39.04 
(8.04) 
40.76 
(7.06) 
37.12 
(8.64) 
39.74 
(7.92) 
40.82 
(7.27) 
38.39 
(8.46) 
Activity sector       
Agriculture 7.56 5.12 10.26 7.32 4.87 10.41 
Industrial 34.63 42.33 26.15 31.09 38.17 22.14 
Services 57.80 52.56 63.59 61.59 56.96 67.45 
Blue-collar 54.88 55.35 54.36 53.63 55.10 51.76 
Education       
0 years 20.00 11.63 29.23 19.69 13.23 27.86 
4 years 46.83 54.42 38.46 46.89 55.45 36.07 
6 years 5.61 6.51 4.62 5.76 6.61 4.69 
9 years 11.46 14.88 7.69 11.14 11.95 10.12 
High school 3.41 3.26 3.59 7.25 7.77 6.60 
University 12.68 9.30 16.41 9.26 4.99 14.66 
Region       
 North 29.51 33.02 25.64 20.92 22.85 18.48 
Centre 14.63 16.28 12.82 9.26 8.70 9.97 
Lisbon 26.34 28.84 23.59 25.58 25.52 25.66 
Alentejo 13.17 8.84 17.95 19.11 16.59 22.29 
Algarve 7.32 6.05 8.72 10.43 11.02 9.68 
Azores 3.66 4.65 2.56 8.48 9.86 6.74 
Madeira 5.37 2.33 8.72 6.22 5.45 7.18 
Reason for retirement (b)       
Lost job 1.49 2.80 0.00 2.43 2.21 2.73 
Mandatory retirement 47.58 41.96 53.97 49.32 46.37 53.25 
Poor health 18.59 16.08 21.43 16.11 14.51 18.24 
Childcare or other 
dependents 
1.12 0.00 2.38 0.72 0.32 1.26 
Problems at work 2.97 4.90 0.79 2.07 2.52 1.47 
Favorable financial 
conditions 
11.52 14.69 7.94 10.80 13.88 6.71 
Other reasons 16.73 19.58 13.49 18.54 20.19 16.35 
Active spouse (c) 25.35 44.19 12.60 22.93 38.44 11.50 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Notes: (a) Continuous variables: standard deviations are presented in parenthesis. All other variables are dummies and values reported are 
percentages. (b) There are 1,380 observations for this variable. (c) There are 998 observations for the variable Active spouse.  
All: 1,954 observations; Men: 1,077 observations; Women: 877 observations. 
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Table 5.C3: Descriptive statistics, by reduction status and gender (employed individuals) 
Variable Reduced Did not reduce 
 All Men Women All Men Women 
Age (a)  58.74 
(5.53) 
59.30 
(5.41) 
58.56 
(5.59) 
55.57 
(4.49) 
55.70 
(4.52) 
55.42 
(4.45) 
Number of years of work (a) 38.16 
(9.77) 
41.11 
(8.32) 
37.16 
(10.07) 
36.94 
(7.68) 
38.35 
(7.01) 
35.23 
(8.11) 
Activity sector       
Agriculture 4.63 3.70 4.94 4.55 5.34 3.59 
Industrial 21.30 37.04 16.05 26.60 36.63 14.41 
Services 74.07 59.26 79.01 68.86 58.04 82.00 
Blue-collar 72.22 48.15 80.25 54.19 61.90 44.83 
Education       
0 years 19.44 7.41 23.46 6.82 6.02 7.79 
4 years 58.33 51.85 60.49 54.16 57.13 50.55 
6 years 6.48 11.11 4.94 7.41 7.50 7.31 
9 years 4.63 7.41 3.70 11.18 11.02 11.38 
High school 0.93 0.00 1.23 7.41 6.70 8.28 
University 10.19 22.22 6.17 13.02 11.64 14.69 
Region       
 North 33.33 40.74 30.86 24.54 25.72 23.10 
Centre 15.74 22.22 13.58 14.33 14.82 13.72 
Lisbon 28.70 25.93 29.63 20.43 18.40 22.90 
Alentejo 9.26 9.26 8.64 14.95 13.74 16.41 
Algarve 5.56 0.00 7.41 10.03 9.43 10.76 
Azores 0.93 0.00 1.23 6.85 8.40 4.97 
Madeira 6.48 0.00 8.64 8.88 9.48 8.14 
Reason for work (b)       
Increase pension benefits 32.76 17.65 39.02 22.69 21.19 24.49 
Obtain sufficient 
household income 
53.45 76.47 4.90 67.85 68.96 66.52 
No financial reasons 13.79 5.88 17.07 9.46 9.85 8.99 
Active spouse (c) 77.42 75.00 77.78 86.27 88.04 85.29 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Notes: (a) Continuous variables: standard deviations are presented in parenthesis. All other variables are dummies and values reported are 
percentages. (b) There are 1,041 observations for this variable. (c) There are 1,672 observations for the variable Active spouse.  
All: 3,319 observations; Men: 1,788 observations; Women: 1,531 observations. 
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Table 5.C4: Definition of the sectors of activity 
Activity sector Industry reported in the survey 
Distribution 
(Retirees’ subsample) 
% 
Distribution 
(All) 
% 
Agriculture 1. Agriculture, animal breeding, 
hunting and forestry 
5.65 5.59 
Industrial 2. Manufacturing industry 
3. Production and supply of electricity, 
gas and water 
4. Construction 
20.00 
2.25 
 
5.43 
19.19 
1.46 
 
7.78 
Services 5. Commercial services; automobile 
vehicles, motorcycles and personal 
use and domestic items’ repair 
6. Accommodation and restaurants 
7. Transports, storage and 
communications 
8. Financial activities 
9. Real estate activities, rentals and 
services to firms 
10. Public administration, national 
defence and mandatory social 
security 
11. Education 
12. Health and social services 
13. Other collective, social and personal 
services activities 
14. Families with domestic employees 
and family production for personal 
use 
15. International organisms and other 
extraterritorial institutions 
5.14 
 
 
2.61 
9.57 
 
7.39 
1.38 
 
16.74 
 
 
10.29 
6.09 
2.17 
 
4.86 
 
 
.43 
7.98 
 
 
4.10 
6.71 
 
3.43 
2.54 
 
13.43 
 
 
9.43 
9.27 
2.71 
 
6.11 
 
 
.27 
Source: Labor Force Survey’s module “Transition to Retirement”, 2006.  
 
 
Table 5.C5: Definition of blue-collar and white-collar workers 
Worker 
defined as: 
Occupation reported in the survey 
Distribution 
(Retirees’ subsample) 
% 
Distribution 
(All) 
% 
White-collar 1. High-level managers 
2. Specialists from intellectual and 
scientific occupations 
3. Technicians and medium-level 
professionals 
4. Administrative personnel and 
similar 
5. Services and sales personnel 
1.88 
8.12 
 
17.54 
 
14.49 
 
10.94 
2.41 
8.36 
 
11.57 
 
10.89 
 
12.33 
Blue-collar 6. Farmers and skilled workers from 
agriculture 
7. Blue-collar workers, craftsmen and 
similar workers 
8. Equipment and machine operators 
and assembly line workers 
9. Unskilled workers 
1.30 
 
17.61 
 
9.78 
 
18.33 
2.67 
 
19.00 
 
10.68 
 
22.09 
Source: Labor Force Survey’s module “Transition to Retirement”, 2006.  
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Table 5.C6: Population in employment, by occupation (second quarter, 2006 estimates) 
Worker 
defined as: 
Occupation reported in the survey Total % 
  5,180,800 100 
White-collar 1. High-level managers 
2. Specialists from intellectual and scientific occupations 
3. Technicians and medium-level professionals 
4. Administrative personnel and similar 
5. Services and sales personnel 
409,000 
447,100 
459,800 
490,000 
741,900 
7.89 
8.63 
8.88 
9.46 
14.32 
Blue-collar 6. Farmers and skilled workers from agriculture 
7. Blue-collar workers, craftsmen and similar workers 
8. Equipment and machine operators and assembly line 
workers 
9. Unskilled workers 
567,900 
1,021,200 
413,300 
 
600,600 
10.96 
19.71 
7.98 
 
11.59 
Source: INE. Labor Statistics, 2007. 
Note: There are 30,200 individuals (0.58%) employed in the Armed Forces that are not reported in the table. 
 
 
Table 5.C7: Distribution of active population (%), by educational level, age group and gender 
Age group 
Total 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-64 >64 Educational 
level All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women 
0 years 5 5 6 0 1 -- 1 2 1 2 3 1 6 4 8 41 30 57 
4 years 28 31 26 5 6 3 8 10 7 25 28 22 50 52 49 49 57 39 
6 years 19 21 18 23 27 18 25 28 23 27 28 25 11 12 11 3 4 2 
9 years 18 19 17 43 45 41 22 25 18 16 16 16 12 13 12 2 3 1 
High school 15 14 16 23 19 28 22 21 24 16 15 17 9 9 9 1 2 -- 
University 13 10 17 6 2 10 21 15 27 15 11 19 11 12 12 3 4 2 
Source: INE. Labor Force Survey, 2nd quarter 2006. Obtained from www.ine.pt 
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Table 5.C8: Transitions between economic states for older workers (55-64), 2005-2006 
Economic status in 2006 
Employed Unemployed Inactive 
Economic status in 2005 PT EU27 (a) PT EU27 (a) PT EU27 (a) 
Employed 94.1 90.2 1.4 1.5 4.5 8.3 
Unemployed 12.8 12.8 64.5 37.7 22.7 49.4 
Inactive 0.4 3.0 0.1 0.7 99.4 96.3 
Source: European Commission (2007). 
Note: (a) EU27 covers the EU Member States excluding Belgium, Ireland, The Netherlands, and Sweden, for which data is 
not available in 2006 on status one year earlier. 
 
Table 5.C9: Weibull regression coefficients 
using Reduction C 
Variable (1)  (2) 
Reduction C   
Reduced .372*** 
(.057) 
.244*** 
(.079) 
Intends to reduce -17.215 
(416.563) 
-17.321 
(653.338) 
Male .045 
(.049) 
.087 
(.069) 
Activity sector   
Agriculture -.042 
(.098) 
-.002 
(.134) 
Industrial .221*** 
(.056) 
.274*** 
(.081) 
Blue-collar -.275*** 
(.062) 
-.299*** 
(.094) 
Active spouse -- -.817*** 
(.077) 
Observations 5,273 2,670 
Log likelihood 1,163.118 702.331 
Source: Computations from the author based on the 
“Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
***/**/* means significance at 1%/5%/10% level, 
respectively. All models have Education and Region dummies. 
 
Table 5.C10: Alternative models, selected estimates 
Variable 
Cox(a) 
(1) 
Cox 
(2) 
Cox 
(3) 
Piecewise-
constant 
Exponential(a) 
(4) 
Piecewise-
constant 
Exponential 
(5) 
Piecewise-
constant 
Exponential 
(6) 
Reduction .040 
(.057) 
-- -- .023 
(.057) 
-- -- 
Reduction A -- .494*** 
(.057) 
-- -- .539*** 
(.057) 
-- 
Reduction B -- -- .132*** 
(.048) 
-- -- .098** 
(.048) 
Male -.009 
(.049) 
.023 
(.049) 
.033 
(.040) 
-.005 
(.049) 
.044 
(.048) 
.028 
(.040) 
Observations 1,954 5,273 2,738 4,124 9,522 6,325 
Log likelihood -12,758.771 -14,340.832 -19,623.166 901.566 -674.489 1,173.275 
Source: Computations from the author based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Note: (a) Estimates refer to models with uncensored (retirees only) observations. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***/** means 
significance at 1%/5% level, respectively. The increase in the number of observations in the Piecewise-constant exponential models is due to 
episode splitting at 55, 60 and 65 years of age. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
Since people live longer with better health care, while births are declining, shifts in the 
size of younger cohorts are smaller than the growth in the size of older cohorts. Active 
aging, as a set of guidelines and policy actions that intend to increase the labor force 
participation of older cohorts, emerges from the need to reduce the social and economic 
impacts of demographic trends on Social Security systems and on labor markets. Labor 
supply shortages are another concern guiding active aging policies. With the prospect of 
shortfalls in Social Security’s funding and the potential for a real labor shortage when the 
economies expand, countries cannot afford to lose older workers in the years ahead. 
For active aging policies to become effective, older workers have to find attractive 
remaining in the labor force. They have to be granted hiring and promotion opportunities 
as well as flexible work arrangements. 
This thesis studies older workers labor market opportunities and the determinants of 
their exit from the labor force. Results echo that there is still much to be done in order to 
promote labor market attractiveness for older individuals. 
In Chapter 3, the use of a fractional logit model applied to longitudinal data, a 
methodological novelty in the study of older workers’ hiring opportunities, shows that 
Portuguese firms prefer long term commitments with their employees. Hence, firms which 
usually engage in long term employment relationships will hire younger workers. If all other 
covariates remain unchanged, a 10 percentage points increase in the share of the firm’s 
workforce with more than 5 years of tenure reduces the share of older workers’ hiring by 
0.4 percentage points. 
Given that firms have a preference towards hiring younger individuals, unemployed 
older workers will find it very difficult to get back into employment. Moreover, this barrier 
may work as an incentive to exit from the labor market due to the perception that there are 
no jobs available. Therefore, creating labor market opportunities for older workers that 
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allows them access, in terms of hiring, to comparable jobs as other age groups of workers 
should be a political concern. This is a matter of particular interest in order to achieve the 
goals set under active aging policies. 
There are other issues concerning labor market opportunities of older individuals that 
must be explored. The study of the promotion prospects for elderly workers provides 
additional insights on the lack of labor market opportunities open to them. Chapter 4 
findings show that age harms workers’ promotion prospects since time to promotion 
increases with age. Compared to 25-34 age group, survival times to first promotion are 
lengthened by 5%, 9% and 18%, correspondingly, for the age groups 35-44, 45-54 and 55-
75. Thus, younger employees are promoted at a faster pace than less younger workers. 
Considering all promotions, and not just the first one, survival times’ differences are 
smaller but still reproduce the same disadvantage. In effect, workers aged 35-44, 45-54 and 
55-75 at hire experience, respectively, 1.7%, 3.8% and 10.8% higher times to promotion 
than workers aged 25-34 at hire. Chapter 4 additionally shows that women, better educated 
workers and individuals entering the firm at lower hierarchical levels face shorter times to 
promotion. 
The preference in promotion opportunities for younger employees may influence older 
workers’ motivation as well as their employment status. There is evidence suggesting that 
age discrimination practices at the firm level are consistent with early retirement behavior. 
Once again, these results seem to demonstrate that active aging policies should be more 
focused on endorsing labor market opportunities for older workers. If the aim is to 
postpone their exit from the labor force, in order to raise the employment rate of older 
individuals, then attention must be given to the improvement of older individuals’ chances 
in all employment related dimensions. 
Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the influence of flexibility in hours of work on the 
retirement decision. Results from duration models suggest that, for a sample of retirees, 
there is no statistical difference in the retirement hazard between individuals that have 
reduced hours of work and those who have not. Nevertheless, considering a sample of 
both retirees and non-retirees, estimates show that reducing hours of work increases the 
hazard rate by 61% compared to that of subjects who did not reduce hours of work. This 
means that, at least for the Portuguese labor market, flexible working schedules are not 
positively associated with the decision to delay retirement, quite the opposite. 
Left for future research is the study of how uneven promotion opportunities influence 
the labor market outcomes of older workers, with particular interest on the exit decision. 
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This can be tested within a competing risks framework in which retirement is one of the 
alternative paths. Knowing the factors that influence the decision to leaving the labor force 
is crucial for the development of policy measures that aim at postponing the exit from the 
labor market.  
Also, the consideration of financial incentives on the retirement decision will deserve 
further attention. The use of panel data with information on income and wealth variables, 
on Social Security benefits, and on employment characteristics should provide new insights 
on the determinants of the complete withdrawal from the labor force. Knowing how much 
a worker would receive of pension in each moment of time would be valuable in the study 
of retirement decisions. 
 
